Ragib Hasan Johns Hopkins University en.600.412 Spring 2010 Lecture 7 03/29/2010 Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing.

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Presentation transcript:

Ragib Hasan Johns Hopkins University en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 03/29/2010 Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing

Provenance Provenance: from Latin provenire ‘come from’, defined as – “(i) the fact of coming from some particular source or quarter; origin, derivation. – (ii) the history or pedigree of a work of art, manuscript, rare book, etc.; a record of the ultimate derivation and passage of an item through its various owners” (Oxford English Dictionary) In other words, Who owned it, what was done to it, how was it transferred … Widely used in arts, archives, and archeology, called the Fundamental Principle of Archival 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan2 L'artiste et son modèle (1928), at Museum of Modern Art

Data Provenance 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan3 Definition* – Description of the origins of data and the process by which it arrived at the database. [Buneman et al.] – Information describing materials and transformations applied to derive the data. [Lanter] – Metadata recording the process of experiment workflows, annotations, and notes about experiments. [Greenwood] – Information that helps determine the derivation history of a data product, starting from its original sources. [Simmhan et al.] *Simmhan et al. A Survey of Provenance in E-Science. SIGMOD Record, 2005.

Forensics and Provenance in Clouds Cloud provenance can be – Data provenance: Who created, modified, deleted data stored in a cloud (external entities change data) – Process provenance: What happened to data once it was inside the cloud (internal entities change data) Cloud provenance should give a record of who accessed the data at different times Auditors should be able to trace an entry (and associated modification) back to the creator 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan4

Privacy questions Should the cloud provider know the identity of cloud users? Should cloud users know the identity of other users in the same group? 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan5

The “Bread and Butter” paper Problem – To preserve user privacy and allow anonymous authentication/access in a cloud – To determine authorship of data, i.e., to bind data versions to user identities in a cloud 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan6 Lu et al., Secure Provenance: The Essential Bread and Butter of Data Forensics in Cloud Computing, AsiaCCS 2010

Threat Model Who are the key players? – Users – SM – SP Who trusts who? – Users: trust the SM, but not the SP – SP: Trust SM – SM: ? What attacks can happen? 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan7

System Model SM: Manages the whole system(?), registers cloud users and providers, issues keys SP: Cloud service provider, manages access to cloud resources Users: A user is part of a group of authorized principals who can access group resources 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan8

Secure provenance (according to the paper) By secure provenance, the authors imply – Users can anonymously authenticate themselves as part of authorized users/groups to the cloud provider – Users can anonymously access and modify resources – Encrypted data stored by a user can be decrypted by other users from the same group – If necessary, the SM can trace a data item to the user who created it 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan9

Setup Inputs: Security parameter k Output: Master key, public parameters 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan10 SM K Master Key Param (Public Parameters)

User/provider registration Inputs: Master key, public parameters, user identity Outputs: Private key, entry in tracking list 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan11 Master Key Param (Public Parameters) User identity U i Private key sk i Tracking list

User-cloud interaction (1) User anonymously authenticate herself to the cloud Cloud provider can check that the signature was made with a key issued by the SM 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan12 χ σ A = sign ski (Yi||χ) σ P / ask i

User-cloud interaction (2) Provider stores Signatures and authentication information during each access 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan13 EncryptedData: C = encrypt(M) Sig = sign aski (C) Store C and σ A

Identifying authorship 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan14 σAσA User identity

Confidentiality preservation Each user gets a different authorized group user access key Any group user access key can be used to decrypt a ciphertext created by other users in the same group 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan15

Discussion Suppose Amazon S3 implements such a model. What will be the advantages, and what will be the disadvantages? 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan16

What about other provenance in computation clouds? If the data is being manipulated by processes running in the cloud, how will the problem change? 3/29/2010en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan17

3/29/201018en Spring 2010 Lecture 7 | JHU | Ragib Hasan Further Reading Ragib Hasan, Radu Sion, and Marianne Winslett, Protecting History Forgery with Secure Provenance, ACM Transactions on Storage, December 2009Protecting History Forgery with Secure Provenance