“Reconceptualizing the Cyprus Problem: Looking beyond deadlock into a cooperative future” Ted Grant

Cyprus:  Turkey invaded the island in 1974  Resulted in North-South divide between Turkish and Greek populations  Development of two states in the 1980s:  Republic of Cyprus (Greek) - South  Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (Turkish) - North  Turkey invaded the island in 1974  Resulted in North-South divide between Turkish and Greek populations  Development of two states in the 1980s:  Republic of Cyprus (Greek) - South  Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (Turkish) - North

Cyprus:  Through the 1990s, each state viewed the other as a long-term threat to its national security  In 1997 the EU opened accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus  On April 16, 2003, the Republic signed the EU Treaty of Accession  Through the 1990s, each state viewed the other as a long-term threat to its national security  In 1997 the EU opened accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus  On April 16, 2003, the Republic signed the EU Treaty of Accession

Cyprus:  Between 2002 and April, 2004, Kofi Annan repeatedly tried and failed to negotiate a compromise settlement between the two states  One last effort was made in April, 2004  The Annan plan was submitted to the Cypriot populations via referendum  Favored by majority of Turkish Cypriots in the North, but rejected by Greek Cypriots in the South  Between 2002 and April, 2004, Kofi Annan repeatedly tried and failed to negotiate a compromise settlement between the two states  One last effort was made in April, 2004  The Annan plan was submitted to the Cypriot populations via referendum  Favored by majority of Turkish Cypriots in the North, but rejected by Greek Cypriots in the South

Cyprus: (cont.)  Result: Republic of Cyprus entered the EU without the consent of the TRNC  Cyprus remains divided today  Result: Republic of Cyprus entered the EU without the consent of the TRNC  Cyprus remains divided today

Yesilada and Sozen (2002)  Argue that T>P>R>S payoff ordering defines the preferences of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots  Predicted outcome: Deadlock  Obviously, will hold over repeated games  Argue that T>P>R>S payoff ordering defines the preferences of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots  Predicted outcome: Deadlock  Obviously, will hold over repeated games

Yesilada and Sozen (2002) Outdated  Three developments make this game theoretical analysis no longer correct:  The EU’s announcement that it would commence accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004 (late 2002)  The EU’s announcement that resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession (2003)  Accession of Greek Cyprus to EU (2004)  Three developments make this game theoretical analysis no longer correct:  The EU’s announcement that it would commence accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004 (late 2002)  The EU’s announcement that resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession (2003)  Accession of Greek Cyprus to EU (2004)

New Model  I propose to model the current situation with a new 2 x 2 social dilemma game:  Same set of strategies: C or D  New ordering of payoffs:  Republic of Cyprus - T>R>P=S  TRNC - R>T>S>P  I propose to model the current situation with a new 2 x 2 social dilemma game:  Same set of strategies: C or D  New ordering of payoffs:  Republic of Cyprus - T>R>P=S  TRNC - R>T>S>P

New Variables  V/2 is the value to both sides of cooperating split equally between them  T is the intangible cost to the Greek side of Turkey’s accession to the EU  t is the intangible benefit to the Turkish side of Turkey’s accession to the EU  P is the political and emotional benefit gained by playing D against a cooperative enemy  V/2 is the value to both sides of cooperating split equally between them  T is the intangible cost to the Greek side of Turkey’s accession to the EU  t is the intangible benefit to the Turkish side of Turkey’s accession to the EU  P is the political and emotional benefit gained by playing D against a cooperative enemy

New Model

 Note: I assume resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession.  The outcome of this game is DC, which differs from the DD outcome predicted by Yesilada and Sozen (2002).  Note: I assume resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession.  The outcome of this game is DC, which differs from the DD outcome predicted by Yesilada and Sozen (2002).

Hypothetical Case  What if CC were no longer a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession to the EU?  My claim: This would create opportunity for cooperation in the near future, perhaps even before Turkey enters the EU.  What if CC were no longer a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession to the EU?  My claim: This would create opportunity for cooperation in the near future, perhaps even before Turkey enters the EU.

Important (Debatable) Assumptions  The EU actually wants Turkey to join its supranational federation  Should the Cyprus condition be lifted, Turkey would eventually be granted EU membership  Should Turkey be granted EU membership, Cypriots, Turks and Europeans would make the assumption that the Cyprus problem will be resolved either before or after accession  The EU actually wants Turkey to join its supranational federation  Should the Cyprus condition be lifted, Turkey would eventually be granted EU membership  Should Turkey be granted EU membership, Cypriots, Turks and Europeans would make the assumption that the Cyprus problem will be resolved either before or after accession

New Variables  L is the additional negotiating leverage held by Turkish Cypriots post-accession because of their parent country’s membership in the EU - is therefore also included as a cost to the Greek side   is defined as a bureaucratic cost to completing the accession process in the second period, once Turkey is part of the EU  Note: In the CC outcome, Turkish Cypriots receive L b/c this is the maximum the Greeks are willing to concede before the accession to avoid a non-CC outcome  L is the additional negotiating leverage held by Turkish Cypriots post-accession because of their parent country’s membership in the EU - is therefore also included as a cost to the Greek side   is defined as a bureaucratic cost to completing the accession process in the second period, once Turkey is part of the EU  Note: In the CC outcome, Turkish Cypriots receive L b/c this is the maximum the Greeks are willing to concede before the accession to avoid a non-CC outcome

Hypothetical Model

Prediction  I argue that a CC outcome is marginally preferred given this set of payoffs:  Both sides would prefer to compromise before Turkey’s accession  I argue that a CC outcome is marginally preferred given this set of payoffs:  Both sides would prefer to compromise before Turkey’s accession