BGP update profiles and the implications for secure BGP update validation processing Geoff Huston Swinburne University of Technology PAM2007 5 April 2007.

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Presentation transcript:

BGP update profiles and the implications for secure BGP update validation processing Geoff Huston Swinburne University of Technology PAM April 2007

Why? Secure BGP proposals all rely on some form of validation of BGP update messages Validation typically involves cryptographic validation, and may refer to further validation via a number resource PKI This validation may take considerable resources to complete. This implies that the overheads securing BGP updates in terms of validity of payload may contribute to: –Slower BGP processing –Slower propagation of BGP updates –Slower BGP convergence following withdrawal –Greater route instability –Potential implications in the stability of the forwarding plane

What is the question here? Validation information has some time span –Validation outcomes can be assumed to be valid for a period of hours Should BGP-related validation outcomes be locally cached? What size and cache lifetime would yield high hit rates for BGP update validation processing?

Method Use a BGP update log from a single eBGP peering session with AS 4637 over a 14 day period –10 September 2006 – 23 September 2006 Examine time and space distributions of BGP Updates that have similar properties in terms of validation tasks

Update Statistics for the session DayPrefix Updates Duplicates: Prefix Duplicates: Prefix + Origin AS Duplicates Prefix + AS Path Duplicates Prefix + Comp-Path 172,93460,105 (82%)54,924 (75%)34,822 (48%)35,312 (48%) 279,36171,714 (90%)67,942 (86%)49,290 (62%)50,974 (64%) 3104,76493,708 (89%)87,835 (84%)65,510 (63%)66,789 (64%) 4107,57694,127 (87%)87,275 (81%)64,335 (60%)66,487 (62%) 5139,483110,994 (80%)99,171 (71%)68,096 (49%)69,886 (50%) 6100,44492,944 (92%)88,765 (88%)70,759 (70%)72,108 (72%) 775,51971,935 (95%)69,383 (92%)56,743 (75%)58,212 (77%) 864,01060,642 (95%)57,767 (90%)49,151 (77%)49,807 (78%) 994,94489,777 (95%)86,517 (91%)71,118 (75%)72,087 (76%) 1081,57678,245 (96%)75,529 (93%)63,607 (78%)64,696 (79%) 1195,06291,144 (96%)87,486 (92%)72,678 (76%)74,226 (78%) 12108,987103,463 (95%)99,662 (91%)80,720 (74%)82,290 (76%) 1391,73287,998 (96%)85,030 (93%)72,660 (79%)74,116 (81%) 1478,40776,174 (97%)74,035 (94%)64,994 (83%)65,509 (84%)

CDF by Prefix and Originating AS

Time Distribution

Time Spread

Space Distribution Use a variable size cache simulator Assume 36 hour cache lifetime Want to know the hit rate of validation queries against cache size

Prefix Similarity

Prefix + Origin Similarity

Prefix + Path Similarity

Observations A large majority of BGP updates explore diverse paths for the same origination True origination instability occurs relatively infrequently (1:4) ? Validation workloads can be reduced by considering origination (prefix plus origin) and the path vector as separable validation tasks Further processing reduction can be achieved by treating a AS path vector as a sequence of AS paired adjacencies

AS Path Similarity

AS Pair Similarity

Observations Validation caching appears to be a useful approach to addressing some of the potential overheads of validation of BGP updates Separating origination from path processing, using a 36 hour validation cache can achieve 80% validation hit rate using a cache of 10,000 Prefix + AS originations and a cache of 1,000 AS pairs

What do we want from secure BGP? Validation that the received BGP Update has been processed by the ASs in the AS Path, in the same order as the AS Path, and reflects a valid prefix, valid origination and valid propagation along the AS Path? or Validation that the received Update reflects a valid prefix and valid origination, and that the AS Path represents a plausible sequence of validated AS peerings?

Thank You