Signed since September 2005 What’s it like 7 months later? Anne-Marie Eklund Löwinder,

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Presentation transcript:

Signed since September 2005 What’s it like 7 months later? Anne-Marie Eklund Löwinder,

What is.se? The Kingdom of Sweden TLD operated by II-stiftelsen ~ domains ( ) A daily growth with ~500 domains 7 unicast servers + 2 anycast clusters

Why? Increase integrity of the DNS Increase security for.SE domain holders and their users. ‣ A countermeasure against pharming and other DNS MITM attacks. ‣ An infrastructure strengthening technique. ‣ A contemplated use of DNSSEC is for authenticated distribution of public keys for other security schemes. Called upon by the authorities (the Swedish Post and Telecom Agency, PTS). New applications ENUM

When? First workshop in February 1999 Testing since January 2003 Public testing since January 2004 RFC 4033, 4034 & 4035 (aka DNSSEC bis) were published in March September 13th 2005,.se started to distribute the signed.se zone. Signed delegations for early adopters from mid- November More extensive tests started February 1st, 2006.

Key Management Zonefile SignerKSK ZSKKSK ZSK

Behind the scenes

Distribution All.SE name servers has been DNSSEC enabled since June Servers are running BIND or NSD. Different platforms and operating systems: ‣ FreeBSD, NetBSD, Linux, Solaris ‣ Sparc, Alpha, x86

Name Servers NetnodStockholm, Gothenburg, Sundsvall + Anycast Service Telia SoneraStockholm, Malmo KTH NocStockholm, Umea VerisignAnycast Service

Monitoring Nagios has been extended to perform basic DNSSEC checks –Warn for signatures soon to expire –Test for correct DNSSEC additional processing –Check the integrity of some signatures

Signing childs – secured delegations The domain must be a sub domain of.SE. The domain holder must sign a limitation of liability statement with IIS. The domain holder must provide IIS with a technical contact person. IIS must be able to authenticate the technical contact person using a certificate signed by a certificate authority trusted by.SE’s key management tool KEYMAN. The domain must be delegated to one or more name servers, all of them supporting DNSSEC according to RFC 4033, 4034 and 4035.

Child Key Management KEYMAN is used for early adopters New registry & registrar system with integrated DNSSEC planned for Q4 2006

New Registry Todays registry model in.se is “confusing” No clear relation between registrar and registrant New registry service will be EPP based, and have a purer Registry – Registrar relationship Registrars will handle DNSSEC through EPP Requirements for DNSSEC? (Probably some extra paragraphs in the registrar agreement) Authentication of registrants?

Certificate Authorities trusted by.SE Posten Sverige AB SIS ID CA v1 (The Swedish Post) Telia e-id CA CAcert.org Thawte Personal Fre SwUPKI CA (Swedish Universities PKI CA) If someone think that their favourite CA is not in the list, they may contact us, and we will consider adding it.

Keyman Keyman is a prototype DNSSEC child key manager used to register keys with.SE – until the new EPP registry is in place Stores active keys in a database - fetch new keys via DNS User selects active keyset DS records generated from database Not scalable to big zones with a great number of delegations

Signing a zone

Lessons learned Stating the obvious…  You might be aware of this already  If not, you probably will be

Do not run BIND 8.

Make sure your firewall can handle EDNS.

Separate authoritative and recursive name servers.

DNSSEC capable software AuthoritativeRecursive ISC BIND Nominum ANSNominum CNS NSD

Performance - resolving We are measuring to get a picture of what DNSSEC does to performance in the DNS environment. A report will be published very soon. From what we experience there are no big differences running without DNSSEC or with DNSSEC enabled.

What is the performance hit on a typical ISP resolver if they would enable DNSSEC validadtion for.se today?

Query Test Data 1 hour ( MET) quries from customers of a large Swedish ISP Queries recorded via tcpdump and anonymized using tcpreplay Average query load 966 qps

Measurement Queries per seconds measured Name server CPU time usage measured Queries / cpusec used as comparison

Public resolvers.SE provides public resolvers for testing purposes: ‣ bind.dnssec.se ‣ cns.dnssec.se

Server configuration The DNS operator are strongly recommended to always check the current key - not only copy and paste without verification. The.SE Key Signing Key (KSK) will be changed from time to time. If anyone configure this key into their resolver, we strongly recommend them to subscribe to the mailing list where we will notify key rollovers.

Tests - Phase 1 Friendly users 18 zones and 11 different domain holders Short period of time Some test participants failed to update their signatures before expiration date No other problems reported

Tests phase 2 Extended test population New agreement on Limitation of Liability Running for 12 months Now 27 zones and 20 different domain holders Planning to send out a survey to get some idea about the participants experiences so far

Zone walking What about it ? The whois service for.se only shows registration status and delegation information Extended information on domain names are only available via web interface and protected by CAPTCHA. We’ve noticed some - but no alarming –activity Working very actively with the development of NSEC3

Costs? 2004 –Project budget SEK (appr Euros) 2005 –Project budget SEK (appr Euros) 2006 –Project budget appr Euros

To do list Tests Phase 2 –Extended tests with more users ending in January 2007 Enable DNSSEC validation at ISP’s - Information –Conference co-arranged with PTS. Try to reach ISP:s to convince them to enable DNSSEC on resolvers for their broadband customers. Sign important DNS infrastructure - Education –1 ½ day sponsored ”hands on” tutorial, participants from registrars, DNS service providers for banks, government agencies, large media companies, ISP:s. Sharing the.se model - Documentation –”DPS”, technical descriptions, code distribution, administrative routines.

Documentation & Policy DNSSEC Policy and Practice Statement DNSSEC Limitation of Liability DNSSEC Environment description Deployment information for other TLDs Internal technical and administrative documentation

Thank you! Questions?