Mechanism Design for Airport Traffic Planning Geert Jonker, John-Jules Meyer, Frank Dignum Utrecht University.

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Presentation transcript:

Mechanism Design for Airport Traffic Planning Geert Jonker, John-Jules Meyer, Frank Dignum Utrecht University

Airport Traffic Plan Repair

Properties Incentive-compatibility: motivate agents to be honest. Clark Tax: pay if you change the outcome. Efficient and incentive-compatible. Fairness: remember histories.

Pay-off accounts solution 1 vs. solution 2

Summary Need for efficient, fair and incentive compatible resource allocation mechanism. Conjecture: fairness and incentive compatibility are incompatible.

Issues Is it fair to make agents express their utility in money? Do agents know their utility? How should we measure fairness?

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