Protection and Security. Policy & Mechanism Protection mechanisms are tools used to implement security policies –Authentication –Authorization –Cryptography.

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Presentation transcript:

Protection and Security

Policy & Mechanism Protection mechanisms are tools used to implement security policies –Authentication –Authorization –Cryptography A security policy reflects an organization’s strategy for authorizing access to the computer’s resources only to authenticated parties –Accountants have access to payroll files –OS processes have access to the page table –Client process has access to information provided by a server

Security Goals Resource X Resource W Resource Y Resource Z Process A Process BProcess C Authentication Authorization read read/write read read/write Machine X Machine Y

Authentication User/process authentication –Is this user/process who it claims to be? Passwords More sophisticated mechanisms Authentication in networks –Is this computer who it claims to be? File downloading Obtaining network services The Java promise

Authorization Is this user/process allowed to access the resource under the current policy? What type of access is allowable? –Read –Write –Execute –Append

Lampson’s Protection Model Active parts (e.g., processes) –Operate in different domains –Subject is a process in a domain Passive parts are called objects Want mechanism to implement different security policies for subjects to access objects –Many different policies must be possible –Policy may change over time

A Protection System Subjects X S Objects S desires  access to X 

A Protection System Subjects X S Objects Protection State S desires  access to X Protection state reflects current ability to access X

A Protection System Subjects X S Objects Protection State Transition S desires  access to X Protection state reflects current ability to access X Authorities can change

A Protection System Subjects X S Objects Protection State Transition Rules S desires  access to X Protection state reflects current ability to access X Authorities can change What are rules for changing authority?

A Protection System Subjects X S Objects Protection State Transition Rules Policy S desires  access to X Protection state reflects current ability to access X Authorities can change What are rules for changing authority? How are the rules chosen?

Protection System Example S X S desires  access to X 

Protection System Example S X  Access matrix S X S desires  access to X Captures the protection state

Protection System Example S X  Access matrix S Access authentication (S, , X) X S desires  access to X Captures the protection state Generates an unforgeable ID

Protection System Example S X  S Access authentication Monitor (S, , x) X S desires  access to X Captures the protection state Generates an unforgeable ID Checks the access against the protection state

Protection State Example S1S1 S2S2 S3S3 S1S1 S2S2 S3S3 F1F1 F2F2 D1D1 D2D2 control block wakeup owner control owner stop deleteexecute owner updateownerseek* read* write* seekowner

A Protection System Subjects X S Objects Protection State Transition Rules Policy Handling state changes

Policy Rules Example S1S1 S2S2 S3S3 S1S1 S2S2 S3S3 F1F1 F2F2 D1D1 D2D2 control block wakeup owner control owner stop deleteexecute owner updateownerseek* read* write* seekowner RuleCommand by S 0 AuthorizationEffect 1transfer(  |  *) to (S, X)  *  A[S 0, X]A[S, X] = A[S, X]  {  |  *} 2grant(  |  *) to (S, X)owner  A[S 0, X]A[S, X] = A[S, X]  {  |  *} 3delete  from (S, X)control  A[S 0, S]A[S, X] = A[S, X]-{  } or owner  A[S 0, X] Rules for a Particular Policy

Protection Domains Lampson model uses processes and domains -- how is a domain implemented? –Supervisor/user hardware mode bit –Software extensions -- rings Inner rings have higher authority –Ring 0 corresponds to supervisor mode –Rings 1 to S have decreasing protection, and are used to implement the OS –Rings S+1 to N-1 have decreasing protection, and are used to implement applications

Protection Domains (cont) Ring crossing is a domain change Inner ring crossing  rights amplification –Specific gates for crossing –Protected by an authentication mechanism Outer ring crossing uses less-protected objects –No authentication –Need a return path –Used in Multics and Intel (& above) hardware

Implementing Access Matrix Usually a sparse matrix –Too expensive to implement as a table –Implement as a list of table entries Column oriented list is called an access control list (ACL) –List kept at the object –UNIX file protection bits are one example Row oriented list is a called a capability list –List kept with the subject (i.e., process) –Kerberos ticket is a capability –Mach mailboxes protected with capabilities

More on Capabilities Provides an address to object from a very large address space Possession of a capability represents authorization for access Implied properties: –Capabilities must be very difficult to guess –Capabilities must be unique and not reused –Capabilities must be distinguishable from randomly generated bit patterns

Cryptography Information can be encoded using a key when it is written (or transferred) -- encryption It is then decoded using a key when it is read (or received) -- decryption Very widely used for secure network transmission

More on Cryptography plaintextciphertext encryption decryption

More on Cryptography plaintext Encrypt Decrypt KeKe KdKd C = E Ke (plaintext)

More on Cryptography plaintext Encrypt Decrypt KeKe KdKd C = E Ke (plaintext) Invader Side informationplaintext

Cryptographic Systems Conventional Systems Modern Systems Private KeyPublic Key K e and K d are essentially the same K e and K d are private K e is public K d is private

Kerberos Authentication Server Client Server

Kerberos Authentication Server Client Server Client ID Session Key Encrypted for client Encrypted for server Ticket

Kerberos Authentication Server Client Server Client ID Session Key Encrypted for client Encrypted for server Ticket Session Key

Kerberos Authentication Server Client Server Client ID Session Key Encrypted for client Encrypted for server Ticket Client ID Session Key Ticket Session Key Client ID Session Key