Time tense. a-properties and b-properties A properties: putative temporal properties like pastness, presentness, futurity, being one day future, etc.

Slides:

Advertisements

Similar presentations

Michael Lacewing Religious belief Michael Lacewing © Michael Lacewing.

Advertisements

True or False. DNA is found in some living things.

Propositional Attitudes. FACTS AND STATES OF AFFAIRS.

Time A-Theory and B-Theory. The A-series and the B-series The B-series is the series of all events ordered in terms of temporal relations like earlier.

Personal Identity. CAUSAL EFFICACY OF CONTENT Breaking Glass o.

LECTURE 24 THE NATURE OF PERSONS PHYSICALISM AND DUALISM (“WHAT AM I?)

Does Time Really Pass? Simon Prosser University of St Andrews University of Durham Institute of Advanced Study Public lecture, 20 th November 2012.

PH251 Metaphysics Week 7. Persistence and Temporal Parts.

Modality Possible Worlds. Possibility and Necessity Triangles have three sides. The Wassermans have two kids.

Universals, Properties, Kinds

Malcolm’s ontological argument Michael Lacewing

Knowledge Representation I Suppose I tell you the following... The Duck-Bill Platypus and the Echidna are the only two mammals that lay eggs. Only birds.

Metaethics and ethical language Michael Lacewing Michael Lacewing

Time occupation. the 4d view x is a temporal part of y =df (i) x exists for a shorter span of time than y, and (ii) throughout x’s existence, x exactly.

Time occupation. the 4d view x is a temporal part of y =df (i) x exists for a shorter span of time than y, and (ii) throughout x’s existence, x exactly.

Empiricism: David Hume ( ) Our knowledge of the world is based on sense impressions. Such “matters of fact” are based on experience (i.e., a posteriori.

Me Talk Good One Day When Language and Logic Fail to Coincide.

Time Thank Goodness That’s Over. Review A-properties are temporary temporal properties like being past. B-properties are permanent temporal relations.

Time The unreality of time. Review The A-Theory: (i) There are genuine A- properties and (ii) the passage of time consists of each time’s successive possession.

Time McTaggart’s Argument. Time W hat, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try.

EE1J2 – Discrete Maths Lecture 5 Analysis of arguments (continued) More example proofs Formalisation of arguments in natural language Proof by contradiction.

The very idea Key resources: Meta-ethics in a small nutshell (short) Meta-ethics in a small nutshell Meta-ethics in a much larger nutshell (longer) Meta-ethics.

Perception & Truth Is it true that: “Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” --that is all Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. (Keats, “Ode on a Grecian.

David Lewis Counterfactuals and Possible Worlds. David Lewis American philosopher, lived between UCLA and Princeton Modal realism.

Lecture 2: The nature and value of knowledge. Two kinds of knowledge Both philosophy and common sense draw a distinction between knowing how, and knowing.

Lecture 4: The nature and value of truth. What is truth? Like the questions “What is knowledge?” and “What turns a true belief into knowledge?” asked.

1 4 Dummett’s Frege. 2 The Background The mentalist conception The mentalist conception It is a code conception of language (telepathy doesn’t need language).

Time and Change Consider where we left off. According to our naive descriptions of properties, we say the following: a is F What about time and change?

1 Chapter 7 Propositional and Predicate Logic. 2 Chapter 7 Contents (1) l What is Logic? l Logical Operators l Translating between English and Logic l.

How to color McTaggart Benj Hellie University of Toronto the Beach II 25 February 2007.

Chapter 1, Part II: Predicate Logic With Question/Answer Animations.

Computational Semantics Day 5: Inference Aljoscha.

TIME Introduction to Metaphysics Lecture 9. Two Intuitions Time flows and, as it passes, things change. Suppose that a God-like being, existing outside.

Armstrong, “The Nature of Possibility” Armstrong advocates a “combinatorial theory of possibility” – a combination of given, actual, elements. What does.

Albert Gatt LIN3021 Formal Semantics Lecture 4. In this lecture Compositionality in Natural Langauge revisited: The role of types The typed lambda calculus.

MLS 570 Critical Thinking Reading Notes Fogelin: Ch. 1 Fall Term 2006 North Central College Dr. Sally Fowler.

Ethical non-naturalism

Time and Persistence. x is a temporal part of y during t =df (i) x is part of y during t, (ii) x overlaps everything that’s a part of y during t, and.

Moving from one place to another Often will not see anything, just passing time between places or just being taken from one place to the next. Nothing.

Propositional Logic Predicate Logic

Computer Science CPSC 322 Lecture 22 Logical Consequences, Proof Procedures (Ch 5.2.2)

Time and Existence. The A-Theory: There are some A-facts that are irreducible to B-facts. The B-Theory: All A-facts are reducible to B- facts. The Token-Reflexive.

CHAPTER SIX: TRUTH P H I L O S O P H Y A Text with Readings ELEVENTH EDITION M A N U E L V E L A S Q U E Z.

Eliminative materialism

1.4 Properties of Real Numbers ( )

Learning objective: To understand the objection that even if a zombie world is conceivable it may not be possible, and to evaluate how convincing this.

Propositional Logic Rather than jumping right into FOL, we begin with propositional logic A logic involves: §Language (with a syntax) §Semantics §Proof.

Very Hard Problems I am so not kidding about this. Please grab a handout.

Bertrand Russell ( ) From The Problems of Philosophy (1912)  Truth & Falsehood  Knowledge, Error, & Probable Opinion  The Limits of Philosophical.

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE Some topics and historical issues of the 20 th century.

Artificial Intelligence Logical Agents Chapter 7.

This week’s aims  To test your understanding of substance dualism through an initial assessment task  To explain and analyse the philosophical zombies.

Lecture 8 Time: McTaggart’s argument

Lecture 9 Time: the A-theory and the B-theory

ConcepTest • Section 1.4 • Question 1

? Anti-realism, reductionism, reference

Religious language: cognitive or non-cognitive?

Bool operators and, or, not

Time and Change Parmenides vs. Heraclitus:

Introduction to Meta-Ethics

On your whiteboard: How many different ways can you think of using the term: “I know…” (i.e. what different types of things can you know?)

True or False: {image} is one-to-one function.

Introduction to Philosophy Lecture 3a Evaluating an argument

Introduction to Philosophy Lecture 12 Moral Realism and Relativism

Analytic Ontology Lezioni

Tenses of Verbs Grade

Cognitive vs Non-Cognitive

Lucretianism Bigelow.

Time Metaphysics 2019.

Presentation transcript:

Time tense

a-properties and b-properties A properties: putative temporal properties like pastness, presentness, futurity, being one day future, etc. B relations: two-place temporal relations like earlier than, simultaneous with, later than, one day later than, etc.

a-theory and b-theory The A Theory: (i) There are genuine A properties, and (ii) the passage of time consists of each time’s successive possession of different A properties. The B Theory: (i) There are no genuine A properties, and (ii) time does not really pass.

the tensless view The Tenseless View of Semantics (TLVS): (i) The verbal tenses of ordinary language (expressions like ‘it is the case that’, ‘it was the case that’, and ‘it will be the case that’) can be eliminated through appropriate use of expressions like ‘simultaneous with’, ‘earlier than’, and ‘later than’. (ii) Propositions – the things that are true or false – have truth values simpliciter rather than having truth values at times.

the tensed view The Tensed View of Semantics (TVS): (i) The verbal tenses of ordinary language (expressions like ‘it is the case that’, ‘it was the case that’, and ‘it will be the case that’) must be taken as primitive and unanalyzable. (ii) Propositions – the things that are true or false – have truth values at times rather than just having truth values simpliciter.

the rate of passage argument (1) If it makes sense to say that time passes, then it makes sense to ask ‘How fast does time pass?’. (2) If it makes sense to ask ‘How fast does time pass?’, then it’s possible for there to be a coherent answer to this question. (3) It’s not possible for there to be a coherent answer to this question. (4) [So] It doesn’t make sense to say that time passes.

prior’s argument (1) When you say “Thank goodness that’s over,” you are saying something sensible about a temporal fact. (2) When you say “Thank goodness that’s over,” you are not saying anything about any B-fact. (3) If (1) and (2), then when you say “Thank goodness that’s over,” you are saying something sensible about an A-fact. (4) If when you say “Thank goodness that’s over,” you are saying something sensible about an A- fact, then there are A-facts. (5) If there are A-facts, then The A Theory true. (6) [So] The A Theory is true.