Article review A good way of checking your understanding is to give a short speech giving an overview of the article or explaining something interesting.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Bidding to the Top: Position-based Auctions Gagan Aggarwal Joint work with Jon Feldman and S. Muthukrishnan.
Advertisements

6.896: Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture 21 Yang Cai.
Chapter Thirty-One Welfare Social Choice u Different economic states will be preferred by different individuals. u How can individual preferences be.
Computational Game Theory Amos Fiat Spring 2012
Chapter 17: Making Complex Decisions April 1, 2004.
4. Public Goods.
Key ideas and lessons learned Peter Bardsley auctions: theory, evidence, policy.
Revealed preference approach to multiperson consumption behavior Laurens Cherchye MWC – 10/12/2009.
Yang Cai Sep 24, An overview of today’s class Prior-Independent Auctions & Bulow-Klemperer Theorem General Mechanism Design Problem Vickrey-Clarke-Groves.
Computer-aided mechanism design Ye Fang, Swarat Chaudhuri, Moshe Vardi 1.
Wenjin Rong For CUHK, Baidu Wenjin Rong CUHK Two Questions What kind of advertising do you like? Who like advertising?
Voting and social choice Vincent Conitzer
Algorithmic Game Theory Uri Feige Robi Krauthgamer Moni Naor Lecture 9: Social Choice Lecturer: Moni Naor.
The Voting Problem: A Lesson in Multiagent System Based on Jose Vidal’s book Fundamentals of Multiagent Systems Henry Hexmoor SIUC.
Intermediate Microeconomics Midterm (50%) (4/27) Final (50%) (6/22) Term grades based on relative ranking. Mon 1:30-2:00 ( 社科 757)
Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications Lecture 6 Auction Theory Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad, Tamer.
Distributed Rational Decision Making Author: Tuomas W. Sandholm Speakers: Praveen Guddeti (1---5) Tibor Moldovan (6---9) CSE 976, April 15, 2002.
Do software agents know what they talk about? Agents and Ontology dr. Patrick De Causmaecker, Nottingham, March
Auctions Ruth Tarrant. Classifying auctions What is the nature of the good being auctioned? What are the rules of bidding? Private value auction Common.
Sep. 8, 2014 Lirong Xia Introduction to MD (mooncake design or mechanism design)
The English Language Development Center and a Quick Trick for Treating the Translation Problem Rebecca Gross, ELDC Director.
Preference Elicitation Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions and Eliciting Non-price Preferences in Combinatorial Auctions.
What is game theory… Game theory studies settings where multiple parties (agents) each have –different preferences (utility functions), –different actions.
Billions and Billions Sourced: Lessons Learned Building eMarkets Robert T. Monroe Tepper School of Business Carnegie Mellon University October 28, 2004.
Speaker: Ariel Procaccia Joint work with: Michael Zuckerman, Jeff Rosenschein Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Week 2 1 COS 444 Internet Auctions: Theory and Practice Spring 2008 Ken Steiglitz
CPS Voting and social choice
Agent Technology for e-Commerce Chapter 10: Mechanism Design Maria Fasli
VAMSEE KONERU PRADNYA SUTE
Auctioning one item PART 3 Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University.
Auctioning one item PART 2 Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University.
Exchanges = markets with many buyers and many sellers Let’s consider a 1-item 1-unit exchange first.
Junta Distributions and the Average Case Complexity of Manipulating Elections A. D. Procaccia & J. S. Rosenschein.
Auctions Hal R. Varian. Auctions Auctions are very useful mean of price discovery eBay, everyone’s favorite example DoveBid, high value, not so well.
Game Theory April 9, Prisoner’s Dilemma  One-shot, simultaneous game  Nash Equilibrium (individually rational strategies) is not Pareto Optimal.
1 Quantifying Trade-Offs in Networks and Auctions Tim Roughgarden Stanford University.
Truthfulness and Approximation Kevin Lacker. Combinatorial Auctions Goals – Economically efficient – Computationally efficient Problems – Vickrey auction.
Stackelberg Voting Games John Postl James Thompson.
Collusion and the use of false names Vincent Conitzer
Social choice (voting) Vincent Conitzer > > > >
CPS Social Choice & Mechanism Design Vincent Conitzer
CPS 173 Mechanism design Vincent Conitzer
By Scott Kominers And Lukens Orthwein.  Computational Complexity  Eliminating “Bad” Equilibria  Unsophisticated Buyers  Lazy Participants.
CPS Voting and social choice Vincent Conitzer
Combinatorial Auctions By: Shai Roitman
1 Self-government and Impossibility Theorem: How to find a good allocation mechanism? Anita Gantner Wolfgang Höchtl Rupert Sausgruber University of Innsbruck.
Mechanism Design CS 886 Electronic Market Design University of Waterloo.
Envy-Free Auctions for Digital goods A paper by Andrew V. Goldberg and Jason D. Hartline Presented by Bart J. Buter, Paul Koppen and Sjoerd W. Kerkstra.
Institutions in The Experimental Economics Framework Chamberlin (1948)- first reported market experiment – unregulated and unstructured trading – outcome.
Game theory, alive: some advanced topics presentation by: Idan Haviv supervised by: Amos Fiat.
Mechanism Design Ruta Mehta. Game design (not video games!) to achieve a desired goal, like fairness, social welfare maximization, etc.
Externalities and Efficiency. Final Exam About 40% old and 60% new Old multiple choice questions will be taken from previous exams (with modifications!)
UML as a Modeling Tool for Developing an Agent-based Auction System Arnold Aribowo ( Department of Computer Engineering, Pelita Harapan University, Indonesia.
Application of Formal Method on Game Mechanism Design Ye Fang, Swarat Chaudhuri, Moshe Vardi.
CMSC 477/677 VOTING AND AUCTION GAME DAY March 17, 2005.
Chapter 33 Welfare 2 Social Choice Different economic states will be preferred by different individuals. How can individual preferences be “aggregated”
CPS Some practice questions
CPS Some practice questions
Applied Mechanism Design For Social Good
مفاهیم بهره وري.
Voting and social choice
Preference elicitation/ iterative mechanisms
Some practice questions
Chapter 34 Welfare.
Introduction to Mechanism Design
Economics and Computation
Economics and Computation
CPS Preference elicitation/ iterative mechanisms
CPS Voting and social choice
Introduction to Mechanism Design
Presentation transcript:

Article review A good way of checking your understanding is to give a short speech giving an overview of the article or explaining something interesting you learned from the article.

Designing the Perfect Auction What did the article say was the inverse of game theory? why? What is the concern about truthfully revealing preferences? Explain the auction types: Dutch, English, First price, second price “the underlying motivation for (ebay) adopting this auction was communication costs”. What are they referring to? What is general idea of Vickrey Clarke Groves?

Making decision based on the preferences of multiple agents What is a plurality rule? Kemeny rule – find an aggregate ranking with minimally disagrees with the input rankings Voting on individual issues separately can easily lead to undesirable results. Give an example. What is the solution?

Terms monotonicity assumptions externalities envy free pareto efficient substitutes/complements combinatorial auctions bidding languages manipulation

Feedback: Privacy Policy Feedback
Do Not Sell My Personal Information
About project: SlidePlayer Terms of Service

© 2025 SlidePlayer.com. Inc. All rights reserved.