SPORC Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources 1SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/10 Ariel J. Feldman,

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Presentation transcript:

SPORC Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources 1SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/10 Ariel J. Feldman, William P. Zeller, Michael J. Freedman, Edward W. Felten

Cloud deployment: pro & con Cloud deployment is attractive Scalable, highly available, globally accessible Real-time collaboration 2SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/10 For user-facing applications : (e.g. word processing, calendaring, , IM) But, there’s a price… Must trust the cloud provider for confidentiality and integrity …

SPORC goals SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/103 Untrusted servers Can’t read user data Can’t tamper with user data without risking detection Clients can recover from tampering Practical cloud apps Flexible framework Real-time collaboration Work offline

Server Making servers untrusted SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/104 Encrypted state Encrypted state App logic SPORC Server’s limited role: Storage Ordering msgs State Client 1 Copy of state App logic Client 2 Copy of state App logic Client App logic Server

Problem #1: SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/105 Client 1 Copy of state App logic Client 2 Copy of state App logic Client How do you keep clients’ local copies consistent? (esp. with offline access) Server Encrypted state Encrypted state

Problem #2: SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/106 Client 1 Copy of state App logic Client 2 Copy of state App logic Client How do you deal with a malicious server? Encrypted state Encrypted state

Keeping clients in sync SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/107 Operational transformation (OT) [EG89] (Used in Google Docs, EtherPad, etc.) AliceBob Server ins “ABC” ins “DE” del 4del 2 ins “ABC” ins “DE” Ops: State: ABCDE ACDE ABCE del 4del 2 del 4 del 2del 4 ACD ACE del 2del 3 T T ACE OT can sync arbitrarily divergent clients Ops: State:

Dealing with a malicious server Digital signatures aren’t enough Server can equivocate SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/108 AC fork* consistency [LM07] Honest server: linearizability Malicious server: Alice and Bob detect equivocation after exchanging 2 messages Embed history hash in every message Server can still fork the clients, but can’t unfork Client

System design SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/109 Client app Local state Local state SPORC lib

System design SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1010 Client app Local state Local state SPORC lib CommittedPending fork* consistent fork* consistent causally consistent causally consistent

System design SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1011 Client app Local state Local state SPORC lib CommittedPending Server Encrypted state Encrypt & sign

System design SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1012 Client app Local state Local state SPORC lib CommittedPending Server Encrypted state Client Verify & decrypt Compare history hashes

System design SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1013 Client app Local state Local state SPORC lib CommittedPending Server Encrypted state Client Decrypt & verify T

System design SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1014 Client app Local state Local state SPORC lib CommittedPending Server Encrypted state Client T

Access control SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1015 Challenges Server can’t do it — it’s untrusted! Preserving causality Concurrency makes it harder Solutions Ops encrypted with symmetric key shared by clients ACL changes are ops too Concurrent ACL changes handled with barriers Encrypted state Encrypted state

Adding a user SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1016 AliceBob Server Charlie Group members:

Removing a user SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1017 AliceBob Server Charlie Group members: ModifyUserOp Rm “Charlie” E alice_pk (k’) E bob_pk (k’) E k’ (k)

BARRIER Barriers: dealing with concurrency SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1018 AliceBob Server Group members: ModifyUserOp Rm “Eve” E k2 (k) 10 ModifyUserOp Rm “Charlie” E k1 (k) … Clients check on the server

Recovering from a fork SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1019 Alice’s history: Bob’s history: Can use OT to resolve malicious forks too Fork!

Implementation SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1020 Client lib + generic server App devs only need to define ops and provide a transformation function Demo apps: key value store, browser-based collaborative text editor Java CLI version + browser-based version (GWT)

Evaluation SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1021 Setup Tested Java CLI version 8-core 2.3 GHz AMD machines 1 for server 4 for clients (often >1 instance per machine) Gigabit LAN Microbenchmarks Latency Server throughput Time-to-join (in paper)

Latency SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1022 Low load (1 client writer) High load (all clients are writers) (Text editor app)

Latency SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1023 Low load (1 client writer) High load (all clients are writers) (Text editor app)

Server throughput SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1024

Conclusion SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1025 Practical cloud apps + untrusted servers Operational transformation + fork* consistency Dynamic access control and key distribution Recovery from malicious forks

Thank you SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1026 Questions? * *

Comparison with Depot SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1027 Future work: SPORC + Depot? ;-) SPORCDepot Consistency with malicious servers ✔✔ Consistency with malicious clients ✔ Fork recovery ✔✔ Work offline ✔✔ Dynamic access control ✔ Confidentiality and key distribution ✔ Depot exposes conflicts, but leaves it to the app to resolve them

Time-to-join SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources — OSDI 10/5/1028