Wifi-Reports Improving Wireless Network Selection with Collaboration Jeffrey Pang (CMU) Ben Greenstein (Intel Research Seattle) Michael Kaminsky (Intel.

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Presentation transcript:

Wifi-Reports Improving Wireless Network Selection with Collaboration Jeffrey Pang (CMU) Ben Greenstein (Intel Research Seattle) Michael Kaminsky (Intel Research Pittsburgh) Damon McCoy (University of Colorado) Srinivasan Seshan (CMU)

Problem: Commercial AP Selection tmobile attwifi (ap 1) attwifi (ap 2) seattlewifi linksys Free Public Wifi $3.99 $9.99 Free! Which networks will run my applications? Which ones have good performance? Quality = ??? We often have many choices of wireless access points (APs), but little information about each Jiwire.com Hotspot database Jiwire.com Hotspot database 2

Goal: Provide More Information tmobile attwifi (ap 1) attwifi (ap 2) seattlewifi linksys Free Public Wifi I need to use VoIP so this is the best network for me Bandwidth: 300 kbps Blocked ports: None Doesn’t work! Provide information about AP performance and application support Doesn’t work! Bandwidth: 100 kbps Blocked ports: None Bandwidth: 300 kbps Blocked ports: None Improved Hotspot database Improved Hotspot database Bandwidth: 30 kbps Blocked ports: Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Blocked ports: None Doesn’t work! 3

Goal: Wifi-Reports 4 Users automatically report on APs that they use

Bob’s Report on AP2 Doesn’t work! Bob’s Report on AP2 Doesn’t work! Bob’s Report on AP1 Doesn’t work! Bob’s Report on AP1 Doesn’t work! Bob’s Report on AP3 Doesn’t work! Bob’s Report on AP3 Doesn’t work! Bob’s Report on AP4 Doesn’t work! Bob’s Report on AP4 Doesn’t work! Bob’s Report on AP5 Bandwidth: 300 kbps Bob’s Report on AP5 Bandwidth: 300 kbps Location Privacy: Authority/databases cannot link a user’s reports Limited Influence: Only count 1 report per AP, per user Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 100 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 100 Mbps Design Challenges 5 Location Context: Account for wireless channel conditions

Talk Overview Motivation Why use reports? A measurement study Wifi-Reports design Wifi-Reports evaluation 6

Would Reports be Useful? Measurement Study We built a Linux reporting client – Measures bandwidth, latency, etc. We measured all APs visible from: – 13 hotspots in the U-District, Seattle, WA – 7 days at different times of day Measurement procedure: – Sit near center of hotspot – Perform active measurements shinka tea tullys 1 starbucks 1 tullys 2 trabant oasis lounjin yunnie bubble tea sureshot bookstore cafeontheave starbucks 2 cafesolstice Our study examines pay-for-access networks and open networks 7

There is a Large Selection of APs Bandwidth of commercial APs in Seattle (by location) red = “official” AP grey = other visible AP 8

There is a Variance in Performance Bandwidth of commercial APs in Seattle (by location) red = “official” AP grey = other visible AP 9

The “Official” AP is not Always Best Bandwidth of commercial APs in Seattle (by location) red = “official” AP grey = other visible AP 10

Most APs are not Open or Free red = “official” AP grey = other visible AP 11 Bandwidth of commercial APs in Seattle (by location)

Measurement Summary Measurement study of hotspots in Seattle – 13 locations in one district over 1 week Finding the best AP is non-trivial: – Large selection: 4 hotspot APs at each location, on average – Variable performance: AP bandwidth differs by up to 50x – Not obvious: official AP is not best at 30% of locations – Not testable: most APs cost money to use  Need historical data to choose the best AP 12

Talk Overview Motivation Why use reports? A measurement study Wifi-Reports design Wifi-Reports evaluation 13

Location Privacy: Authority/databases cannot link a user’s reports Limited Influence: Only count 1 report per AP, per user Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 10 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 100 Mbps Mallory’s Report on AP4 Bandwidth: 100 Mbps Design Requirements 14 Location Context: Account for wireless channel conditions

Threat Model e.g., Account authority obeys protocol –violations can be detected Prevents large-scale sybil attacks –e.g., signup requires credit card Most clients are honest 15 Location Privacy: Authority/databases cannot link a user’s reports Limited Influence: Only count 1 report per AP, per user Location Context: Account for wireless channel conditions

If Alice has already submitted a report on cafe1 then abort, else save the report Straw men Protocols R  report on cafe1 mix network submit: R authenticate Alice measure cafe1 Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Limited Influence submit: R Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mb Anonymous Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mb 16

Report Protocol request: cafe1, T blind reply: S blind {k cafe1, k -1 cafe1 }  new key pair If Alice requested cafe1 before then abort else sign the token  S blind authenticate and download list of APs Unblind the signature  S cafe1 R  report on cafe1 mix network submit: cafe1, S cafe1, k cafe1, R, S R Verify the signatures Delete old reports signed with k cafe1 measure cafe1 cafe1 cafesolstice tmobile #4 AT&T #54  Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Blind the token k cafe1  T blind Sign the report  S R List of all APs 17 cafe1 starbucks2 cafe2 … {k cafe2, k -1 cafe2 }  new key pair …

Verify the signatures Delete old reports signed with k cafe1 Report Protocol request: cafe1, T blind reply: S blind {k cafe1, k -1 cafe1 }  new key pair If Alice requested cafe1 before then abort else sign the token  S blind authenticate and download list of APs Unblind the signature  S cafe1 R  report on cafe1 measure cafe1 Blind the token k cafe1  T blind Sign the report  S R Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Location Privacy Limited Influence cafe1 Report on cafe2 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe2 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps cafe2 mix network submit: cafe1, S cafe1, k cafe1, R, S R 18

request: cafe1, T blind reply: S blind authenticate and download list of APs measure cafe1 Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Problem: Asking for a token reveals the target AP Solution: Ask for the tokens for all APs in a city Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 100 Mb Problem: Some users may submit bad reports Solution: Robust summary functions (e.g., median) mix network submit: cafe1, S cafe1, k cafe1, R, S R … cafe1 starbucks2 UW tullys shinkatea cafe2 APs in Seattle Report Protocol 19

Design Requirements 20 Location Privacy: Authority/databases cannot link a user’s reports Limited Influence: Only count 1 report per AP, per user Location Context: Account for wireless channel conditions Accounting for: Signal quality – Report SNR Time-of-day – Report time Traffic contention – [Sundaresan 06] – [Vasudevan 05] …  lots of summaries for each AP!

Design Requirements 21 SNR Loss rate Location Privacy: Authority/databases cannot link a user’s reports Limited Influence: Only count 1 report per AP, per user Location Context: Account for wireless channel conditions Empirically, coarse SNR is good enough (see paper for details)

Wifi-Reports: Other Details Adding & removing APs AP changes over time Rate limiting reports AP spoofing attacks Eclipse attacks Side-channel attacks Collusion attacks See paper for details 22

Talk Overview Motivation Why use reports? A measurement study Wifi-Reports design Wifi-Reports evaluation 23

Do Reports Improve AP Selection? Hotspot databases (e.g., JiWire.com) – Obviously more useful with more information What about selecting APs at a fixed location? – Traditional approaches: “official” AP, test all open APs [Nicholson 06], best SNR, etc. – Evaluate using our measurement study: Question: Which approach predicts the best AP? (best = highest bandwidth, see paper for other metrics) Ground truth = measurements at each location Reports = measurements excluding the one being tested 24

Reports Improve AP Selection 25 median 3 rd quartile 1 st quartile Throughput (normalized to optimal) Location Each error bar = 6-13 experiments at each location over 7 days

Overhead and Robustness What is the overhead of obtaining tokens? Implementation on single CPU server Hotspot density estimated from JiWire.com 0.02 cents/city/user on Amazon EC2 Overhead is small. 26

Overhead and Robustness Overhead is small. How robust are predictions to fraud? ideal distribution Ground truth = measurement study Fraud = report AP has infinite bandwidth Robust to 10% fraud. Implementation on single CPU server Hotspot density estimated from JiWire.com 0.02 cents/city/user on Amazon EC2 27 What is the overhead of obtaining tokens?

Summary & Future Work Key results: – Selecting the best commercial APs is not easy – Using historical reports is close to optimal – We can obtain reports while preserving privacy, limiting fraud, and adjusting for channel conditions Future work: – Wifi-Reports client for handsets – Wifi-Reports as a general urban sensing platform 28 Wifi-Reports data and tools:

=== BACKUP === 29

Location Privacy Threats 30

Who Should Care About Tracking? End-users – CRA Grand Challenge: “Give computer end-users privacy they can control” Service providers – Location databases can be compromised by third parties (e.g., AOL search debacle) Device manufacturers – Privacy concerns about tracking can hurt sales (e.g., Intel CPUID debacle, Benetton RFID boycott) 31

Estimating SNR Loss Regions Use throughput to estimate relative loss Assume intermediate loss region is 10 dB Find the “best fit” for the three regions dB throughput SNR (dB) SNR Loss rate

Wifi-Reports request: cafe1, T blind reply: S blind {k cafe1, k -1 cafe1 }  new key pair If Alice already requested cafe1 then abort, else: S blind  sign(K -1 cafe1, T blind ) authenticate and download list of APs S cafe1  unblind(K cafe1, S blind, r) verify(K cafe1, S cafe1, H(k cafe1 )) = 1 R  new report on cafe1 send over mix network submit: cafe1, S cafe1, k cafe1, R, S R verify(K cafe1, S cafe1, H(k cafe1 )) = 1 verify(k cafe1, S R, H(R)) = 1 Delete old reports signed with k cafe1 measure cafe1 database cafe1 cafesolstice tmobile #4 AT&T #54  {K cafe1, K -1 cafe1 } = official key pair for cafe1, … Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Report on cafe1 Bandwidth: 5 Mbps r  random() T blind  blind(K cafe1, H(k cafe1 ), r) S R  sign(k -1 cafe1, H(R)) cafe1 cafe1 = K cafe1 … List of all APs 33

Reports Improve AP Selection 34

Using Reports Improves Selection 35

No AP is the Best in All Metrics Better 36 Mean Google latency (sec) Mean Throughput (Mbps)

Results: Are there many APs? Better 37

Results: Are there many APs? Better 38

Results: Is there diversity? Better 39

Results: Is there diversity? Better 40

Results: Are measurements predictive? Better 41

Results: Is there diversity? Better Blocked port = no measurement 42

Results: Is there diversity? Better Blocked port = no measurement 43

Results: Are measurements predictive? Better Blocked port = no measurement 44

Fetch time for all WiGLE APs 45 Cost is 2 cents/city/user if we include all APs

=== OLD SLIDES === 46

Goal: Use Collaborative Reports Reports Database Bandwidth: 30 kbps Blocked ports: Bandwidth: 5 Mbps Blocked ports: None community uploads measurement reports members download summary statistics 47