19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments.

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19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments

2 players. Not a hard game. Can do with backwards induction. Player 1 may choose D if he doesn’t trust the other person.

Lesson 20: Wars of Attrition

Bribe contests (try to get your way by bribing, but as long as both parties do, no winner) – also called all pay auctions. Bidding for a $1 bill Possible that a fight could go on quite a while. By the time they fought the second time, they had exhausted the reward. Over time, losses far exceed possible prize at stake. Reasons for the fight: a. Want to establish a reputation of being fighters. Reputation could extend beyond this game. b. Even though the prize is only a dollar, the players care about winning! (pride) A dollar isn’t a good description of reward. c. Losses in the past are “sunk” – lost it anyway. Are irrelevant now. If fighting seemed good initially, would still seem good later. Can get huge loss even if: a. no reputation to maintain b. are rational

Look at a simplified version – only two periods.