| Astronautics Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and the Environment University of Southampton,

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
P 2 ROTECT FP7-SPACE Prediction, Protection & Reduction of Orbital Exposure to Collision Threats 63 rd International Astronautical Congress Naples,
Advertisements

DS-01 Disaster Risk Reduction and Early Warning Definition
Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services Evaluation of the SME Funding Schemes - summary European Agency for Safety and Health at Work.
To Queue or Not to Queue? Physical queues can be really stressful and exhausting…
DEBRIS REMOVAL DESIGN DRIVERS BASED ON TARGET SELECTION 2 nd European Workshop on Active Debris Removal CNES HQ, Paris, 18 th - 19 th July 2012 Adam White:
Space Debris Environment Impact Rating System 1 University of Southampton 2 PHS Space Ltd. H.G. Lewis 1, S.G. George 1, B.S. Schwarz 1 & P.H. Stokes 2.
Federal Aviation Administration On-Orbit Debris Mitigation Methods for Upper Stages COMSTAC: Space Transportation Operations Working Group and Risk Management.
3 rd Manfred Lachs International Conference ‘NewSpace Commercialization and the Law’ Montreal, March 2015 NewSpace, Small Satellites and Law: Finding.
Safety Evaluation According To UK Regulations Dr Richard Crowther Head, Space Engineering & Technology Division Rutherford Appleton Laboratory Oxfordshire,
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE The Art of Modeling with Spreadsheets STEPHEN G. POWELL KENNETH R. BAKER Compatible with Analytic Solver Platform FOURTH EDITION CHAPTER.
Efficient Methodologies for Reliability Based Design Optimization
The impact of long-term trends on the space debris population Dr Hugh Lewis Astronautics Research Group, Faculty of Engineering & the Environment.
The Fast Debris Evolution (FaDE) Model H.G. Lewis, G.G. Swinerd, R.J. Newland & A. Saunders Astronautics Research Group School of Engineering Sciences.
 Structured peer to peer overlay networks are resilient – but not secure.  Even a small fraction of malicious nodes may result in failure of correct.
Sultanate of Oman Oman Drinking Water Safety Plan.
Capability Maturity Model
Opportunity Engineering Harry Larsen The Boeing Company SCEA 2000 Conference.
Mercury Laser Driver Reliability Considerations HAPL Integration Group Earl Ault June 20, 2005 UCRL-POST
Long-term evolution of the space debris population Dr Hugh Lewis Astronautics Research Group, Faculty of Engineering & the Environment.
N By: Md Rezaul Huda Reza n
An Assessment of CubeSat Collision Risk H.G. Lewis 1, B.S. Schwarz 1, S.G. George 1 and H. Stokes 2 1 Astronautics Research Group, Faculty of Engineering.
Pioneers, Imitators, and Generics – A Simulation Model of Schumpeterian Competition The authors develop a computer simulation model of R&D competition.
CCDs in space: the effects of radiation on Hubble’s Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS) Max Mutchler, David Golimowski (Space Telescope Science Institute),
LECTURE 22 VAR 1. Methods of calculating VAR (Cont.) Correlation method is conceptually simple and easy to apply; it only requires the mean returns and.
ACCORD Aim: Provide a mechanism for communicating the efficacy of current debris mitigation practices & identifying opportunities for strengthening European.
The Next 100 Years Projection of Debris in GEO Space Systems Dynamics Laboratory Yuya Mimasu 1st March, 2007.
The Effectiveness of Space Debris Mitigation Measures ISU’s 16 th Annual International Symposium 21 st February 2012 Adam E. White, Hugh G. Lewis, Hedley.
1 ORBITAL DEBRIS: TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE SPACE ACTIVITIES PARIS SPACE WEEK 2015 Christophe BONNAL CNES – Launcher Directorate – Senior Expert Chairman – Space.
Freak Waves: A Suggested Definition and Possible Consequences for Marine Structures 1. What is the target safety level of offshore structures? 2. Are rogue.
IAC-12-A Debris Mitigation Capability and Capacity to Reduce Orbital Debris Hugh Lewis (University of Southampton, UK) Hedley Stokes (PHS Space.
Scalable Statistical Bug Isolation Authors: B. Liblit, M. Naik, A.X. Zheng, A. Aiken, M. I. Jordan Presented by S. Li.
2014 Key Issues Review: Ensuring a Robust U.S. Human Spaceflight Program Congressional Visits Day Preparatory Briefing Teleconferences February 12, 19,
The effect of modelling assumptions on predictions of the space debris environment R. Blake and H.G. Lewis Astronautics Research Group, Faculty of Engineering.
AAE 450- Propulsion LV Stephen Hanna Critical Design Review 02/27/01.
Market research for a start-up. LEARNING OUTCOMES By the end of this lesson I will be able to: –Define and explain market research –Distinguish between.
Advanced Decision Architectures Collaborative Technology Alliance An Interactive Decision Support Architecture for Visualizing Robust Solutions in High-Risk.
The Augustine Committee Review of Human Spaceflight Plans Committee Briefing to COMSTAC October 29, 2009 Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee.
 The Multi-Tier Mission Architecture and a Different Approach to Entry, Descent and Landing Jeremy Straub Department of Computer Science University of.
Good Practice/ Practice that works “…something that has been tried with beneficial effects with the implication that it may work for others and to be transferrable.
COMSTAC Risk Management Working Group October 28, 2009 Chris Kunstadter XL Insurance
Program Evaluation Principles and Applications PAS 2010.
Guide to the Identification of Safety-Critical Hardware Items for RLV Developers COMSTAC RLV Working Group Meeting Washington D.C. 25 May 2005.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Space Debris Assessment for USA-193 Presentation to the 45 th Session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee.
Abstract Service Learning is a useful avenue in developing agency in college students, giving them the opportunity to interact with issues linking course.
Marco Martuzzi World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe Health Impact Assessment as part of SEA.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Conceptual Design Bryan C Fuqua – SAIC Diana DeMott – SAIC
Recommendation to Cease NASA Crew Return Vehicle Development April 29, 2004 Amanda KellyBlake HajovskyAnthony Pittman Engineering Technical Communications.
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency TM Technical Meeting to Discuss Human Intrusion and Future Human Actions in relation to Disposal of Radioactive.
Motorcycle Noise Emissions - The German Position – - ISO response - 4. GRB Informal Group Meeting 25./26. August 2005 Milwaukee.
V - 1 V. System Technology for Large Space Telescopes Session Chair: Juan A. Roman.
Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Statistics for Business and Economics 8 th Edition Chapter 9 Hypothesis Testing: Single.
A Decision Framework for Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Programs Using Health Benefit Analysis Ying Li University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
INFLUENCE OF ORBITAL DEBRIS ON SPACE ARCHITECTURE EFFICACY Dr. Darren S. McKnight Integrity Applications, 31 st Space Symposium,
Partnering for a better Belgium? Results of the survey “How do profit and non-profit collaborate for the greater good in Belgium?” Presentation – May 24.
ESA UNCLASSIFIED – Releasable to the Public Session 7: Science and engineering lessons from the de- orbiting and re-entry phase C. Pardini (1), H. Krag.
Chapter 4 PowerPoint Spreadsheet Analysis.
Stardust – A Fresh Look at Planetary Defence
Space Traffic Management
Vaccine Efficacy, Effectiveness and Impact
Combating Tag Cloning with COTS RFID Devices
Capability Maturity Model
Knowing When to Stop: An Examination of Methods to Minimize the False Negative Risk of Automated Abort Triggers RAM XI Training Summit October 2018 Patrick.
Take Control Over Underwriting Quality and Leakage
Space Communications Architecture Application Portfolio
EU Tyre Industry comments on document ECE/TRANS/WP.29/GRB/2019/6
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Introduction: IAEA activities / Documents on human intrusion
Capability Maturity Model
What is the target safety level of offshore structures?
Alessandro Chiesa Project Manager, Aviospace srl
Presentation transcript:

| Astronautics Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and the Environment University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom IAC-14-A6.P.58 Hugh G. Lewis & Aleksander Lidtke Active Debris Removal: Consequences of Mission Failure Motivation There is widespread belief that Active Debris Removal (ADR) is needed to reduce the hazard posed by an increasing space debris population in low Earth orbit (LEO). Evolutionary models have demonstrated that the sustained removal of a few large debris objects can have a beneficial effect on the LEO debris environment. Following these studies, there has been a drive towards the development of technologies and concepts for ADR, with several on-orbit demonstration missions now proposed. However, the ubiquitous assumption made in modelling studies and the subsequent concept development has been that ADR always results in a successful mission outcome, i.e. the ultimate removal from orbit of the targeted debris and the chaser vehicle used. This is unrealistic, given that traditional space missions can, and do, fail on-orbit. Of real concern, therefore, is the potential for ADR to add to the space debris hazard. Three mechanisms exist through which the benefits of ADR may be lost: key debris targets may not be retrieved, new debris may be added in the form of failed chaser vehicles, or collisions involving the former objects may occur. The last mechanism is of particular concern because debris targets and failed chaser vehicles will be in highly populated regions of LEO. This research aimed to address the concern, through simulations of these mechanisms using the University of Southampton’s debris evolutionary model DAMAGE. In so doing, recommendations for ADR mission reliability and programmatic approach were identified. LEO population growth Fraction of all Monte Carlo runs showing population growth Fraction of all collisions involving a failed ADR chaser vehicle Fraction of all removal missions targeting a failed ADR chaser vehicle Method Two ADR mission approaches were studied: a “single-removal” chaser vehicle that removed only one debris target before de-orbiting itself, and a “multiple-removal” chaser vehicle that removed five debris targets before de-orbiting. In the latter case, it was assumed that the chaser vehicle attached a de-orbit device (e.g. drag sail, tether or solid rocket motor) to each debris target before performing an orbit transfer to the next debris target and repeating the procedure. Consequently, a failure of the multiple-removal chaser vehicle would only have consequences for debris targets yet to be visited. Launch vehicles associated with the ADR chaser vehicles were assumed to de-orbit immediately following the payload separation. Five different chaser vehicle failure rates were simulated: 0%, 5%, 15%, 30% and 45% per year, with vehicles selected randomly, and three removal rates: 5, 10 and 15 debris objects per year (with the addition of a baseline case with no removals used for comparison). In addition, it was assumed that a mission failure resulted in the complete loss of control of the ADR chaser vehicle, which remained on orbit. ADR chaser vehicles successfully completing their mission were removed from orbit immediately. Failures were assumed to occur in one of three positions, selected randomly, relative to the target debris: (1) in a drift phase 100 km below, (2) in an inspection phase 50 m below, or (3) in a contact phase. The probabilities associated with each position were 50%, 25% and 25%, respectively. Failed missions were not repeated in the same year. Projections of the LEO debris population ≥ 10 cm from 2013 through 2113 were performed using DAMAGE, with 50 Monte Carlo (MC) runs used for each scenario. Conclusions A “multiple-removal” chaser vehicle provided substantial benefits in terms of robustness to failure, compared with the “single-removal” chaser vehicle approach. However, such missions are inherently more complex and involve potentially greater risk of failure, given the need for multiple proximity operations. Further work is required to understand the effect of this trade-off. The “single-removal” chaser vehicle approach resulted in a significant effort (up to 35% of removal missions) focused on removing failed ADR chaser vehicles, and up to one-in-four collisions involved an ADR chaser vehicle (27% of all collisions). The results also showed that debris removal rates of more than five objects per year were needed to prevent, or limit, the growth of the LEO population over 100 years. At the same time, a higher number of removals required a corresponding decrease in the individual mission failure rate (i.e. an increase in reliability) to achieve the same outcome, for both types of mission. The effect of higher failure rates was an increasing probability that the LEO debris population would grow in number. Future efforts in ADR must move beyond the assumption of immunity to failure: consideration needs to be given to ADR technologies and concepts that are robust to failure and result in a benign impact on the environment in case of failure. Without such a move, there is a possibility that a remediation method, widely perceived as the only solution to the growing space debris hazard, could exacerbate the problem. Effective number of objects (LEO, ≥ 10 cm) Year Population density as a function of time for failure scenarios involving single-removal ADR missions launched at a rate of 10 per year No failures; No removals No failures; Target: 10 removals per year 5% failures; Target: 10 removals per year 15% failures; Target: 10 removals per year 45% failures; Target: 10 removals per year Results Charts showing the population density, LEO population growth (compared with the 2013 population), number of MC runs in which population growth was observed, fraction of collisions involving failed ADR chaser vehicles and fraction of removal missions that targeted failed ADR chaser vehicles, are reported here. Single-removal Multiple-removal Single-removal Multiple-removal Single-removal Multiple-removal Single-removal Multiple-removal Acknowledgements Thanks to Holger Krag, Head of the ESA Space Debris Office, for permission to use the MASTER reference population within DAMAGE, and colleagues from IADC WG2 for comments on an earlier report on these results.