National Incident Management Systems Session 6 Slide Deck

Session Objectives 1 Discuss alternative models to NIMS ICS 2 Cite potential positive and negative attributes of the ICS 3 Discuss some of the limitations of the ICS and obstacles to effective implementation 4 Understand how to utilize information about limitations and obstacles

Importance Become a better participant within ICS structures Understand the context in which the ICS operates Understand the challenges faced by the system in implementation

Alternative models and the NIMS ICS NIMS ICS designed to be universal Alternatives to NIMS ICS not supposed to be used Many different models were used for decades within the fire discipline Most models based on either the FIRESCOPE ICS or the Fireground Command System

FIRESCOPE ICS 1960s response to a series of wildfires Interagency group convened to solve problems in 1972 Outcome was Wildfire Incident Command System Grew in popularity Adopted and adapted by fire departments and other disciplines

FIRESCOPE ICS and NIMS ICS FIRESCOPE ICS most similar to NIMS ICS Intelligence function different – NIMS ICS allows addition of 6 th functional area for intelligence – FIRESCOPE located information and intelligence functions within Planning Section

Fireground Command System Chief Brunacini at Pheonix Fire Departments – Recognized similar problems to those in wildland firefighting – Believed a system that could be used day-to-day more useful – Adapted FIRESCOPE model for structural fires

Differences Between the Systems Suitability to incidents of different scale, scope and duration Utilization of hierarchical levels and organizational structures Terminology

Examples of Adaptations National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department Incident Management System Model Procedures Guide for Structural Firefighting

Shared Concepts and Principles Each version shares basic concepts and principles Examples include – Hierarchical modular organization – Span of control – Establishment and transfer of command – Chain of command and unity of command – Accountability – Information management

Differences Terminology Organizational structuring mechanisms Positions (roles and titles)

Critical Issue Not the number of variations that exist But that jurisdictions and disciplines have felt it necessary to adapt and modify the ICS In fact, variations to this day – Nonuse – Partial use – Modifications – Adaptations

Variations Implications for response efforts? What may contribute to the tendency of jurisdictions to change the system? These questions will be discussed throughout this session.

Exercise Form groups of 2-4 people Brainstorm a list of potential positive and negative attributes of the ICS You will have 10 minutes When finished write your group’s list on the blackboard/whiteboard

Potentially Positive Attributes Flexible Widely applicable Designed to standardize Can be used day-to-day All levels of government and all disciplines Based on proven management characteristics Enjoys wide support Use is required Use can decrease – Perception of chaos and confusion – Communication problems – Leadership issues – Duplication of effort – Unnecessary response- related expenditures Use can increase safety of responders

Potentially Negative Attributes Based on assumptions Characteristics of emergencies and disasters Everyone has to use the system Everyone has to be trained Positions are specialized Everyone has to practice Everyone has recognize incident commander as legitimate On-scene management Volunteers and groups will emerge Temporary Use ICS is mandates Buy-in and commitment are necessary

Exercise Perceptions vary – Levels of government – Person-to-person – Organization-to-organization Questions to consider: – Why did you choose to list attributes as positive or negative? – Are there any attributes that do not belong? If so, why?

+ Flexibility and Scalability + Certain functions must be addressed in every incident System can be adapted based on nature of incident, stage of incident, and available resources Quickly scaled up or down Facilitated by as little as one or many

+ Applicability + Characteristics of incident should not affect the use of the ICS Has been used successfully to manage diverse incidents

+ Standardization + Should be used in the same way Allows predictable and patterned coordination and communication

+ Used Day-to-Day + Plan events Structure administrative activities Response to routine emergencies Coordinate response to disasters Day-to-day use encourages smooth transition into and scaling up of the ICS

+ All Levels of Government and Disciplines + Designed to let all entities merge into common structure Work together efficiently Despite, different – Missions – Priorities – Responsibilities – Terminology – Cultures

+ Proven Management Characteristics + Practitioner developed Based on “best practices” and “lessons learned” Continues to evolve

+ Wide Support + Fire discipline has used for decades Other organizations adopted prior to the mandate of the ICS through NIMS Examples include – United States Coast Guard – Occupational Health and Safety Administration – Environmental Protection Agency – Military and some businesses

+ ICS is Required+ Condition for funding Should ensure compliance

+ Perception of Chaos and Confusion + Common issue—perceptions of chaos – Link with lack of organization The ICS can reduce when effectively implemented

+ Communication Problems + Utilize common terminology, incident action planning, ICS forms, and other tools Tools designed to – Facilitate flow of information and – Minimize communication problems

+ Leadership Issues + Common issue—perceived lack of command and control The ICS provides processes for – Designation of incident commander – Transferring command – Use of unified command

+ Duplication of Effort + Common issue—more than one organization attempts to meet the same need Leads to unnecessary response-related expenditures Use of the ICS should eliminate

+ Increase Safety + Priority placed on safety in many ways Examples include – Designation of safety officer – Incident action planning process – Resource management – Span of control

- Assumptions - Chaotic situations that must be managed through command and control System works It works for everyone Everyone will want to use it Response will be efficient if used Little research Implications if any assumptions are not true?

- Incident Characteristics - Prior research on disasters Qualitative and quantitative differences How might qualitative and quantitative differences impact the ability to implement the ICS?

- Everyone Has to Use - Relies on consistent use – Within organizations – Across organizations Creates opportunities for the system not to perform

- Training - Depends on knowledge Knowledge depends on training – Accessible and available Additional position-specific training – More than one person in preparation for large-scale incidents Ongoing training due to turnover Jurisdictions – Commit personnel and funding – Easier for some than others What might happen if jurisdictions do not get enough training?

- Practice - Depends on practice (i.e. experience) using system Get practice – Exercises – Actual incident management – Use on a daily basis What happens if organizations do not have enough practice?

- Incident Commander - Incident commander – Must be perceived to be legitimate – All must work under the incident commander Clear criteria, but – May not follow the criteria – And/or may not agree on how command and control should be handled What happens if they do not work within the structure?

- On-scene Management - ICS used for field operations MACs can use what they feel best-suited Implications for response if similar systems are not used in each?

- Volunteers and Emergent Groups - Volunteers and emergent groups – Research has shown common, necessary, and helpful Not always positively perceived Implications of volunteers and emergent groups for the ICS?

- Temporary Use - Many organizations do not use the ICS on a daily basis Reasons why they do not include – Organization’s mission, priorities, leadership, and culture – Complexity may be off-putting Potential issues for traditional first responders too Implications if not used on a daily basis?

- ICS Mandate - Both positive and negative attribute Have to be compliant for certain funding – No obligation if they do not seek funding Implications if jurisdictions opt out?

- Buy-in - Resentment of federal mandates Training and practice not enough Implications if jurisdictions do not buy-in to the system?

Exercise Continue to work in same groups. Review and analyze one of four Moynihan (2006) case studies Identify the factors that encouraged or limited the implementation of the ICS in the case study. You have 20 minutes to conduct your analysis and prepare a list.

1993 Laguna and 2003 Cedar Fires Encouraged Relationships and trust in place prior to incident Limited There were not enough resources Incident’s scope rapidly expanded There were jurisdictional disagreements Individuals worked outside the ICS/chain of command Responders did not have sufficient training and experience

1995 Oklahoma City Bombing Encouraged Limited in scope Limited number of tasks Victims had limited variety of needs Agreement about who should be in charge There were enough resources Well-practiced and trained Preexisting relationships Limited Resources converged Volunteers emerged

2001 Attack on the Pentagon Only Encouraging Factors Limited geographic scope Small number of victims Incident site easily accessible There were enough resources The types of tasks generated by incident were familiar Incident command established without debate System was used flexibly Responders had training and experience Preexisting relationships and trust

Hurricane Katrina Only Limiting Factors Geographic scope widespread Large number of tasks Lack of resources Communications systems and facilities unusable Many individuals and organizations involved and worked outside the ICs Neither incident command or unified command were established Responding organizations were themselves overwhelmed Lack of knowledge and training Lack of accountability Lack of preexisting relationships

Patterns? Conditions Encouraging Use Limited number of tasks Geographically limited incidents Limited time pressure A manageable number of organizations involved in the response Responders have experience with the ICS model High capacity and adequate resources Preexisting relationships

Moynihan’s Conclusion Responders cannot control nature of crisis faced Implications: – Issues the system itself cannot correct – Nature of the incident – Potentially allows explanation and prediction

Moynihan (2008) The success of the ICS is contingent Limited: – Nature of crisis – Lack of experience Encouraged: – Use of SOPs – Interagency trust – Incidents long duration and limited scope

Buck et al. (2006) Preconditions: – Familiar tasks – Preexisting relationships and trust – Incident characteristics Conclude – System not flawed, rather faulty implementation – Doubtful will be used “by all actors and in all disaster contexts” – Not a universal system

Perry (2006) Preconditions: – Familiar tasks – Training – Enough resources – Effective resource management

Wenger et al. (1990) Problem with system itself Findings: – The ICS modified and adapted – Does not deal well with small scale disasters – Issues with command – Too “fire-centric” – Did not integrate organizations into system well – Depends on significant practice – Complex nature of disasters not conducive to standardization

EFO Papers Supportive of the ICS and its use as a standard But many similar issues to those in academic work – Working with other jurisdictions and/or agencies/organizations – Resource issues – How departments (or other organizations) used the system – Appropriateness for volunteer and small fire departments – Command and the ICS – Command post and emergency operation center interface

EFO Papers Cont. Conditions: – Buy-in – Training – Regional perspective – Funding and resources – Critical role of practice – Daily use

Implications from Literature Factors within control Training Education Practice Resource management Generating buy-in and commitment Factors beyond control Availability of resources (e.g. funding) Incident characteristics Victims’ needs Number and kind of tasks Whether or not other organizations involved have trained, practiced, and are committed

Implications Cont. Successful implementation may be dependent on preconditions ICS not a “cure-all” But knowledge of limitations and obstacles can help

Exercise Take 5 minutes to individually consider how the information and discussion from this session might impact you in your – First job where ICS training and implementation is required – As a professional in the field of emergency management – As an emergency management student

First Job Manage expectations Manage personal performance Recognize where obstacles may exist and work with other stakeholders to overcome those obstacles Understand there may be factors beyond control

Professional Better understanding of what may have impacted the performance of the system in particular incidents Understand that some issues can be controlled and others cannot System will be refined over time When change required ensure preconditions met and/or advocate for the resources necessary to ensure they are met

Students Understand the contributions that empirical research and testing can and needs to make Connect the disaster literature to the ICS Utilize the way we have analyzed the ICS and apply this type of analysis to other emergency management issues