Shouting into the Wind: Examining the Structural Weakness of Developing Countries in the Global Trading Order Michael Smith Department of Political Science, Columbia University IPES Conference, November 15, 2008

LDCs and the WTO: Newfound Voice Seattle Ministerial, 1999: Dozens of unmet LDC demands leads to mass exodus Doha: Well organized and coherent expression of LDC interest in negotiations

Research Question Is this new voice indicative of a greater power in the GATT/WTO regime?

LDCs and the WTO: Newfound Power? Democratization leads to a new interest in free trade (Milner and Kubota)

LDCs and the WTO: Newfound Power? Democratization leads to a new interest in free trade (Milner and Kubota) Efficiency rationale: International regimes allow states to overcome domestic barriers to free trade (neoliberal institutionalists)

LDCs and the WTO: Newfound Power? RoundDates Number of Member Countries Geneva Annecy Torquay Geneva Dillon Kennedy Tokyo Uruguay Doha2001-pres.147

LDCs and the WTO: Newfound Power? Democratization leads to a new interest in free trade (Milner and Kubota) Efficiency rationale: International regimes allow states to overcome domestic barriers to free trade (neoliberal institutionalists) New coalitional bargaining strategies allow LDCs to effectively press their demands in WTO negotiations (Narlikar and Tussie)

But… New coalitional bargaining strategies made possible by institutional changes in GATT/WTO that allow for trade-related coalitions

But… New coalitional bargaining strategies made possible by institutional changes in GATT/WTO that allow for trade-related coalitions If structural change in the GATT/WTO empowered the global south, why did this structural change occur in the first place?

But… New coalitional bargaining strategies made possible by institutional changes in GATT/WTO that allow for trade-related coalitions If structural change in the GATT/WTO empowered the global south, why did this structural change occur in the first place? Analysis of evolving GATT/WTO regime requires a role for power

But… New coalitional bargaining strategies made possible by institutional changes in GATT/WTO that allow for trade-related coalitions If structural change in the GATT/WTO empowered the global south, why did this structural change occur in the first place? Analysis of evolving GATT/WTO regime requires a role for power Expression of voice by developing countries doesn’t correspond theoretically or empirically to increased power

Bringing Power Back In Gruber’s ‘go-it-alone’ power: dominant powers seeking efficiency gains from international cooperation can change status quo in system through creation of self-serving agreements and compel other states to join

Bringing Power Back In Gruber’s ‘go-it-alone’ power: dominant powers seeking efficiency gains from international cooperation can change status quo in system through creation of self-serving agreements and compel other states to join Extended to GATT/WTO example: core coalition of dominant cooperating states can exercise structural power. A kind of ‘go-it- together’ power

Bringing Power Back In Gruber’s ‘go-it-alone’ power: dominant powers seeking efficiency gains from international cooperation can change status quo in system through creation of self-serving agreements and compel other states to join Extended to GATT/WTO example: core coalition of dominant cooperating states can exercise structural power. A kind of ‘go-it- together’ power When agreement is reached between dominant powers, developing countries feel compelled to join

Expressions of Power Structural: Draws in Outliers

Expressions of Power Structural: Draws in Outliers Rule Setting: Defining Institutions

Expressions of Power Structural: Draws in Outliers Rule Setting: Defining Institutions Agenda Setting: Content of Votes and Declarations

Expressions of Power Structural: Draws in Outliers Rule Setting: Defining Institutions Agenda Setting: Content of Votes and Declarations Exit: But Fruitless

Hypotheses: When Agreement? Core Coalition? Structural Power Rule Setting Power Agenda-Setting PowerAgreement Yes No Yes (though ineffectual) No

Expectations Small-n agreements driven by efficiency concerns

Expectations Small-n agreements driven by efficiency concerns For an agreement to grow it must be between states with large structural power

Expectations Small-n agreements driven by efficiency concerns For an agreement to grow it must be between states with large structural power Where a core coalition exists, GATT/WTO rules will be changed as needed

Expectations Small-n agreements driven by efficiency concerns For an agreement to grow it must be between states with large structural power Where a core coalition exists, GATT/WTO rules will be changed as needed Agenda setting may coexist with any form of coalition but only leads to agreement when forwarded by core coalition

Evidence GATT/WTO negotiations considered as four cases: 1. Havana to the Kennedy Round 2. Tokyo Round 3. Uruguay Round 4. Doha Development Round

Havana to Kennedy GATT founded as UK-US-France coalition More development-friendly ITO rejected Substantive agreements represent northern interest: agriculture kept off the table

Tokyo Round US/EC division over agricultural liberalization stalls progress until US concedes agricultural products as special goods Developing world makes fails to gain desired removal of safeguards proposal despite agreement with US: EC achieves maintenance of selective safeguards Global South largely avoids signing agreements; agitate in alternative but ineffective UNCTAD

Uruguay Round Developing countries compelled to return to negotiations despite prior exit US/EC dispute over agriculture stall negotiations; resolved when US threat of retaliatory tariffs compels EC to accede New institutional framework of WTO meets blueprint of Dunkel Draft – a US and EC drafted document Passage of round as single undertaking: for South, take it or leave it

Doha Development Round Seattle 1999: Enduring US-EU-Japan disagreements over accelerating agricultural liberalization in addition to North/South arguments over discussing Uruguay’s implementation. Walkout. Cancun : G-22 forms, fight for lowered agricultural subsidies and Northern market access. Maintain coherence until re-introduction of Singapore issues forces an impasse; again, walkout. Geneva July 2008: Inclusion of China, India and Brazil in writing draft text. Breakdown over efforts by China and India to protect farmers

Conclusions and Questions Voice does not mean power: in trade rounds, the existence of a core coalition is required for progress. How do changes in the international economy affect this? Does inclusion of China, India and Brazil in Green Room talks indicate a change in the core coalition?