6.853: Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory

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Presentation transcript:

6.853: Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture 14 Fall 2011 Constantinos Daskalakis

Markets

“Economics is a science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.” Lionel Robbins (1898 – 1984)

How are scarce resources assigned to alternative uses?

How are scarce resources assigned to alternative uses? Prices! Parity between demand and supply equilibrium prices

the beginnings of a mathematical theory

Adam Smith (1723-1790) The Wealth of Nations (1776): the “invisible hand of the economy” “By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.” “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”

Augustin Cournot (1801-1877)

Cournot’s Contributions: notion of a demand function D = F(p), where p is the price; F(.) is assumed continuous, and it is taken as an empirical proposition that the demand function is decreasing analysis of a monopoly: - profit-maximizing producer with cost f(D), for production D; discusses decreasing, constant and increasing cost functions - equations determining equilibrium price duopoly model: two rival producers of a homogeneous product unlimited competition, communication of markets on single commodity, …

question left unanswered by Cournot…

Leon Walras (1834-1910) Elements of Pure Economics, or the theory of social wealth, 1874

Leon Walras (1834-1910) - goal was to solve the problem that was left open by Cournot, i.e. characterize the price equilibrium of a market with many commodities; - gave system of simultaneous equations for price equilibrium: informal argument for the existence of an equilibrium based on the assumption that an equilibrium exists whenever the number of equations equals the number of unknowns - recognized the need for dynamics leading to an equilibrium tâtonnement: price adjustment mechanism

Irving Fisher (1867-1947) hydraulic apparatus for solving markets with 3 traders with money and a producer of 3 commodities

Irving Fisher (1867-1947) First computational approach! 1891

[ Irving Fisher (1867-1947) ] Stock Market Crash of 1929: "Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau." [Shortly before the crisis] Market is “only shaking out of the lunatic fringe” [October 21, 1929 (8 days before black Tuesday)] ]

[….]

Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie Theorem One of the most celebrated theorems in Mathematical Economics. Established the existence of a market equilibrium under very general conditions using Brouwer/Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. it is hence highly non-constructive!

Kenneth Arrow Nobel Prize, 1972

Gerard Debreu Nobel Prize, 1983

Exchange Market Model (without production) Consider a marketplace with: traders (or agents) goods (or commodities) assumed to be infinitely divisible Utility function of trader i: non-negative reals consumption set for trader i specifies trader i’s utility for bundles of goods Endowment of trader i: amount of goods trader comes to the marketplace with

Exchange Market Model (without production) Suppose the goods in the market are priced according to some price vector . Under this price vector, each trader would like to sell some of her endowment and purchase an optimal bundle using her income from what s/he sold; thus she solves the following program: Programi(p) Note: If ui is continuous and is compact, then the above program has a well-defined optimum value.

Competitive (or Walrasian) Market Equilibrium Def: A price vector is called a competitive market equilibrium iff there exists a collection of optimal solutions to Programi(p), for all i = 1,…, n, such that the total supply meets the total demand, i.e. total demand total supply

Arrow-Debreu Theorem 1954 Theorem [Arrow-Debreu 1954]: Suppose (i) is closed and convex (ii) (all coordinates positive) (iii a) (iii b) (iii c) Then a competitive market equilibrium exists.

Market Clearing Nonsatiation + quasi-concavity  at equilibrium every trader spends all her budget, i.e. if xi(p) is an optimal solution to Programi(p) then  every good with positive price is fully consumed

A market with no equilibrium Alice has oranges and apples, but only likes apples. Bob only has oranges, and likes both oranges and apples. - if oranges are priced at 0, then Bob’s demand is not well-defined. - if oranges are priced at > 0, then Alice wants more apples than there are in the market.

Proof of the Arrow-Debreu Theorem Steps (details on the board) simplifying assumption: ui is strictly concave (i) w.l.o.g. can assume that the are compact argument on the board; the idea is that we can replace with without missing any equilibrium, and without introducing spurious ones (ii) by compactness and strict concavity: for all p, there exists a unique maximizer xi(p) of Programi(p) (iii) by the maximum theorem: xi(p) is continuous on p (iv) rest of the argument on the board

Utility Functions Linear utility function (goods are perfect substitutes) Leontief (or fixed-proportion) utility function e.g. buying ingredients to make a cake e.g. rate allocation on a network Cobb-Douglas utility function Interpretation: the per-unit fraction of buyer i’s income used in purchasing good j is proportional to aij. i.e. at optimality xij pj =c aij.

Utility Functions CES utility functions: Convention: - If uij =0, then the corresponding term in the utility function is always 0. - If uij > 0, xj=0, and ρ<0, then ui(x)=0 no matter what the other xj’s are. linear utility form Leontief utility form Cobb-Douglas form elasticity of substitution:

Homework CES utility functions: show it is concave (2 points)

Fisher’s Model Suppose all endowment vectors are parallel…  relative incomes of the traders are independent of the prices. Equivalently, we can imagine the following situation: n traders, with specified money mi k divisible goods owned by seller; seller has qj units of good j Arrow-Debreu Thm  (under the Arrow-Debreu conditions) there exist prices that the seller can assign on the goods so that the traders spend all their money to buy optimal bundles and supply meets demand

Fisher’s Model with CES utility functions Buyers’ optimization program (under price vector p): Global Constraint:

Eisenberg-Gale’s Convex Program The space of feasible allocations is: But how do we aggregate the trader’s optimization problems into one global optimization problem? e.g., choosing as a global objective function the sum of the traders’ utility functions won’t work…