Honeypots, Honeynets, and the Honeywall David Dittrich The Information School/C&C The University of Washington ARO Information Assurance Workshop 3 March.

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Presentation transcript:

Honeypots, Honeynets, and the Honeywall David Dittrich The Information School/C&C The University of Washington ARO Information Assurance Workshop 3 March 2004

Honeypots

Concept of Honeypots First popularized in “The Cuckoo’s Egg” by Cliff Stoll Redefined by the Honeynet Project “A security resource who’s value lies in being probed, attacked or compromised” Has no production value; anything going to/from a honeypot is likely a probe, attack or compromise Used for monitoring, detecting and analyzing attacks

Advantages Fidelity – Information of high value Reduced false positives Reduced false negatives Simple concept Not resource intensive Return on Investment

Disadvantages Labor/skill intensive Limited field of view Does not directly protect vulnerable systems Risk (more on this later…)

Low-Interaction Emulates services and operating systems. Easy to deploy, minimal risk Captures limited information Examples include Specter, KFSensor, and Honeyd.

Emulation of Services QUIT* ) echo -e "221 Goodbye.\r" exit 0;; SYST* ) echo -e "215 UNIX Type: L8\r" ;; HELP* ) echo -e "214-The following commands are recognized (* =>'s unimplemented).\r" echo -e " USER PORT STOR MSAM* RNTO NLST MKD CDUP\r" echo -e " PASS PASV APPE MRSQ* ABOR SITE XMKD XCUP\r" echo -e " ACCT* TYPE MLFL* MRCP* DELE SYST RMD STOU\r" echo -e " SMNT* STRU MAIL* ALLO CWD STAT XRMD SIZE\r" echo -e " REIN* MODE MSND* REST XCWD HELP PWD MDTM\r" echo -e " QUIT RETR MSOM* RNFR LIST NOOP XPWD\r" echo -e "214 Direct comments to ;; USER* )

Honeyd

High-interaction Provide real operating systems and services, no emulation. Complex to deploy, greater risk. Capture extensive information. Examples include ManTrap and Honeynets.

The Role Of Honeypots In The Enterprise Augments Firewalls and IDS Research Incident Response / Forensics Deception / Deterrence

Utility – Identifying new exploits

Honeynets

Honeynet Requirements Data Control Data Capture

Gen II Honeynet

Virtual Honeynets

No Data Control

Data Control

Snort fast logging 01/08-10:06: [**] [111:10:1] (spp_stream4) STEALTH ACTIVITY (XMAS scan) detection [**] {TCP} : > :1

Snort full logging [**] [111:10:1] (spp_stream4) STEALTH ACTIVITY (XMAS scan) detection [**] 01/08-10:06: : > :1 TCP TTL:52 TOS:0x0 ID:29436 IpLen:20 DgmLen:60 **U*P**F Seq: 0x452BBA60 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x400 TcpLen: 40 UrgPtr: 0x0 TCP Options (4) => WS: 10 NOP MSS: 265 TS:

IPTABLES Packet Handling

rc.firewall (data control) ### Set the connection outbound limits for different protocols. SCALE="day" TCPRATE="15" UDPRATE="20" ICMPRATE="50" OTHERRATE="15" iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit ${TCPRATE}/${SCALE} --limit-burst ${TCPRATE} -s ${host} -j tcpHandler iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 1/${SCALE} --limit-burst 1 -s ${host} -j LOG --log-prefix "Drop TCP after ${TCPRATE} attempts“ iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -s ${host} -j DROP

iptables connection logging Jan 8 09:52:43 honeywall user.warn klogd: INBOUND ICMP: IN=br0 OUT=br0 PHYSIN=eth0 PHYSOUT=eth1 SRC= DST= LEN=84 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64

iptables connection limits Jan 9 10:02:27 honeywall user.warn klogd: Drop TCP after 9 attemptsIN=br0 OUT=br0 PHYSIN=eth1 PHYSOUT=eth0 SRC= DST= LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=32932 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=32830 DPT=9999 WINDOW=5840 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0

snort_inline iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j QUEUE

snort_inline reject tcp $HONEYNET any <> $EXTERNAL_NET 80 (msg: "REJECT";) drop tcp $HONEYNET any <> $EXTERNAL_NET 80 (msg: "DROP TCP";) sdrop tcp $HONEYNET any <> $EXTERNAL_NET 80 (msg: "SDROP";) alert tcp $HONEYNET any <> $EXTERNAL_NET 80 (msg: "Modifying HTTP GET"; content:"GET"; replace:“BET";)

snort_inline logging 03/23-21:21: [**] [1:0:0] Dropping Telnet connection [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} : > :23 03/23-21:21: [**] [1:0:0] Modifying HTTP GET command [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} : > :80

Sebek * Keystroke Logging * Sebek is developed by Ed Balas, Indiana University

Looking at Keystrokes

Attacks logged

And our attacker is…?

IRC traffic plugin output

Legal Issues Entrapment Liability Privacy

Entrapment Applies only to law enforcement Useful only as defence in criminal prosecution Still, most legal authorities consider honeypots non-entrapment

Liability An organization may be liable if their honeypot is used to attack or damage third parties Example: T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp. (No weather radios) Civil issue, not criminal Decided at state level, not federal This is why the Honeynet Project focuses so much attention on Data Control.

Privacy No single US federal statute concerning privacy Electronic Communications Privacy Act (amends Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968) Title I: Wiretap Act (18 USC § ) Title II: Stored Communications Act (18 USC § ) Title III: Pen/Trap Act (18 USC § )

The Honeywall

Honeywall Bootable CD-ROM Standard ISO distribution GenII Data Capture/Data Control features Sebek Simple User Interface Auto-configure from floppy Customization features “Template” customization (file system) Run-time boot customization

Standardized Hardware

Example honeynet 1 Honeywall w/1 honeypot & direct management connection

Direct Connections Advantages Can’t sniff traffic Fewer cables Can put in-line in emergency w/o disruption (FAST!) Disadvantages One honeypot/honeywall/management host Can’t directly manage from central location Requires mgmt host be in proximity Doesn’t scale

Example honeynet 2 Honeywall w/2 honeypots & shared management connection

Shared Connections Advantages Remotely accessible Easily expand number logging to central host Can logically monitor many systems using VLANs Disadvantages Can sniff traffic Attacker can more easily locate honeywall Requires encryption and/or VLAN

Example honeynet 3 Honeywall in managed wireless network

Future Distributed sensor networks Configuration/ reconfiguration Central Logging & Alerting OPSEC Honeypot management & analysis (forensics take time!)

Thank you More information u.washington.edu Slides available at: