Scaling up rural sanitation in Vietnam Experiences with a problem-driven approach to the political economy of water and sanitation Daniel Harris Michelle Kooy Pham Quang Nam 16 January 2012

Problem statement Given persistently disappointing outcomes in the rural sanitation subsector, why is it that a number of seemingly successful pilot programmes of various ‘innovative approaches’ in the subsector have not been scaled up? 2

Findings Ensuring sufficient intra-sectoral allocation for any approach to improving rural sanitation Why an effective pilot isn’t enough: Overcoming barriers to innovative approaches to sanitation – Formal barriers Regulations on recurrent/development expenditure – Informal barriers Visibility, credit and risk-reward calculations for sanitation planners – Operational realities: Partners at scale 3

Partners at scale 4

Implications 5 National enabling environment Securing funds for sanitation subsector within the WATSAN sector (in NTP3) Development of guidance on budgeting for innovative approaches (NTP3 budget circular) Develop (outcome- based) performance indicators Rebalance between investment and recurrent expenditure Provide a legal basis for adopting innovative approaches (NTP3) Provincial decision-making Support in developing detailed budgets for implementation of recurrent spending Leverage incentives (top-down and bottom-up) for provincial and other local level leadership Pilot projects Include mechanisms to progressively shift to government systems (or other actors capable of operating at scale) Provide evidence of outcomes and benefits accruing to local leadership Awareness of funding mechanisms, options for innovative approaches (including availability of TA where necessary) Demonstrate feasible cost norms and accounting for the cost of all inputs (sequenced funding) Push the boundaries of accepted approaches to sanitation

Extended engagement 6 Clarity of purpose Problem identification Pre-analysis Systemic factors Actors, Incentives Prescription Analysis Uptake of findings Evaluation Thinking Programming Outcomes Post- analysis

Many thanks to Mark Harvey, Renwick Irvine, Ngo Thi Quynh Hoa, Than Thi Thien Huong and others at DFID-Vietnam for their assistance and engagement with the project, Helen Richards and Jane Crowder at DFID-UK, Simon O’Meally for his leadership on initial project development, and all those who have contributed time and thoughts to the work. The views presented here are those of the speaker, and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI or our partners. 111 Westminster Bridge Road, London, SE1 7JD T:

Problem-driven analysis What is the challenge, or ‘problem’ to be addressed? Begin with identification and review of evidence of poor outcomes to which political economy weaknesses appear to contribute What are the systemic factors in place that are relevant to the problem? Analysis of systemic factors including features of geography, geopolitics, population, culture and social structure; Historical legacies; Formal and informal institutions What combination of perceived incentives shape the behaviour leading to this problem? Analysis of: 1.Stakeholders’ interests, influence and alignment; 2.Problems of: Credible commitment; Collective action (free riding, tragedy of commons, etc.); Moral hazard; Information asymmetry among principals and agents; Exit, voice and loyalty 8 Source: Adapted from Fritz et al., 2009:7