Review: Game theory Dominant strategy Nash equilibrium

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Presentation transcript:

Review: Game theory Dominant strategy Nash equilibrium Alice: Testify Alice: Refuse Bob: Testify -5,-5 -10,0 Bob: Refuse 0,-10 -1,-1 Dominant strategy Nash equilibrium Pareto optimal outcome

Game of Chicken Is there a dominant strategy for either player? -10, -10 -1, 1 1, -1 0, 0 Straight Chicken Is there a dominant strategy for either player? Is there a Nash equilibrium? (Straight, chicken) or (chicken, straight) Anti-coordination game: it is mutually beneficial for the two players to choose different strategies Model of escalated conflict in humans and animals (hawk-dove game) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_of_chicken

Mixed strategy equilibria Player 1 Player 2 S C -10, -10 -1, 1 1, -1 0, 0 Straight Chicken Mixed strategy: a player chooses between the moves according to a probability distribution Suppose each player chooses S with probability 1/10. Is that a Nash equilibrium? Consider payoffs to P1 while keeping P2’s strategy fixed The payoff of P1 choosing S is (1/10)(–10) + (9/10)1 = –1/10 The payoff of P1 choosing C is (1/10)(–1) + (9/10)0 = –1/10 Is there a different strategy that can improve P1’s payoff? Similar reasoning applies to P2

Finding mixed strategy equilibria P1: Choose S with prob. p P1: Choose C with prob. 1-p P2: Choose S with prob. q -10, -10 -1, 1 P2: Choose C with prob. 1-q 1, -1 0, 0 Expected payoffs for P1 given P2’s strategy: P1 chooses S: q(–10) +(1–q)1 = –11q + 1 P1 chooses C: q(–1) + (1–q)0 = –q In order for P2’s strategy to be part of a Nash equilibrium, P1 has to be indifferent between its two actions: –11q + 1 = –q or q = 1/10 Similarly, p = 1/10

Mixed strategy equilibria: Another example Wife: Ballet Football Husband: 3, 2 0, 0 Husband:Football 2, 3 Pure strategy equilibria: (Ballet, ballet) or (football, football)

Mixed strategy equilibria: Another example Wife: Ballet w/ prob. p Football w/ prob. 1-p Husband: Ballet w/ prob. q 3, 2 0, 0 Husband: Football w/ prob 1-q 2, 3 Payoff to wife assuming she chooses ballet: Payoff to wife assuming she chooses football: 3q = 2(1–q) or q = 2/5 Payoff to husband assuming he chooses ballet: Payoff to husband assuming he chooses football: 2p = 3(1–p) or p = 3/5 Mixed strategy equilibrium: wife picks ballet w/ probability 3/5 and husband picks football with probability 3/5 3q 2(1–q) 2p 3(1-p)

Mixed strategy equilibria: Another example Wife: Ballet w/ prob. p Football w/ prob. 1-p Husband: Ballet w/ prob. q 3, 2 0, 0 Husband: Football w/ prob 1-q 2, 3 Mixed strategy equilibrium: wife picks ballet w/ probability 3/5 and husband picks football with probability 3/5 How often do they end up in different places? P(wife = ballet, husband = football or wife = football, husband = ballet) = 3/5 * 3/5 + 2/5 * 2/5 = 13/25 What is the expected payoff for each? 3/5 * 2/5 * 3 + 3/5 * 2/5 * 2 = 6/5 What is the payoff for always going to the other’s preferred event?

Back to rock-paper-scissors Zero-sum game: want to find minimax solution for P1 0,0 1,-1 -1,1 P2

Back to rock-paper-scissors Zero-sum game: want to find minimax solution for P1 Let r, p, s = probability of P1 playing rock, paper, scissors Let’s find the expected payoffs for P1 given different actions of P2: P2 plays rock: u = r(0) + p(1) + s(–1) = p – s P2 plays paper: u = r(–1) + p(0) + s(1) = s – r P2 plays scissors: u = r(1) + p(–1) + s(0) = r – p P2 is trying to minimize P1’s utility, so we have u  p – s; u  s – r; u  r – p To find r, p, s, maximize u subject to the above constraints and r + p + s = 1 Linear programming problem Solution is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) 1 -1 P2

Computing Nash equilibria Any game with a finite set of actions has at least one Nash equilibrium If a player has a dominant strategy, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which the player plays that strategy and the other player plays the best response to that strategy If both players have strictly dominant strategies, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which they play those strategies

Computing Nash equilibria For a two-player zero-sum game, simple linear programming problem For non-zero-sum games, the algorithm has worst-case running time that is exponential in the number of actions For more than two players, and for sequential games, things get pretty hairy

Nash equilibria and rational decisions If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, it will be adopted if each player is rational and the payoff matrix is accurate doesn’t make mistakes in execution is capable of computing the Nash equilibrium believes that a deviation in strategy on their part will not cause the other players to deviate there is common knowledge that all players meet these conditions http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium

Nash equilibria and rational decisions Do you have a dominant strategy? yes no Play dominant strategy Do you know what the opponent will do? yes no Maximize utility Is opponent rational? yes no Can agree on a Nash equilibrium? Maximize worst-case outcome yes no Play the equilibrium strategy Maximize worst-case outcome

More fun stuff: Ultimatum game Alice and Bob are given a sum of money S to divide Alice picks A, the amount she wants to keep for herself Bob picks B, the smallest amount of money he is willing to accept If S – A  B, Alice gets A and Bob gets S – A If S – A < B, both players get nothing What is the Nash equilibrium? Alice offers Bob the smallest amount of money he will accept: S – A = B Alice offers Bob nothing and Bob is not willing to accept anything less than the full amount: A = S, B = S (both players get nothing) How would humans behave in this game? If Bob perceives Alice’s offer as unfair, Bob will be likely to refuse Is this rational? Maybe Bob gets some positive utility for “punishing” Alice?

Repeated games Cooperate Defect -1,-1 0,-10 -10,0 -5,-5 What if the Prisoner’s Dilemma is played for many rounds and the players remember what happened in the previous rounds? What if the number of games is fixed and known in advance to both players? Then the equilibrium is still to defect If the number of games is random or unknown, cooperation may become a equilibrium strategy Perpetual punishment: cooperate unless the other player has ever defected Tit for tat: start by cooperating, repeat the other player’s previous move for all subsequent rounds In order for these strategies to work, the players must know that they have both adopted them

Some multi-player games The diner’s dilemma A group of people go out to eat and agree to split the bill equally. Each has a choice of ordering a cheap dish or an expensive dish (the utility of the expensive dish is higher than that of the cheap dish, but not enough for you to want to pay the difference) Nash equilibrium is for everybody to get the expensive dish El Farol bar problem (W. Brian Arthur) If less than 60% of the town’s population go to the bar, they will have a better time than if they stayed at home. If more than 60% of the people go to the bar, the bar will be too crowded and they will have a worse time than if they stayed at home Nash equilibrium must be a mixed strategy

Mechanism design (inverse game theory) Assuming that agents pick rational strategies, how should we design the game to achieve a socially desirable outcome? We have multiple agents and a center that collects their choices and determines the outcome

Auctions Goals Maximize revenue to the seller Efficiency: make sure the buyer who values the goods the most gets them Minimize transaction costs for buyer and sellers

Ascending-bid auction What’s the optimal strategy for a buyer? Bid until the current bid value exceeds your private value Usually revenue-maximizing and efficient, unless the reserve price is set too low or too high Disadvantages Collusion Lack of competition Has high communication costs

Sealed-bid auction Each buyer makes a single bid and communicates it to the auctioneer, but not to the other bidders Simpler communication More complicated decision-making: the strategy of a buyer depends on what they believe about the other buyers Not necessarily efficient Sealed-bid second-price auction: the winner pays the price of the second-highest bid Let V be your private value and B be the highest bid by any other buyer If V > B, your optimal strategy is to bid above B – in particular, bid V If V < B, your optimal strategy is to bid below B – in particular, bid V Therefore, your dominant strategy is to bid V This is a truth revealing mechanism

Dollar auction A dollar bill is being auctioned off. It goes to the highest bidder, but the second-highest bidder also has to pay Player 1 bids 1 cent Player 2 bids 2 cents … Player 2 bids 98 cents Player 1 bids 99 cents If Player 2 passes, he loses 98 cents, if he bids $1, he might still come out even So Player 2 bids $1 Now, if Player 1 passes, he loses 99 cents, if he bids $1.01, he only loses 1 cent What went wrong? When figuring out the expected utility of a bid, a rational player should take into account the future course of the game How about Player 1 starts by bidding 99 cents?

Tragedy of the commons States want to set their policies for controlling emissions Each state can reduce their emissions at a cost of -10 or continue to pollute at a cost of -5 If a state decides to pollute, -1 is added to the utility of every other state What is the dominant strategy for each state? Continue to pollute Each state incurs cost of -5-49 = -54 If they all decided to deal with emissions, they would incur a cost of only -10 each Mechanism for fixing the problem: Tax each state by the total amount by which they reduce the global utility (externality cost) This way, continuing to pollute would now cost -54

Game theory issues Is it applicable to real life? Humans are not always rational Utilities may not always be known Other assumptions made by the game-theoretic model may not hold Political difficulties may prevent theoretically optimal mechanisms from being implemented Could it be more applicable to AI than to real life? Computing equilibria in complicated games is difficult Relationship between Nash equilibrium and rational decision making is subtle