Conflict Resolution Threat-display contests Variable length contests

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Presentation transcript:

Conflict Resolution Threat-display contests Variable length contests Hawk-dove-bully Hawk-dove-assessor Variable length contests War-of-attrition Sequential assessment Variable sequence contests

Dove-Bully Game Opponent: Bully Dove Actor: Bully Dove V/2 V 0 V/2 If V = 2 then Opponent: Bully Dove Actor: Bully 1 2 Dove 0 1 Bully is a pure ESS

Hawk-Bully Game Opponent: Bully Hawk Actor: Bully Hawk V/2 0 V (V-C)/2 If V = 2, C = 4 then Opponent: Bully Hawk Actor: Bully 1 0 Hawk 2 -1 Yes, Hawks can invade Bullies, but Bullies invade Hawks Therefore, this is a mixed ESS

Correlated asymmetry Opponents differ in RHP Example: hawk - dove - assessor Assessor strategy: if larger play hawk, if smaller play dove If owner and intruder are equally frequent and get equal payoffs: Opponent: Hawk Dove Assessor Actor: Hawk Dove Assessor (V-C)/2 V (V-C)/2 0 V/2 V/4 V/2 3V/4 V/2 When there is a cost to fighting, Assessor is pure ESS assuming that assessment is costless and accurate

Calling in toads

War of attrition - the waiting game Assumptions Resource cannot be shared Cost of display increases with length of contest No information is received during contest and opponents are symmetrical Winner is the contestant willing to accept the higher cost The cost to both contestants equals the cost acceptable to the loser The range of actions of each contestant is continuous

War of attrition - Payoff matrix xi = amount of time individual i displays k = rate at which costs are expended V = value of resource Payoff to: Player A Player B Actor : xA > xB Opponent: xA < xB V - kxB - kxB - kxA V - kxA No pure ESS is possible, since an opponent that displayed a little bit longer would have higher fitness Solution is a mixed ESS where the probability of leaving at any time is a constant. The times an individual stays should be distributed as a negative exponential.

Asymmetric war-of-attrition If animals experience different costs of display or the resource differs in value to them, the game is asymmetric Which player has the largest V/k will win, but this may not be known This may lead to two different giving up time strategies

War-of-attrition solutions

Fight duration and resource value in newts Males fight longer over larger females. Larger females carry more eggs and are, therefore, more valuable.

Sequential assessment Assumptions Animals display in order to acquire information about each other’s fighting ability and resource value Fights only occur when animals are closely matched Predictions Fight duration increases as the asymmetry in fighting ability decreases and/or as resource value increases The cost of a fight increases as the asymmetry in fighting ability decreases Probability of winning increases with asymmetry

Sequential assessment ESS

War of attrition in spiders Resource value equal

Ownership effects in spider fights

War of attrition in spiders

Assessment in red deer

Jumping spider contest stages

Sequential assessment in phases

Sequential assessment in cichlids

Why give multiple signals? Each display serves a different function Signal erosion: threat displays lose effectiveness as the frequency of bluff increases Displays transmit graded information about display intentions Multiple signals may lower potential risk associated with escalation

Cricket display costs

Little blue penguin fights Cave dwellers use more displays, but have lower escalated fights

Little blue penguin display repertoire