1.5 - Two Summary Examples1 Two Summary Examples Section 1.5.

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Presentation transcript:

1.5 - Two Summary Examples1 Two Summary Examples Section 1.5

1.5 - Two Summary Examples2 Ex. 1 Who Wins? ABCD BCAC DDDB CABA Earlier we saw that wins using Plurality wins using Instant Run-off wins using Hare

1.5 - Two Summary Examples3 Who wins using Borda? 1. A 2. B 3. C 4. D Pts ABCD3 BCAC2 DDDB1 CABA0 0 of 30

1.5 - Two Summary Examples4 Who wins using Condorcet? 1. A 2. B 3. C 4. D 5. No winner ABCD BCAC DDDB CABA 0 of 30

1.5 - Two Summary Examples5 Who wins using Approval? Voters approve of candidates in Green 1.A 2.B 3.C 4.D ABCD BCAC DD D B CABA 0 of 30

1.5 - Two Summary Examples6 Ex. 2 Who Wins? MARiRaVV VARiA VRaVV Ri RaARiA AMMMMM

1.5 - Two Summary Examples7 Plurality MARiRaVV VARiA VRaVV Ri RaARiA AMMMMM 1. M. 2. A 3. Ri 4. Ra 5. V 0 of 30

1.5 - Two Summary Examples8 Instant Run-off 1. M 2. A. 3. Ri 4. Ra 5. V MARiRaVV VARiA VRaVV Ri RaARiA AMMMMM 0 of 30

1.5 - Two Summary Examples9 Hare 1. M 2. A 3. Ri. 4. Ra 5. V MARiRaVV VARiA VRaVV Ri RaARiA AMMMMM 0 of 30

1.5 - Two Summary Examples10 Borda 1. M 2. A 3. Ri 4. Ra. 5. V Pts MARiRaVV4 VARiA 3 VRaVV 2 Ri RaARiA1 AMMMMM0 0 of 30

1.5 - Two Summary Examples11 Condorcet 1. M 2. A 3. Ri 4. Ra 5. V MARiRaVV VARiA VRaVV Ri RaARiA AMMMMM 0 of 30

1.5 - Two Summary Examples12 Approval 1. M 2. A 3. Ri 4. Ra 5. V MARiRaVV V ARi A V RaVV RaRa Ri RaARiA AMMMMM 0 of 30

1.5 - Two Summary Examples13 End of 1.5

1.5 - Two Summary Examples14 Meta-Material