International civil servants Constructivist perspectives (Barnett and Finnemore 2004): –International bureaucrats apply authority in influential ways, such as by classifying and defining overall discourse in a given policy area, fixing meaning in the social world and actively guiding norm diffusion (Barnett and Finnemore 2004:31)

International civil servants Types of authority: Moral authority: “impartial representation of common interest/higher goals” Rational-legal authority: vested in legalities, procedures, rules (impersonal) Expert authority: specialized knowledge (socially recognized), knowledge creates appearance of de-politicization

International civil servants Autonomy emanate from Vague mandates Agenda-setting Information asymmetry Social construction of reality “missionaries of our times aiming to define what constitutes acceptable state behaviour”

International civil servants The story is about pathological agency behaviour / run-away agent, mission creep IMF (conditionality) UN High Commissioner for Refugees (repatriation of refugees) UN peacekeeping (Rwanda - nonintervention)

A (rational) response: principal-agent (PA) theories PA relationship governed by a contract (Hawkins et al. 2006):  “a grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former (…) limited in time or scope (…) must be revocable by principals” “Relatively theory-neutral” Focus on:  reasons for delegation  the concepts of agency losses based on information asymmetry  controlling agents

The four steps of PA theory Why principals delegate (to IOs) How principals control Agent autonomy (by design) How agents use “autonomy” (and under what conditions…)

Why principals delegate to IOs? (Hawkins et al. 2006) Specialization / division of labor Managing various policy externalities Facilitating collective decision-making (endless cycling) Enhancing credibility (time-inconsistency problems) Resolving disputes (addressing reneging, compliance) Creating policy bias (lock-in) ☛ Preference heterogeneity ☛ Power

How principals control Ex ante control:  Screening and selection (“hiring an agent”)  Existing or new institution/agent? On the spot control:  Information/oversight: personal control vs. third party assistance (police-patrol vs. fire-alarm)  Direct influence: budgeting, Committee work Ex post control:  Sanctioning (acceptance, implementation, re-contracting)

Agent autonomy by design Autonomy is a by-product of delegation (there is no complete contract) Autonomy differs (nature of the task, degree of control):  Agenda-setting agent  Negotiation agent  Implementation agent  Enforcement agent  Arbitration agent

How agents use “autonomy” Agent positions (own preferences, reading of mandate, socialization, control structures) Different risk profile: risk-taking vs. risk-minimizing Different behavioral patterns  Work to rule…  Filling the gap…  Exploiting asymmetry…  Buffering…  Building permeability…  Interpretation…  Norm diffusion…

PA applied The World Trade Organization’s Secretariat and trade negotiations Background:  The role of the Secretariat in assisting negotiations  The negotiation agent lost influence over time (variance)  Leading explanations are not satisfactory ☛ the puzzle of missing delegation

WTO: The puzzle of “missing” delegation Rational explanations for delegation (Hawkins et al. 2006, Martin 2006): We should observe that states favour delegation…  …when they lack international influence  …when states are dissatisfied with the status quo  …when preferences among states diverge (which goes hand in hand with stricter control mechanisms)  …when staff and states have similar preferences

Size of contracting parties’ Geneva mission (2006) 48

The omitted variable: proximate principals Sovereign Principal (Contracting Parties / Ministerial Meetings) Proximate Principal (General Council) Agent (in the narrow sense) (DG and staff)     The IO as a Complex Agent (agent in the wider sense)

The omitted variable: proximate principals Why resistance to further delegation? ☛ Interest of proximate principals: material and social factors ☛ Lack of trust in international civil servants

Alternative explanations The power argument (Steinberg 2002) The legalization argument (Goldstein and Martin 2001, Pauwelyn 2005)

Agents: Servants of Masters?