BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE AGENCY FOR ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS May 2006

Workshop on Angra Neutrino Detector Design CBPF – May ABACC ACTIVITIES PRESENTED BY Antonio Abel Oliveira Secretary (ARG)

Argentina and Brazil, together, constitute an area of km 2, surpassed only by the Russian Federation. Population of 200 million inhabitants. Represents two thirds of South America’s surface, population and Gross National Product (GNP). Industrializing countries with a medium size industrial capability.

Foundation and Purpose Binational organization created in July 1991 with the purpose to manage and apply the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC), established by the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Argentine. Its headquarters are located in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. ABACC also has an office in Buenos Aires, Argentine.

ABACC and the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - SCCC The Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials is a mechanism created in order to verify if Argentine and Brazil utilize their nuclear materials exclusively for pacific purposes.

Declarations and Other Documents in the Field of Nuclear Safeguards 1985 – Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu 1987 – Declaration of Viedma 1988 – Declaration of Iperó 1990 – Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu 1991 –Bilateral Agreement for for the Exclusively Pacific Use of Nuclear Energy (18/07/91) 1991 – Quadripartite Agreement for the Application of Comprehensive Safeguards (13/12/91) 1994 – Enforcement of the Quadripartite Agreement 1994 – Full adhesion of Argentine (in January) and of Brazil (in May) to the Treaty of Tlatelolco 1995 – Adhesion of Argentine to the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (TNP) 1997 – Adhesion of Brazil to the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (TNP) 2005 – Puerto Iguazú Commitment

The Bilateral Agreement F In July 1991, the Bilateral Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy was signed. F Established the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) F Created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

The Bilateral Agreement F The Basic Undertakings of the bilateral Agreement between Argentina and Brazil are: F To use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. F To prohibit in the respective territories: F The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means of any nuclear weapon; and F The receipt, storage, installation, deployment or any other form of possession of any nuclear weapon.

The SCCC The SCCC consists of the General Procedures and the Application Manuals for each installation. F The General Procedures contain the directives of the SCCC. F The Application Manuals are negotiated between ABACC and the respective country for each facility.

The SCCC The adequate level of accounting and control on nuclear material in each facility and other locations shall be specified in the corresponding Application Manual, taking into account: F The nuclear material category, considering its relevant isotopic composition; F The conversion time; F The inventory of annual throughput of nuclear material production.

The National Authorities The National Authorities play a significant and special role in the implementation of the SCCC: Besides the usual activities at the State level, each of the National Authorities is the channel through which ABACC requires the services needed to perform control activities in the other country.

ABACC-IAEA relationship the Quadripartite Agreement The Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the IAEA for the Application of safeguards, called the Quadripartite Agreement, entered into force in March The Basic Undertakings of the Quadripartite Agreement are: The IAEA, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the SCCC. The acceptance by the State Parties of safeguards on all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities within their territories, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

ABACC-IAEA relationship Furthermore, The State Parties, ABACC and the IAEA shall cooperate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in the Agreement. ABACC and the IAEA shall reach independent conclusions. ABACC and the IAEA shall avoid unnecessary duplication of safeguards activities. A CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE IAEA AND ABACC TO AVOID UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS AND TO REACH INDEPENDENT CONCLUSIONS IS MANDATORY.

Regional systems enhancing safeguards The practice of international safeguards can be strengthened by two means: by improving the ability to detect diversion of declared nuclear material; or by strengthening the ability to detect non-declared activities, especially related to the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

Regional systems enhancing safeguards In 1995 the IAEA introduced new measures to strengthen its safeguards and to detect non-declared nuclear activities. IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT BOTH THE SCCC AND ABACC WERE ESTABLISHED IN 1991, ABACC’s SAFEGUARDS APPROACH NEVER EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF MISUSE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS OR FACILITIES.

Regional systems enhancing safeguards A regional organization presents the advantage of controlling a small universe of facilities and material. It is not required to follow universal standard procedures as requested in an international system. Mutual inspection system implemented by ABACC makes it possible to profit from the best professional expertise available in each of the two countries.

Chief Attributions Manage and apply the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in Argentine and in Brazil. Nominate inspectors, perform and evaluate inspections and other procedures which are necessary to the application of the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials – SCCC. Represent Argentine and Brazil before third parties with reference to the application of the SCCC. Celebrate international agreements with the express authorization from Argentine and Brazil.

ABACC Criteria The safeguards basic criteria and procedures adopted by ABACC do not constitute a rigid set of rules. Each specific case is studied and control measures are established taking into account the facility and the characteristics of the nuclear installations in each country.

Confidentiality of the Information ABACC is not allowed to disclose industrial, commercial or any confidential information regarding the facilities and the features of the nuclear programs of Argentine and Brazil without the express consent of the parties.

Organization Commission 2 argentine members 2 brazilian members Secretariat Professional staff (12) Auxiliary staff (5) Inspectors (83)

Attributions of the Commission Approve the General Procedures and the Manuals on the Application of Nuclear Safeguards. Provide the necessary means for the Secretariat of ABACC. Notify the state parties of any irregularity which may occur in the application of the SCCC. Supervise the activities of the Secretariat, set guidelines for its operation, appoint the professional and auxiliary staff besides designating safeguards inspectors. Request the state parties the authorization to create ad-hoc groups of advisers in order to improve the implementation of the SCCC.

Attributions of the Secretariat Follow the guidelines established by ABACC’s Commission. Execute the activities which are necessary to the application and management of the SCCC, including the indication of inspectors, the analysis and evaluation of their reports, giving notice to the Commission of any irregularity in the application of the SCCC. Prepare the annual budget of ABACC to be submitted to the Commission. Report its activities to the Commission. Act as ABACC’s representative in its relations with the state parties as well as with third parties, by mandate of the Commission.

Organization of the Secretariat Secretaries (2- 1 from each country- ) Planning and evaluation (2) Operations (2) Accounting of nuclear materials (2) Technical support (2) Institutional relations (1) Management and finances (1)

Planning and Evaluation Plan and develop safeguards approaches and criteria to be applied in cooperation with the IAEA. Evaluate the fulfillment of the safeguards goals by both countries. Evaluate the diversion of nuclear materials scenarios and establish adequate counter- measures. Develop procedures for joint inspections for ABACC and IAEA. Analysis and evaluation of the Design Information Questionnaires and their joint documents.

Operations Plan and coordinate safeguards inspections performed in Argentine and in Brazil. Coordinate with the National Authorities and the IAEA the planning and execution of inspections. Prepare and evaluate the inspectors for the application of safeguards. Update the ABACC Operations database. Cooperate with other sectors of ABACC to prepare safeguards approaches for nuclear facilities.

Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials Account for the nuclear materials in Argentine and Brazil. Process, evaluate and forward to the IAEA the accounting information received from the National Authorities. Evaluate the results of inspection activities with respect to the accounting information. Verify, follow up and clarify any discrepancies in the accounting information. Develop computerized systems and provide for personal training to perform properly nuclear accounting activities. Develop safe communication procedures for the accounting information of Argentine and Brazil.

Technical Support Coordinate the analyses necessary to safeguards application. Identify, purchase, assemble, calibrate, install and provide for the maintenance of equipment and materials. Prepare the safeguard equipment for utilization during inspections. Organize the training of ABACC and IAEA inspectors. Coordinate the development of new equipment and methodologies to be used by ABACC or in collaboration with the IAEA.

Institutional Relations Assist the Secretariat of ABACC in its communication strategies and relations with other organizations, public and press. Plan, coordinate and edit the publications of ABACC. Update, maintain and coordinate the website and the intranet of ABACC. Follow the edition of the cooperation agreements involving the ABACC. Provide for the maintenance of the privileges and immunities of ABACC and its staff.

Management and Finance Manage the necessary actions to the operation of ABACC. Take care of the personnel of ABACC. Deal with the finances of ABACC, including its Annual Balance. Provide the necessary information for the Auditing Annual Report.

Budget U$S

TC with foreign organizations With DOE (agreement in force since April 1994) With Euratom (agreement in force since February 1999) With IAEA (agreement in force since May 1998) With TCNC/KAERI (arrangement in force since January 2000) Cooperation without formal agreement: with the Commissariat à L’Energie Atomique (CEA), France. with the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC), Japan.

Areas / Fields of Cooperation Training (inspectors & personnel). Safeguards techniques and equipment development: unattended measurement systems & remote monitoring; environmental sampling; containment & surveillance. Intercomparison of laboratories and analytical results: DA & NDA; Hi Performance Trace Analysis (HPTA).

Areas / Fields of Cooperation Procurement, characterization and use of standards nuclear material. Information treatment & management. Material accountancy & data transmission. Development of safeguards documents, criteria and guidelines. Approaches for facilities such as: enrichment plants, CANDU reactors, fabrication facilities. Role of Regional Safeguards Systems and interaction with SSAC & IAEA systems.

Facilities in Argentina and Brazil

Number of Inspections Number of inspections

Availability/Inspection effort

What can be extrapolated from ABACC’s experience? The creation of ABACC to administer the SCCC was a political decision in the framework of the establishment of a free trade area in the region: there was a need to provide transparency of Brazil and Argentina’s nuclear programs.

Internal barriers that need to be overcome to allow a Regional System to reach its goals: attain willingness from the States Parties to give transparency to their nuclear programs, thus creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence; convey such atmosphere to the international community; achieve technical credibility of the system and international acknowledgement thereof. can be What extrapolated from ABACC’s experience?

What can be extrapolated from ABACC’s experience? There is no need to follow universally applied criteria and procedures; Possibility for inspection teams to be staffed with specialists in the process to be controlled; Formal and informal channels that provide access to far more data than those Argentina and Brazil are obliged to supply to the IAEA.

Integrated Safeguards Integrated Safeguards should consider the existence of SSAC and RSAC with good degree of credibility. To the extent possible, conventional safeguards should be delegated to the national and regional systems, under adequate quality assurance procedures and audited by the IAEA.

Thank you!