Stabile Marriage Thanks to Mohammad Mahdian Lab for Computer Science, MIT.

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Presentation transcript:

Stabile Marriage Thanks to Mohammad Mahdian Lab for Computer Science, MIT

Stable Marriage Consider a set of n women and n men. Each person has an ordered list of some members of the opposite sex as his or her preference list. Let µ be a matching between women and men. A pair (m, w) is a blocking pair if both m and w prefer being together to their assignments under µ. Also, (x, x) is a blocking pair, if x prefers being single to his/her assignment under µ. A matching is stable if it does not have any blocking pair.

Example LucyPeppermintMarcieSally CharlieLinusSchroederFranklin Schroeder Charlie Franklin Linus Schroeder Linus Franklin Lucy Peppermint Marcie Peppermint Sally Marcie Sally Marcie Lucy Stable! Charlie Linus Franklin

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms In each iteration, an unmarried man proposes to the first woman on his list that he hasn’t proposed to yet. A woman who receives a proposal that she prefers to her current assignment accepts it and rejects her current assignment. This is called the men-proposing algorithm. (Gale and Shapley, 1962)

Example LucyPeppermintMarcieSally CharlieLinusSchroederFranklin Schroeder Charlie Franklin Linus Schroeder Linus Franklin Lucy Peppermint Marcie Peppermint Sally Marcie Sally Marcie Lucy Stable! Charlie Linus Franklin Schroeder Charlie Franklin Linus Schroeder Charlie Linus Franklin Schroeder Charlie Linus Franklin Linus Franklin Lucy Peppermint Marcie Sally Marcie Lucy Peppermint Sally Marcie Lucy Peppermint Marcie Peppermint Sally Marcie

Theorem 1. The order of proposals does not affect the stable matching produced by the men-proposing algorithm. Theorem 2. The matching produced by the men- proposing algorithm is the best stable matching for men and the worst stable matching for women. This matching is called the men-optimal matching. Theorem 3. In all stable matchings, the set of people who remain single is the same. Classical Results

Applications of stable matching Stable marriage algorithm has applications in the design of centralized two-sided markets. For example:  National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) since 1950’s  Dental residencies and medical specialties in the US, Canada, and parts of the UK.  National university entrance exam in Iran  Placement of Canadian lawyers in Ontario and Alberta  Sorority rush  Matching of new reform rabbis to their first congregation ……