Individual Transferable Quotas in the Baltic Sea Herring Fishery: a Socio-bioeconomic Analysis Soile Kulmala, Hanna Peltomäki, Marko Lindroos, Sakari Kuikka & Pirkko Söderkultalahti Workshop on: New Developments in Rights Based Fisheries Management: Community Fishing Rights 29-30th August, University of Southern Denmark, Esbjerg, Denmark

Structure of the talk Background Background Bioeconomic model and results Bioeconomic model and results Fishermen interviews Fishermen interviews Conclusions Conclusions

Background Baltic herring is the most important species Baltic herring is the most important species Fleet too big compared to TAC Fleet too big compared to TAC Fishing time restrictions Fishing time restrictions Declining herring stock Declining herring stock Poor economic performance Poor economic performance Fishermen recall for fishery policy change Fishermen recall for fishery policy change

Objective of present study Find out the possible economic, biological and social effects of ITQs Find out the possible economic, biological and social effects of ITQs  Bioeconomic analysis  Fishermen interviews

Bioeconomic model Age-structured population dynamics Current State TAC/IQ Future ? ITQ FOODFODDER Fishing costs Herring price CPUE

Bioeconomic Model 18 food trawlers 18 food trawlers 204 fodder trawlers 204 fodder trawlers Catch proportion Catch proportion Historical catches Historical catches Grandfathering Grandfathering Catch proportion Catch proportion 55 % food 45 % fodder Quota trade within segments Quota trade within segments 5 food trawlers 5 food trawlers 51 fodder trawlers 51 fodder trawlers IQ ITQ

Modelling results FNPV (M€) Current state Optimum with ITQs Optimum with IQs0.04 9

Modelling results Herring catch

Modelling results Spawning stock biomass

Modelling results FoodFodder Σ Whole fishery Quota price % from catch value NPV (M€) FNPV (M€) FNPV (M€) NPV (M€) F

Fishermen interview IQs better than current management system IQs better than current management system Increasing profitability Increasing profitability No capital interest (saving fish) No capital interest (saving fish) Vessel quota Vessel quota Only for professional fishermen Only for professional fishermen Grandfathering Grandfathering Historical catches Historical catches Transferability Transferability Flexibility Flexibility Market speculations Market speculations Concentration Concentration

Fodder (n = 8) Food (n = 5) Total (n = 13) 1. Are IQs necessary? No011 Yes729 I do not know / no answer The ownership of IQs should belong to fisherman202 boat639 fishing firm011 I do not know / no answer The quota buying right should be given to only for professional fishermen8311 all interested person011 I do not know / no answer The best way of initial allocation of quotas is by free to all active boats729 to sell quotas to active boats000 by auctions000 to give a major part of quotas free and auction the rest134 to sell major part with fixed price and auction the rest000 none of previous000 I do not know / no answer011

Fodder (n = 8) Food (n = 5) Total (n = 13) 5. The best criteria for initial allocation is historical catches707 value of boat and equipments000 combination of previous145 none of previous000 I do not know / no answer Should the quotas be transferable? without restrictions314 transitions should be restricted e.g. regionally011 quotas per owner should be restricted224 quotas should be non-transferable303 I do not know / no answer011

Conclusion Improving economic performance Improving economic performance Greater herring stock Greater herring stock Fishermen support Fishermen support Economic advice more concervative than biological Economic advice more concervative than biological  No effect on fishery policy

Thank you for your attention