Coye Cheshire & Andrew Fiore June 13, 2015 // Computer-Mediated Communication Trust and Trustworthiness Part II.

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Coye Cheshire & Andrew Fiore June 13, 2015 // Computer-Mediated Communication Trust and Trustworthiness Part II

6/13/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore1 Quick Recap of Sources of Uncertainty in Exchange/Interaction Quality of ‘goods’ or ‘services’ Structural uncertainty of an exchange Uncertainty about finding an exchange partner ?

6/13/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore2 No noble thing can be done without risks. “ ” — Michel Eyquem de Montaigne

6/13/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore3 Risk What is at stake in a given situation/interaction? - The risk may be defined by the situation (i.e., it cannot vary) - The risk may be vary across exchange situations with the same partners (in many cases the participants can change the relative risks)

6/13/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore4 Understanding trust through ‘games’

6/13/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore5 Rules for the CMC trust game…  Two players  Each player gets 3 items from the experimenter on each round.  Players simultaneously decide whether to ‘entrust’ 1 to 3 of their items to the other player.  Players decide whether to return the items to their partner or not.  If player returns the items, the experimenter DOUBLES the amount returned to the partner.  The player can just keep the entrusted items; then nothing is returned to the partner.

6/13/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore6 Debriefing… What were the risks? What were the sources of uncertainty? What are the opportunity cost(s) in this game? Does the game play any differently when there are repeated interactions with the same partner, compared to when there are new, random partners?

6/13/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore7 Prisoner’s Dilemma Keeps silentBetrays Keeps silent 6 mo. each A: 10 years B: freedom Betrays A: freedom B: 10 years 5 years each A B Two suspects are captured, A and B. What sentences do they receive?

6/13/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore8 Prisoner’s Dilemma CooperateDefect Cooperate Defect A B What if we consider the same problem with “benefit units” instead of prison years?

6/13/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore9 Trust-Building Processes in US and Japan

6/13/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore10 Trust-Building Processes in US and Japan