Professor Stefan Collignon Democratic Surveillance or Bureaucratic Suppression of National Sovereignty in the European Union? Ideas on the Multilateral Surveillance Regulation European Parliament 15. September 2010

Professor Stefan Collignon 2 I. It’s democracy, stupid! II. Debating competitiveness III. A democratic framework for budget surveillance

Professor Stefan Collignon 3 I. It’s democracy, stupid!

Professor Stefan Collignon 4 Europe has been built by “enlightened despotism” and present reform proposals for economic governance are more of the same But the legitimacy of policy-making behind closed doors is increasingly questionable –Compliance with rules and policy agreements is fading: Greece, Germany, Slovakia –Legitimacy by policy-output vanishes, as the Union does not produce the output people want

Professor Stefan Collignon 5 Recent Eurobarometer Between spring and autumn 2010, approval of the EU has fallen by 10 points in Germany and 17 points in Greece. At the same time national governments or parliaments inspire even less trust than European institutions Legitimacy matters –Good governance creates legitimacy –Legitimacy creates good governance

Professor Stefan Collignon 6 What’s wrong with economic governance? COM: the recent crisis “showed gaps and weaknesses in the current system, underlining the need for stronger and earlier policy co-ordination, additional prevention and correction mechanisms and a crisis resolution facility for euro-area Member States.”

Professor Stefan Collignon 7 What’s wrong with economic governance? ECB: “The disappointing performance of fiscal policies under the EU framework was due to the weak governance of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), notably (i) a lack of enforcement of fiscal discipline at the EU level and (ii) insufficient national incentives to comply with the EU rules.”

Professor Stefan Collignon 8 Policy proposals aim at raising the efficiency of policy making, –i.e. improving the system’s output, but none talks about the legitimacy of a political system, where policy compromises are negotiated between governments, and the democratic representatives of citizens, namely the European Parliament, have very little to say.

Professor Stefan Collignon 9 The fundamental questions Why was the governance so weak? What kind of incentives are needed to improve the situation? Who is legitimizing European policy decisions? How is it possible that governments tell each other what to do, when each has been democratically elected to something else?

Professor Stefan Collignon 10 Most reformers fail to see that democratic member states are responsive to national constituencies, and that this often leads them to ignore the European collective good as long as there is no European authority that can legitimately overrule and stop their uncooperative behaviour.

Professor Stefan Collignon 11 The answer A democratically legitimate Economic Government Representation of and deliberation by all citizens, not a in the faction of nation states Lisbon Treaty: “ordinary legislative process” (art. 294) sets a procedure for the interaction of Commission, Council and European Parliament.

Professor Stefan Collignon 12 II. Debating competitiveness

Professor Stefan Collignon 13 Economic competitiveness is a confused notion. Paul Krugman (1994) has famously argued: “Competitiveness is a seductive idea, promising easy answers to complex problems. But the result of this obsession is misallocated resources, trade frictions and bad domestic economic policies.”

Professor Stefan Collignon 14 What criteria? –Current account balances? What is good, what is bad? Engendered by fast or slow growth? –Structural positions intra & extra EU trade

Professor Stefan Collignon 15 Two concepts –Improve efficiency and productivity Lisbon strategy, 2020? –Be price-competitive and take market share ULC diverge

Professor Stefan Collignon 16 Wage negotiations are too nation based and secretive –Need to open Macroeconomic Dialogue –Open debate at EP before meeting with ECB

Professor Stefan Collignon 17 III. A democratic framework for budget surveillance

Professor Stefan Collignon 18 The need for more fiscal policy coordination: Defining the aggregate fiscal stance and control implementation Voluntary by sovereign MS? –Failure due to collective action problems –No taxation without representation Bureaucratic centralisation? –COM: European semester –ECB: independent expert panels Ordinary legislation process? –EP as citizens’ representation

Professor Stefan Collignon 19 A proposal: Borrowing permits 1.The Economic Guidelines become a Union legal act –that defines the general policy orientations and decides/authorises the optimal borrowing requirement for the Euro Area, –i.e. the aggregate budget deficit which is considered consistent with the economic environment (business cycle) and the structural requirements of the European economy (public investment, aging etc.).

Professor Stefan Collignon The European Parliament will have an active role in the formulation of the desirable aggregate policy stance. –Council must decide: political will 3. Each member state is allocated a share of the total borrowing authorization. Share of GDP possibility of horizontal transfers of the borrowing permits –Pollution permits

Professor Stefan Collignon 21

Professor Stefan Collignon Implementation. A European law (directive) could oblige financial institutions to lend only to public entities if they can present borrowing permits for the required amount. –Markets as police, not bureaucracy Ensures that no government can violate the budget position, which was considered optimal by the democratic institutions of the European Union.

Professor Stefan Collignon 23 Thus, contrary to the bureaucratic surveillance proposed by European authorities, the system of borrowing permits would give democratic legitimacy to defining the desirable aggregate budget position for the Euro Area, and decentralize the policy implementation

Professor Stefan Collignon 24 Crisis management Providing liquidity to MS governments at reasonable conditions –Not solvency issue which is concern of SGP Problem: distortion by market intervention Solution: Union Bond to generate portfolio effect of euro-liquidity risk.

Professor Stefan Collignon 25 Conclusion Europe has many common goods that affect all citizens They must be represented in governance Only the EP can provide this legitimacy

Professor Stefan Collignon 26 Thank you! Vive la République européenne!