1 Dr. David MacQuigg Research Associate Autonomic Computing Laboratory Autonomic Trust System – Verify Identity and Assess Reputation University of Arizona ECE 509 November 2008

June 13, The Problem with Trust on the Internet –Spam problem, $20B/year, “intractable” –Fraud and other serious crimes –Non-technical factors are critical Modeling of Mail Handling Systems –Actors, Agents, Terminology –Roles and Responsibilites Trust = Identity + Reputation Identity (Authentication) –IP-based (CSV, SPF, SenderID) –Signatures (DKIM) Reputation –Reputation/Accreditation Systems –Registry of Internet Transmitters

June 13, Economics of Abuse $200B annual benefit of $20B cost of abuse 100M users x ($.25/day deleting spam + $100/yr lost s) $2B benefit to anti-spam industry 100 companies x $20M/yr $0.2B benefit to spammers 10K spammers x $20K/yr $0.02B cost of an effective authentication/reputation system 10M users x $2/yr 100K companies x $200/yr (90% internal, 10% external services)

June 13, Textbook Model of a Mail Handling System Figure 9.1 Sequence of mail relays store and forward messages {Peterson & Davie, Computer Networks, 4 th ed.}

June 13, Real Mail Handling System P. Faltstrom, mail-flows-0.4, Jan 6, 2004,

June 13, D. Crocker, "Internet Mail Architecture", 2008, Function Modules and the Protocols used between them Relay-Level Model

June 13, Administrative-Level Model | ADMD1 | | ADMD3 | | ADMD4 | | | | | | | | | >| | | | | User | | |-Edge--+--->|-User | | | | | >| | | | | V | | | ADMD2 | | | Edge | | | | | | | | | |-Transit | | D. Crocker, "Internet Mail Architecture", 2008, Administrative Management Domains (ADMD)

June 13, The Internet Today Our Domain Trusted Forwarders The Swamp 3

June 13, Typical Mail Handling System ( a better textbook model ) |--- Sender's Network ---| |-- Recipient's Network -| / Author ==> MSA/Transmitter --> / --> Receiver/MDA ==> Recipient / Border

June 13, Proposed Model for Mail Handling Systems Simple Setup with four Actors |--- Sender's Network ---| |-- Recipient's Network -| / Author ==> MSA/Transmitter --> / --> Receiver/MDA ==> Recipient / Border Actors, Roles and Notation Actors include Users and Agents. Agents may play more than one role, but no role has more than one Actor. Typical roles include Transmitting, Receiving, Forwarding, and Delivery. A Border occurs when there is no prior relationship between Agents. --> Direction of mail flow (no statement as to relationship) ~~> Indirect relationship (e.g. both directly related to Recipient) ==> Direct relationship between Actors (e.g. a contract) A/B Roles A and B both played by the same Actor

June 13, Other Common Setups Simple Forwarding is quite common | Recipient's Network | / --> / --> Receiver/Forwarder ~~> MDA ==> Recipient / Border Chain Forwarding should be discouraged | Recipient's Network | / --> / --> Receiver ~~> Forwarder(s) ~~> MDA ==> Recipient / Border Open Forwarding must be banned / / |-- Recipient's Network -| --> / --> Forwarder --> / --> Receiver/MDA ==> Recipient / / Border Border

June 13, Roles and Responsibilities Author - Originate messages - Provide a password or other means of authentication MSA - Mail Submission Agent - Authenticate the Author - Manage Author accounts Transmitter - Spam Prevention - rate limits, content analysis, alerts - respond to spam reports - maintain reputation - Authentication - RFC compliance - IP authorization (SPF, SID, CSV,...) - signatures & key management (DKIM...) Receiver - Block DoS - Authenticate Sender - HELO, Return Address, Headers, Signature - reject forgeries - Assess reputation - whitelists - Filter spam - Add authentication headers - Manage Recipient accounts/options - whitelisting, blacklisting, filtering, blocking, forwarding - Process spam reports

June 13, Roles and Responsibilities (continued) Forwarder - Authenticate upstream Agent - Set up forwarding to downstream Agent - check RFC compliance - set up authentication records - submit forwarding request, wait for approval - Manage Recipient accounts - maintain database of forwarding addresses - suspend account when a message is rejected - communicate w Recipient re " " - Maintain reputation as a trusted Forwarder - certifications MDA - Mail Delivery Agent - Authenticate upstream Agent - Sort and store messages - Provide access for Recipients - POP3, IMAP, Webmail - Manage Recipient accounts/options - Relay spam reports to Receiver (or don't accept them) Recipient - Set up accounts with each Agent - Select options in each account - Report spam to Receiver

June 13, Identity – Authenticating the Sender SMTP makes Forgery Easy Forger > / / Author ==> MSA/Transmitter --> / --> Receiver/MDA ==> Recipient / / / / Border / / / -- Secure Channel -- TCP makes IP addresses (relatively) secure The source address is real, but it may be only a zombie! DNS offers a (relatively) secure channel Domain owners can publish their authorized addresses Or they can publish a public key

June 13, Authentication Methods Author ==> MSA/Transmitter --> / --> Receiver/MDA ==> Recipient / / / / Border / / / -- Secure Channel -- IP-based Authentication (SPF, SenderID, CSV): Sender provides a list of authorized transmitter addresses. Can be very efficient (no data transfer). Signature-based Authentication (DKIM): Sender provides a Public Key via a secure channel. Messages are signed with the related Private Key. End-to-end protocol can be very secure, even with an un-trusted Forwarder in the middle.

June 13, Reputation – the other half of trust Millions of legitimate senders are simply unknown Aggregation of data is essential Ground Up: Gossip Top Down: Proprietary Systems Registry of Internet Transmitters Some legitimate senders are not qualified to operate a transmitter Make outsourcing the Transmitter role easy. Accountability is essential – no excuses.

June 13, So why isn’t it happening? Hurdles that trust systems must avoid or overcome, in order of decreasing severity: 1)Required simultaneous upgrades in software or setup (Flag Day) 2)Required widespread adoption by Agents before any benefit is realized by Recipients (By June 30th, all senders will...) 3)Required widespread adoption of one company's method or service (Microsoft patent) 4)Changes that cause a temporary degradation in service ( loss of mail due to misconfigurations on the Receiver side ) 5) Changes in current practices a) A well-established and standards-compliant practice. b) A widespread but non-standardized practice. ("Misuse" of Return Address) c) A widespread but non-compliant practice. (bad HELO name) d) An already unacceptable practice. (open relays) 6) Lack of motivation a) Can’t keep track of all their transmitter addresses b) Reversed incentives – more spam = more money

June 13, Suggested Receiver Setup

June 13, Analysis of SPF using our models Simple Forwarding | Recipient's Network | / --> / --> Receiver/Forwarder ~~> MDA ==> Recipient / Border SPF correlates the Return Address to the incoming IP address. Forwarders are expected to re-write the Return Address. Very few forwarders are doing that. A misconfigured MDA sees the forwarded message as forgery. The message is quarantined, and possibly lost. Senders are avoiding the loss by publishing “neutral” SPF records. Forwarders will not change until senders demand it. SPF is stuck.

June 13, Bibliography TCP/IP Illustrated, vol. I, The Protocols, W. Richard Stevens, Very thorough, yet readable. Good illustrations. Computer Networks, Peterson & Davie, 4 th ed. – good on all relevant technologies except . "Internet Mail Architecture", D. Crocker, crocker- -arch-11.txt (work in progress) - best overview with references to all the relevant RFC standards. crocker- -arch-11.txt Pro DNS and BIND, Ron Aitchison, Apress – Very readable book on the Domain Name System. "CircleID", – a "Collaborative Intelligence Hub for the Internet's Core Infrastructure & Policies" – current articles by top industry experts. Project Links – current status of our Identity and Reputation Systemhttps:// – articles and notes from early development. A short list of the most useful books and articles on the technology underlying .

June 13, Identities in an Session $ telnet open-mail.org open-mail.org ESMTP Sendmail /8.13.1; Wed, 30 Aug :36: HELO mailout1.phrednet.com 250 open-mail.org Hello ip068.subnet71.gci-net.com [ ], pleased to meet you MAIL FROM: Sender ok RCPT TO: Recipient ok DATA 354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself From: Dave\r\nTo: Test Recipient\r\nSubject: SPAM SPAM SPAM\r\n\r\nThis is message 1 from our test script.\r\n.\r\n k7TKIBYb Message accepted for delivery QUIT open-mail.org closing connection RFC-2821 Helo Name Envelope Addresses: Return Address Recipient Addresses RFC-2822 Header Addresses: From Address Reply-To Address Network Owner