Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Training Employees.

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Presentation transcript:

Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Training Employees

There are two types of training –General training –Specific Training Who pays for what?

Training Employees An Example Helen Jones will work Now and Later.

Training Employees An Example Helen Jones will work Now and Later. –Her VMP now is $30,000.

Training Employees An Example Helen Jones will work Now and Later. –Her VMP now is $30,000. –General training now increases her VMP next period to $40,000. Her wage rate next period will be $40,000.

Training Employees An Example Helen Jones, will work Now and Later. If the training costs $5,000, her firm will offer the choice – Pay for the general training herself –Accept a wage rate this period of $25,000

Training Employees Part Time MBA Programs Employers often pay for some general training like a part time MBA program, (They will not pay for programs unlikely to have payoff for the worker’s VMP.)

Training Employees Part Time MBA Programs Employers often pay for some general training like a part time MBA program, (They will not pay for programs unlikely to have payoff for the worker’s VMP.) –Formal contracts. –Providing to workers unlikely to leave. –Requiring cost participation. –Price discrimination.

Training Employees Part Time MBA Programs Employers often pay for some general training like a part time MBA program, (They will not pay for programs unlikely to have payoff for the worker’s VMP.) –Formal contracts. –Providing to workers unlikely to leave. –Requiring cost participation. –Price discrimination.

Training Employees Specific Training T he training will increase Helen’s value to her firm only.

Training Employees Specific Training T he training will increase Helen’s value to her firm only. –In theory, the firm should offer to pay for all of it and not give her any extra pay, but she has no incentive then to get the training.

Training Employees Specific Training T he training will increase Helen’s value to her firm only. The usual deal is that Helen Jones pays for part of the training and her firm pays for the rest. –If she invests, say $100, perhaps with her own time, she will expect compensation in the future with a discounted present value exceeding $100.

Training Employees Turnover and Training E mployee turnover is a factor. The firm must make a calculation of the likelihood of the worker remaining with the firm.

Training Employees Turnover and Training E mployee turnover is a factor. The firm must make a calculation of the likelihood of the worker remaining with the firm. The lower the employee turnover, the more attractive is investment in employees.

Training Employees Turnover and Training Japanese firms with low turnover relative to their American counterparts invest more in their workers than do American Firms. Large American Firms with lower turnover than small firms invest more than small businesses.

Training Employees End ©2003 Charles W. Upton