Guy Gogniat, Jean Philippe Diguet,Romain Vaslin,Tilman Wolf, Wayne Burleson, Lilian Bossuet University of South Britanny, University of Massachusetts,

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Presentation transcript:

Guy Gogniat, Jean Philippe Diguet,Romain Vaslin,Tilman Wolf, Wayne Burleson, Lilian Bossuet University of South Britanny, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, University of Bordeaux IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VERY LARGE SCALE INTEGRATION (VLSI) SYSTEMS, VOL. 16, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2008 Deepika Ranade Sharanna Chowdhury

 Security issues  Sophisticated attacks  User concerns ◦ Confidentiality and privacy ◦ Security

 Processor-based cryptography solutions ◦ Computation is costly  Cryptography Co-processor ◦ Not considered energy-efficiency  FPGA for security primitives ◦ Not considered flexibility of primitives  Hardware Monitoring ◦ Energy Monitoring  SAFES is the first approach to dynamically adapt security primitive

Classification of attacks against embedded systems  Hardware Attacks ◦ Active  Irreversible ( Invasive)  Reversible ( Non Invasive) ◦ Passive  Counter Measures ◦ Symptom-free ◦ Security-aware ◦ Activity-aware ◦ Agility ◦ Robust

Security High Performance SOLUTION ?? Reconfigurable Hardware - to deal with hardware security and performance Properties: Adaptability Dynamic Property

Battery ProcessorMemory Bus Monitor Power Monitor FPGAI/O Secure Embedded System Primitive Monitor Clock Monitor Channel Monitor Security Executive Processor Se cu rit y Pr i m iti ve Clock

 Tracks specific data of system  Detects attacks  Characterizes normal activity  Monitors authenticated in the network  Levels of reaction: ◦ reflex or global  Monitors linked by on- chip security network ◦ controlled by the security executive processor (SEP)  FPGA which contains security primitives  Dynamically reconfigurable primitives  Security Primitive ◦ Agile Hardware Accelerator ◦ Performs security Algorithm  Goals: ◦ speedup computation ◦ provide flexibility ◦ provide various tradeoffs The Monitoring SystemThe Reconfigurable Architecture

1] The security primitive datapath 2] The security primitive controller (SPC) SPC is connected to the datapath ~ for the reconfiguration of the datapath SPC is connected to the system processor ~to define the configuration of the security primitive 2] The security primitive controller (SPC) SPC is connected to the datapath ~ for the reconfiguration of the datapath SPC is connected to the system processor ~to define the configuration of the security primitive 3] The system security controller (SSC) SSC is connected to the SPC ~ to monitor the primitive ~ to detect attacks against the primitive. SSC is connected to all monitors of the system ~ to analyze the different parts of the system 3] The system security controller (SSC) SSC is connected to the SPC ~ to monitor the primitive ~ to detect attacks against the primitive. SSC is connected to all monitors of the system ~ to analyze the different parts of the system

SPC FSM SPC FSM Init Security Run Stop Config Algorithm Parameters modification for security Restart Security Primitive Checking of Algorithm Parameters done Security Primitive Ready Security Primitive Terminated Algorithm Parameters modification for performance INITIALIZATION SPC polls system state Battery level Comm. channel quality Defines implementation feasible within the primitive Provides info. to processor

SPC FSM SPC FSM Init Security Run Stop Config Algorithm Parameters modification for security Restart Security Primitive Checking of Algorithm Parameters done Security Primitive Ready Security Primitive Terminated Algorithm Parameters modification for performance CONFIGURATION After Processor selects algorithm parameters SPC selects configuration data Begins configuring datapath

SPC FSM SPC FSM Init Security Run Stop Config Algorithm Parameters modification for security Restart Security Primitive Checking of Algorithm Parameters done Security Primitive Ready Security Primitive Terminated Algorithm Parameters modification for performance RUN Security Primitive is ready to run SPC checks system through SSC to define if primitive needs reconfiguration

SPC FSM SPC FSM Init Security Run Idle/ Stop Config Algorithm Parameters modification for security Restart Security Primitive Checking of Algorithm Parameters done Security Primitive Ready Security Primitive Terminated Algorithm Parameters modification for performance IDLE/ STOP Computation performed. Security Primitive can be stopped (Idle)/ removed from Reconfigurable hardware(Stop)

SPC FSM SPC FSM Init Security Run Stop Config Algorithm Parameters modification for security Restart Security Primitive Checking of Algorithm Parameters done Security Primitive Ready Security Primitive Terminated Algorithm Parameters modification for performance SECURITY Always active. Driven by SSC to indicate requirement of reconfig. Enforces activation of Config state

AttackSSC’s action  Irregular activity in primitive/ system  Hijack  Denial of service attack  Extraction of secret information attack  SSC indicates the configuration to SPC  Reconfigure Security primitive  Enhance fault tolerance of primitive  Stall I/O of primitive

 SPC defines new configuration ◦ Power limitation ◦ Evolving environment  Protected modes require more area, power ◦ Kick in only when required  For best effort performance policy ◦ Throughput Vs energy ◦ Energy-efficient architecture with lower throughput  Battery low  Channel quality < threshold

CauseEffect  Primitive/ System evolves  New configuration needs to be downloaded

AttackSolution  Replace correct configuration  All trusted configurations replaced  Encrypt Bitstream  Download bitstream to system only after integrity check  Store all bitstreams in attack-proof memory

 Xilinx Virtex-II Pro device  Xilinx ISE, Xilinx Xpower  AES and RC6 algorithms MemoryFPGA Processor Architectural Modes Fault Detection/ Tolerance Throughput, Area, Energy Algorithm parameters Execution modes Key/ data sizes

 Performance analysis  2 steps ◦ Offline exploration of architectures ◦ Online select parameters  Application-wise bandwidth requirement  Adapt area, power

ParametersArchitectures  # pipeline stages ◦ Data (i) & key (j) ◦ Data (i+1) & key (j+1)  # of key generators ◦ insignificant area  Period for computation  Pipeline stages ◦ 1, 2, 4, 8  Key generators ◦ 1,2  If 2 KG ◦ Parallel Encryption and Decrytion  If 1 KG ◦ Alternate Encryption and Decrytion

ResultsThroughput Vs Area  ID0-3: 1 KG ◦ Depth of pipeline doubled  Throughput doubles  ID4-7: 2 KG ◦ Parallel Computation ◦ Double throughput w.r.t 1 KG

ResultsEnergy  Energy Efficiency = Throughput / energy  Parallel Computations provide better energy-efficiency PipePower (W)Energy Efficiency (Gbit/J) KG=1KG=2KG=

 Performance analysis  2 steps ◦ Offline exploration of architectures ◦ Online parameters selection  Application-wise bandwidth requirement  Compare Required Throughput Vs Maximum Throughput with current parameters  Is reconfiguration needed?  Select slower/ faster configuration  Adapt area, power

 Feedback mode without security  Feedback mode + fault detection ◦ Parity-based  Feedback mode + fault tolerant architecture ◦ TMR technique

 Feedback mode  FB + fault detection ◦ Only +2.1 % area, -2.7 % power  FB + fault tolerant architecture ◦ High energy (GB/J), area overhead  Bus monitoring ◦ Regular access to key memory address ◦ Counter for non-key n key access

 Reconfigurable hardware in Embedded Systems ◦ Adaptability ◦ Dynamic Reconfiguration  SAFES ◦ Energy-efficient + Secure ◦ Protection + Performance ◦ Reconfigurable Security Primitives ◦ Continuous monitoring to detect abnormal behaviour  Future work ◦ Control flow monitor within Embedded Processor ◦ Attack detection