Oct. 2006 Combinational Modeling Slide 1 Fault-Tolerant Computing Motivation, Background, and Tools.

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Presentation transcript:

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 1 Fault-Tolerant Computing Motivation, Background, and Tools

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 2 About This Presentation EditionReleasedRevised FirstOct This presentation has been prepared for the graduate course ECE 257A (Fault-Tolerant Computing) by Behrooz Parhami, Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at University of California, Santa Barbara. The material contained herein can be used freely in classroom teaching or any other educational setting. Unauthorized uses are prohibited. © Behrooz Parhami

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 3 Combinational Modeling

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 4 When model does not match reality.

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 5 A Motivating Example Five-site distributed computer system Data files to be stored on the sites so that they remain available despite site and link malfunctions S = Site availability (a S in handout) L = Link availability (a L in handout) Some possible strategies:  Duplication on home site and mirror site  Triplication on home site and 2 backups  Data dispersion through coding Here, we ignore the important problem of keeping the replicas consistent and do not worry about malfunction detection and attendant recovery actions

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 6 Data Availability with Home and Mirror Sites A = SL + (1 – SL)SL = 2SL – (SL) 2 Requester R D D Home Mirror Assume data file must be obtained directly from a site that holds it For example, S = 0.99, L = 0.95, A = With no redundancy, A = 0.99  0.95 = Combinational modeling: Consider all combinations of circumstances that lead to availability/success (unavailability/failure) R D D R D D R D D R D 1SL 1 – L (1 – S)L Analysis by considering mutually exclusive subcases

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 7 Data Availability with Triplication A = SL + (1 – SL)SL + (1 – SL) 2 SL = 3SL – 3(SL) 2 + (SL) 3 Requester R D DD Home Backup 1 For example, S = 0.99, L = 0.95, A = With duplication, A = With no redundancy, A = R D DD R D D R D DD R DD 1 SL 1 – L (1 – S)L Backup 2 R D DD R D DD R D D SL 1 – L (1 – S)L 1SL Can merge these two cases A = SL + (1 – SL) [SL + (1 – SL)SL]

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 8 Data Availability with File Dispersion File accessible if 2 out of 4 sites accessible A = (SL) 4 + 4(1 – SL)(SL) 3 + 6(1 – SL) 2 (SL) 2 = 6(SL) 2 – 8(SL) 3 + 3(SL) 4 Requester R d dd d Piece 2 Encode an l-bit file into  5l/3 bits (67% redund.) Break encoded file into 5 pieces of length l/3 Store each piece on one of the 5 sites Any 3 of the 5 pieces can be used to reconstruct the original file Piece 1 Piece 4Piece 3 Piece 5 For example, S = 0.99, L = 0.95, A = , Redundancy = 67% With duplication, A = , Redundancy = 100% With triplication, A = , Redundancy = 200% With no redundancy, A =

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 9 Series System A system composed of n units all of which must be healthy for the system to function properly R =  R i Example: Redundant system of valves in series with regard to stuck-on-shut malfunctions (tolerates stuck-on-open valves) Example: Redundant system of valves in parallel with regard to to stuck-on-open malfunctions (tolerates stuck-on-shut valves)

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 10 Series System: Implications to Design Assume exponential reliability law R i = exp[– i t ] R =  R i = exp[– (  i ) t ] Given the reliability goal r, find the required value of  i Assign a failure rate “budget” to each unit and proceed with its design May have to reallocate budgets if design proves impossible or costly

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 11 Parallel System A system composed of n units, the health of one of which is enough for the system to function properly 1 – R =  (1 – R i ) That is, the system fails only if all units malfunction Example: Redundant system of valves in series with regard to stuck-on-open malfunctions (tolerates stuck-on-open valves) Example: Redundant system of valves in parallel with regard to stuck-on-shut malfunctions (tolerates stuck-on-shut valves)

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 12 Parallel System: Implications to Design Assume exponential reliability law R i = exp[– i t ] 1 – R =  (1 – R i ) Given the reliability goal r, find the required value of  (1 – R i ) Assign a failure probability “budget” to each unit For example, with identical units, 1 – R m = n 1 – r Assume r = , n = 4  1 – R m = 0.1 (module reliability must be 0.9) Conversely, for r = and R m = 0.9, n = 4 is needed

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 13 The Concept of Coverage For r = and R i = 0.9, n = 4 is needed Standby sparing: One unit works; others are also active concurrently or they may be inactive (spares) When a malfunction of the main unit is detected, it is removed from service and an alternate unit is brought on-line; our analysis thus far assumes perfect malfunction detection and reconfiguration R = 1 – (1 – R m ) n = R m 1 – (1 – R m ) n 1 – (1 – R m ) Let the probability of correct malfunction detection and successful reconfiguration be c (coverage factor) R = R m See [Siew92], p – c n (1 – R m ) n 1 – c(1 – R m )

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 14 Series-Parallel System The system functions properly if a string of healthy units connect one side of the diagram to the other 1 – R = (1 – R 1 R 2 ) (1 – R 3 R 4 ) Example: Parallel connection of series pairs of valves (tolerates one stuck-on-shut and one stuck-on-open valve) Example: Series connection of parallel pairs of valves (tolerates one stuck-on-shut and one stuck-on-open valve) R = [1 – (1 – R 1 ) (1 – R 3 )]  [1 – (1 – R 2 ) (1 – R 4 )]

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 15 More Complex Series-Parallel Systems The system functions properly if a string of healthy units connect one side of the diagram to the other R = R 2  prob(system OK | Unit 2 OK ) + (1 – R 2 )  prob(system OK | Unit 2 not OK) R 2OK = [1 – (1 – R 1 ) (1 – R 6 )]  [1 – (1 – R 3 ) (1 – R 5 )]  R We can think of Unit 5 as being able to replace Units 2 and R 2  OK = [1 – (1 – R 1 R 5 ) (1 – R 3 R 6 )]  R 4 R 2  OK R 2OK

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 16 Analysis Using Success Paths R  1 –  i  (1 –  R ith success path ) R  1 – (1 – R 1 R 5 R 4 ) [*] (1 – R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 ) (1 – R 6 R 3 R 4 ) This yields an upper bound on reliability because it assumes the paths to be independent With equal module reliabilities: R  1 – (1 – R m 3 ) 2 (1 – R m 4 ) If we expand [*] by multiplying out, removing any power for the various reliabilities, we get an exact reliability expression R = 1 – (1 – R 1 R 4 R 5 )(1 – R 3 R 4 R 6 – R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 – R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 R 6 ) = R 3 R 4 R 6 + R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 + R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 R 6 + R 1 R 4 R 5 – R 1 R 3 R 4 R 5 R 6 –R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 R 5 – R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 R 5 R 6 (Verify for the case of equal R j )

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 17 k-out-of-n System There are n modules, any k of which are adequate for proper system functioning V Example: System with 2-out-of-3 voting Assume perfect voter R = R 1 R 2 R 3 + R 1 R 2 (1 – R 3 ) + R 2 R 3 (1 – R 1 ) + R 3 R 1 (1 – R 2 ) With all units having the same reliability R m and imperfect voter: R = (3R m 2 – 2R m 3 ) R v Triple-modular redundancy (TMR) R =  j = k to n ( ) R m j (1 – R m ) n–j k-out-of-n system in general njnj Assuming that any 2 malfunctions in TMR lead to failure is pessimistic With binary outputs, we can model compensating errors (when two malfunctioning modules produce 0 and 1 outputs)

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 18 Consecutive k-out-of-n:G (k-out-of-n:F) System Units are ordered and the functioning (failure) of k consecutive units leads to proper system function (system failure) Ordering may be linear (usual case) or circular Example: System of street lights may be considered a consecutive 2-out-of-n:F system Example: The following redundant bus reconfiguration scheme is a consecutive 2-out-of-4:G system From module Redundant bus lines Common control for shift-switch settings: up, straight, or down

Oct Combinational Modeling Slide 19 n-Modular Redundancy with Replicated Voters Voters (all but the final one in a chain) no longer critical components V V V V V V V V V V Can model as a series system of 2-out-of-3 subsystems