Governance Policies for Privacy Access and their Interactions ICFI-2005 Waël Hassan 1 & Luigi Logrippo 2 1 University of Ottawa School of information technology.

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Presentation transcript:

Governance Policies for Privacy Access and their Interactions ICFI-2005 Waël Hassan 1 & Luigi Logrippo 2 1 University of Ottawa School of information technology and engineering 2 Université de Québec en Outaouais Department of Computer Science & Engineering

Goal Detecting policy interactions in privacy governance policies How By using formal models Proposing a privacy model

Agenda Policy Drivers –Convergence of control and policy systems –Requirements of new privacy models Conflict detection using formal models –Delegation, separation, alloy Proposed process based privacy model Evaluation –Support of existing concepts –Advantages over existing models Verification Conclusion

Policy Model Drivers Convergence of control and policy systems –From operational to rules of governance –Activity or trigger based to data based Requirements of new privacy models –Release information based on purpose –Control flow of information –Ability to specify separation of concerns

Layers Actions Features Transactions Functional Hierarchies (Roles) Process Level

Conflicts in Enterprise Governance Policies of Access to information can cause conflict depending on their scope –Logically contradicting policies will interact if their scope over lapped. –A subject roaming in multiple scopes can cause a rule conflict –A subject delegating authority of an object can cause a conflict –An object shared by multiple subjects can cause conflict Policies of privacy access can interact if the reason (purpose) of access is conflicting

Overlapping scope (PoliciesxRoles) Roaming Shared Delegation

Examples Rule: An employee cannot have access to both customers’ address and credit card information (Card Number, expiry date, PIN, and last 4 digits on the back of card) ; Process –one of the tasks of issuing a new card (CreateAccount), includes the mailing of the credit card to the consumer. –(Process) CreateAccount:- (Step)LeaveTraceInSystem, (Process) CreateCard, (Process) MailCard. Result –Interaction

Separation of concerns Rule: –No one person is allowed to create and delete accounts –(Process) CreditCardApp:- (Process) ReceiveCardApplication, (Process) CallCreditCheck, (Process) IssueCard, (Process) CreateAccount. –(Process) WithdrawApplication:- (Process) DeleteAccount, (Step) NotifyClient. In this instance Alloy was able to detect violations of such rule. %

Delegation Interaction Rule: Information collected for the purpose of credit verification should not be generally available to employees in loan processing Loan Processing Process includes Verify Credit Employee delegates Role to manager

Process Based Governance Governance of organizations by specifying control of access (to information) by applying policies to processes

Process Based Control A business process is a unit that can be composed of steps and/or processes. Steps in a process are sequential Process

In a business process environment it should be Easy to tie purposes to actions Possible to apply invariants for a complete structure Easy to trace policy modifications Business Process

PPM Approach Supports Flow of information (Bell Lapadula) Separation of concerns (Chinese Wall)

Bell-Lapadula Intended for military applications, Flow Based 1.Security Clearances 2.Security Requirement A can access y iff –clearance of A > requirement of y A can forward access to y for B iff –clearance of B > requirement of y A X B yLevel

Bell-Lapadula Lattice based model U C S TS Leq UUnclassified CClassified SSecret TSTop-Secret Leq Partial-Order Reflexive Transitive Anti-Symmetric

Chinese Wall Originally intended for banking applications Creates separation of concerns groups Group A & Group B cannot share access to an object set {x,y,z} A B XYzXYz

CW / SOD - Separation of duties User Role Role Centric Irreflexive User cannot fill two conflicting Roles Inherit conflict groups Assigned User Centric Irreflexive 2 conflicting users cannot collectively fill 2 roles in conflict. Inherit conflict groups

Privacy Process Model Users Roles Processes Steps Permissions Operations Objects Permission Assignment Process Hierarchy Role Hierarchy

Two Variations The process has all the properties and people are simply assigned to steps (activities) as per their roles Steps retain properties and people are as assigned as per their roles Users Processes Steps Process Hierarchy Users Processes Steps Process Hierarchy User-ProcessUser-Step

Privacy Process Model - User-Step Users Roles Processes Steps Permissions Operations Objects Permission Assignment Process Hierarchy Role Hierarchy Sequence

Permission Assignment Privacy Process Model- User-Process Users Roles Processes Steps Permissions Operations Objects Process Hierarchy Role Hierarchy Sequence

Information flow A part of standard procedures is delegating work to others. –Example: delegate meeting announcement to secretary Using process model –Action delegate meeting, allowed in a process –Action meeting cancellation cannot be delegated

Separation of Concerns In the banking industry, different groups may not share access to particular resources. Using process model we can set rules to separate groups –Example: No data that admission and scholarship share Finance and Marketing share no information

Advantages of PPM Captures context Simplifies management (privacy)

Captures Context As a part of credit application process (x,y,z,t), an employee A receives access to credit information in step z. –Using standard security model, A can download all credit information of all customers on file When using a process model, –access is granted or revoked based on the sequence of operations. –Therefore, under the process model, an employee A will only have access If steps x & y have been performed –Access will be revoked after operation t is completed xy z t

Simplifies Management Privacy is dependent on the application and not on the identity An identity can have a role which is involved in several functions. However Its privileges are dependent on process. Grouping policies per process reduces time and management policies that are based on roles. Example: –Old If rank is General, then grant access If rank is secretary and name is Lise then grant access –New: Secretary allow-access step 3 General allow-access process change-direction

Implementation and Validation A validation environment is provided by the language Alloy A formal language based on set theory and first order predicate calculus –Model analyser –Consistency checker –Being developed at MIT

Alloy Signatures or elements are the basic constructs of an Alloy model; they are a cluster of relationships grouped in a class like structure. 1.Sig [abstract] enterprise { 2. root : CEO 3.}{ 4. [lone] root 5.} 1.abstract sig process { 2. parent : lone process, 3. composedOf : set steps 4.} Process abstract sig policy { attachedTo : lone process, permitted: role -> process, denied : role -> process Policy Enterprise } no permitted & denied role.permitted in attachedTo role.denied in attachedTo } Facts & Rules

Alloy Process

Architecture UML Model Verification Alloy Meta Model Alloy Policy Specification Translation Manual Translation Manual Verification XACML ebXML Manual Verification

Pragmatic Goals GUIs to formulate validated policies Able to answer questions: –Given an enterprise model and a set of policies Who can/cannot and under what circumstances Given circumstances, who can/cannot? Is there inconsistency ? Is the system compliant to a set of Policies? Automatic translation between –GUI representation –XACML representation –Formal representation (Alloy or other)

Conclusion & Future Work Privacy requires a native model; We were able to model system and detect basic interactions using a formal tool. We plan to use a process based model that attaches policies to processes which are composed of activities, We use Alloy as model analyzer to verify properties.

Thanks from Waël Hassan, Luigi Logrippo

Extra (Process) CreditCardApp:- (Process) ReceiveCardApplication, (Process) CallCreditCheck, (Process) IssueCard, (Process) CreateAccount. (Process) CreateAccount:- (Step)LeaveTraceInSystem, (Process) CreateCard, (Process) MailCard. (Process) DeleteAccount:- (Step)LeaveTraceInSystem, (Step)RemoveAccount. (Process) WithdrawApplication:- (Process) DeleteAccount, (Step) NotifyClient.

Security Basic:- –Identity  Access Right An identity justifies an access-right –Example: given I am a wael, I can access my lab Extended:- –Identity1, Identity2  Forwarding Right (object) A right is owned and can be forwarded (delegated) –Example: given I am an assistant, »I own the right to access personal student file, »I can allow Jasmine access to my file Combined:- –Identity1, Identity2  Concurrent Access (object) Two subjects may be allowed to have concurrent access to an object

Privacy Basic:- –Purpose  Access-Right (Identity) A purpose justifies access-right Example: To update student profile, –Jo-Anne needs to have access to accepted student application data Extended:- –Step  Forwarding Right (Identity1, Identity2) A step which can be owned by a person in a process suggests a right, and that right may be forwarded (delegated) iff the recipient has access to the process/step. –Example: given that Jo-Anne participates in the admissions procedure, »She is assigned access to activity open personal student file, »She can allow Jasmine (another officer) access to the same file as long as she has the authority and she is assigned to the process Combined:- –Process1, Process2  Concurrent Access (object) Two subjects participating in two processes may or not have concurrent access to certain objects.