The Select Agent Laboratory: at the intersection of research, preparedness and safety Nancy Connell,PhD Professor and Vice-chair for Research Department.

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Presentation transcript:

The Select Agent Laboratory: at the intersection of research, preparedness and safety Nancy Connell,PhD Professor and Vice-chair for Research Department of Medicine UMDNJ-New Jersey Medical School Director, UMDNJ Center for BioDefense at the intersection of research, preparedness and safety Nancy Connell,PhD Professor and Vice-chair for Research Department of Medicine UMDNJ-New Jersey Medical School Director, UMDNJ Center for BioDefense

Safety- regulations training inspections Preparedness- planning, training, exercising Research- “dangerous experiments” reporting and publication Whistleblower Protection Safety- regulations training inspections Preparedness- planning, training, exercising Research- “dangerous experiments” reporting and publication Whistleblower Protection

Training BSL3 training Incident command First aid Examinations Experience Responsibility BSL3 training Incident command First aid Examinations Experience Responsibility

Preparedness “planning, training, exercising” walk-throughs, table tops, and full-scale power outages, floods, accidents, fire, health emergency, theft Students, certificates, electives “planning, training, exercising” walk-throughs, table tops, and full-scale power outages, floods, accidents, fire, health emergency, theft Students, certificates, electives

Scenarios and Exercises Operation Smokescreen Operation Secure Access Operation Secure Egress Operation Smokescreen Operation Secure Access Operation Secure Egress

Research “dual-use”

Poste’s list of activities Stealth viral vectors Novel genes Novel proteins Novel organisms Host range expansion Host immune evasion Agents that induce immune hyperresponse Recombination: benign X virulent Latent/triggerable infections Stealth viral vectors Novel genes Novel proteins Novel organisms Host range expansion Host immune evasion Agents that induce immune hyperresponse Recombination: benign X virulent Latent/triggerable infections

Restrictions on release of information Mousepox/IL-4 case: should these data not have been published? Who reviews and decides? How can lack of publications be compensated? Mousepox/IL-4 case: should these data not have been published? Who reviews and decides? How can lack of publications be compensated?

Controlling dangerous pathogens Monitoring and verification protocols: BWC Domestic: CDC, DoD, USDA Comprehensive international oversight of work with biological pathogens Model: Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee? Protective oversight regime: consequential regulation Adequate protection against interference with scientific exploration Monitoring and verification protocols: BWC Domestic: CDC, DoD, USDA Comprehensive international oversight of work with biological pathogens Model: Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee? Protective oversight regime: consequential regulation Adequate protection against interference with scientific exploration

Whistleblowing and disclosure: protection of the concerned citizen- scientist

ICRC: “Voicing concern” Those working in life sciences who voice concern and take responsible action require and deserve political and professional support and protection. Action points: Encourage people who work in the life sciences to voice concern about issues relating to poisoning and the deliberate spread of infectious disease. Ensure that adequate mechanisms exist for voicing such concerns without fear of retribution. ICRC: “Voicing concern” Those working in life sciences who voice concern and take responsible action require and deserve political and professional support and protection. Action points: Encourage people who work in the life sciences to voice concern about issues relating to poisoning and the deliberate spread of infectious disease. Ensure that adequate mechanisms exist for voicing such concerns without fear of retribution.

First, what are the possible events or situations that might lead a responsible individual to make the decision to report an activity? First, what are the possible events or situations that might lead a responsible individual to make the decision to report an activity? 1. lack of biosafety compliance 2. lack of security compliance 3. experimental procedures that lead or might lead to the generation of dangerous strains or toxins (”the seven experiments of concern”) How to make vaccine ineffective Alter host range of pathogen Enhance virulence of pathogen Confer resistance to useful antibiotics & antivirals 4. use of science in ways that might contravene BWTC 1. lack of biosafety compliance 2. lack of security compliance 3. experimental procedures that lead or might lead to the generation of dangerous strains or toxins (”the seven experiments of concern”) How to make vaccine ineffective Alter host range of pathogen Enhance virulence of pathogen Confer resistance to useful antibiotics & antivirals 4. use of science in ways that might contravene BWTC

Gov’t Laboratory Institution BWTC ombudsman committee BWTC ombudsman committee Reporting pathways