DNA Starts to Learn Poker David Harlan Wood 4 * Hong Bi 1 Steven O. Kimbrough 2 Dongjun Wu 3 Junghuei Chen 1* Departments of 1 Chemistry & Biochemistry.

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Presentation transcript:

DNA Starts to Learn Poker David Harlan Wood 4 * Hong Bi 1 Steven O. Kimbrough 2 Dongjun Wu 3 Junghuei Chen 1* Departments of 1 Chemistry & Biochemistry and 4 Computer & Information Sciences University of Delaware 2 The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 3 Benett S. Lebow College of Business, Drexel University

Player Dealt an Ace Ace Say Ace (adds $1) Player Dealer Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Deal Loses $2

2 Say Ace (adds $1) Say 2 Player Dealer Losses $ 1 Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Wins $ 2 Deal Player dealt a 2

Ace2 Say Ace (adds $1) Say Ace (adds $1) Say 2 Player Dealer Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Wins $ 2 Deal Player dealt an Ace Player dealt a 2 Loses $2 OBJECTIVE: To Obtain Probabilistic Strategies Each player wants to obtain a strategy for the game. A strategy prescribes an action in every possible situation. That is, at each node, raising as a function of hand dealt.

Poker Play New Game New Dealer Strategies Deals Assemble New Player Strategies

Learning Separate by Payoffs Programmable Selection of Recovered Dealer Strategies Programmable Selection of Recovered Player Strategies Dealer’s Adaptation Player’s Adaptation Amplify Crossover Mutate Amplify Crossover Mutate Recover & Distribute Strategies Recover & Cut Play Histories for Player’s & Dealer’s Strategies Player’s StrategiesDealer’s Strategies

Learning Poker Play New Game Separate by Payoffs Programmable Selection of Recovered Dealer Strategies Programmable Selection of Recovered Player Strategies Dealer’s Adaptation Player’s Adaptation Amplify Crossover Mutate New Dealer Strategies Amplify Crossover Mutate Deals Assemble New Player Strategies Recover & Distribute Strategies Recover & Cut Play Histories for Player’s & Dealer’s Strategies Player’s StrategiesDealer’s Strategies

R.E. 1 Dealer’s Strategies R.E. 2 Stopper Say A’ FOLD’ Call’Fold’ Player’s Strategies R. E. 1 2’Say 2’Fold’Error SAY2’ Say A’A’Say A’ Stopper 2 Dealt 2 R.E. 2 A Ace2 Say Ace (adds $1) Say Ace (adds $1) Say 2 Player Dealer Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Wins $ 2 Deal Loses $2 Sequences from: Sakamoto, et. al, DNA4 (1997) Dealt A

Dealer’s Strategies

Player’s Strategies

Deals

Two Strategies and a Deal Define a Game Ace Dealt A Player’s Strategy R. E. 1 2’Say 2’Fold’Error SAY2’ Say A’A’Say A’ A Dealer’s Strategy R.E. 1R.E. 2 Say A’ FOLD’ Call’Fold’ A R.E. 2

Cut with R.E.1 & R.E.2 and Assemble A Game Player’s Strategy Dealer’s Strategy Deal 2’ Say 2’ Fold’ Error Say A’ A’ Say A’ Call’ Fold’ A SAY 2’ FOLD’ 2’ Say 2’ Fold’ Error Say A’ A’ Say A’ R. E. 1 Say A’ Call’ Fold’ R.E. 2 A SAY 2’ FOLD’

Cut with R.E.1 & R.E.2 and Assemble A Game Player’s Strategy Dealer’s Strategy Deal 2’ Say 2’ Fold’ Error Say A’ A’ Say A’ Call’ Fold’ A SAY 2’ FOLD’ 2’ Say 2’ Fold’ Error Say A’ A’ Say A’ R. E. 1 Say A’ Call’ Fold’ R.E. 2 A SAY 2’ FOLD’ Two Strategies and a Deal Define a Game Ace Dealt A Player’s Strategy R. E. 1 2’Say 2’Fold’Error SAY2’ Say A’A’Say A’ A Dealer’s Strategy R.E. 1R.E. 2 Say A’ FOLD’ Call’Fold’ A R.E. 2

Player’s Strategy Dealer’s Strategy Deal 2’Say 2’Fold’ErrorSay A’A’Say A’ Call’Fold’A SAY 2’ FOLD’ 74-mer (S1) 57-mer (S2) 48-mer (S3) 53-mer (S4) L1 (25 mer) L3 (28 mer) L2 (28 mer) S1 S2 S3 S4 R1 R2 M R1: Ligation Reaction R2: Purified Ligation Product

Ace Say Ace (adds $1) Say 2 Player Dealer Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Deal Player dealt an Ace Player Says A Dealer Folds Dealer MIGHT Change to Call Loses $2

Player Dealt an Ace 2’Say 2’Fold’Error SAY 2’ Say A’A’Say A’ FOLD’ Call’Fold’ A Player’s Strategy Dealer’s Strategy Deal Player Says Ace A’Say A’ Extend (Say A) A Player’s Strategy Extend (Fold) Say A’ Fold’ Say A Dealer Folds Dealer’s Strategy Extend (Call) Dealer MIGHT Change to Call Fold’ FOLD’ Call’ Fold Preventer Dealer’s Strategy Error

Player Says Ace A’ Say A’ Extend (Say A) A Extend (Fold) Say A’ Fold’ Say A Dealer Fold Extend (Call) Dealer MIGHT Change to Call Fold’ FOLD’ Call’ Fold Preventer (232-mer) (247-mer) (262-mer) (282-mer)

2 Say Ace (adds $1) Say 2 Player Dealer Losses $ 1 Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Wins $ 2 Deal Player dealt a 2 Player Says 2 (Block Say 2) Player Changes to Say A Dealer Changes to Call Dealer Folds

Player Dealt a 2 2 2’ Say 2’ Fold’Error SAY 2’ Say A’ A’ Say A’ FOLD’ Call’ Fold’ Player’s Strategy Dealer’s StrategyDeal Dealer MIGHT Change to Call FOLD’ Call’ Fold Extend (Call) Fold’Error Preventer Dealer’s Strategy Dealer Folds Extend (Fold) Say A’ Fold’ Say A Dealer’s Strategy Player MIGHT Change to Say Ace Player’s Strategy SAY 2’ Say A’ Extend (Say A) Say 2 Player Says 2 Say 2’ 2’ Extend (Say 2) 2 Player’s Strategy

Ace2 Say Ace (adds $1) Say Ace (adds $1) Say 2 Player Dealer Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Wins $ 2 Deal Player dealt an Ace Player dealt a 2 Player Says A Dealer Folds Dealer MIGHT Change to Call Loses $2 Dealer MIGHT Change to Call Dealer Folds Player MIGHT Change to Say Ace Player Says 2

Learning Poker Play New Game Separate by Payoffs Programmable Selection of Recovered Dealer Strategies Programmable Selection of Recovered Player Strategies Dealer’s Adaptation Player’s Adaptation Amplify Crossover Mutate New Dealer Strategies Amplify Crossover Mutate Deals Assemble New Player Strategies Recover & Distribute Strategies Recover & Cut Play Histories for Player’s & Dealer’s Strategies Player’s StrategiesDealer’s Strategies

Separate by Payoffs Programmable Selection of Recovered Dealer Strategies Dealer’s Adaptation Amplify Crossover Mutate Recover & Distribute Strategies Recover & Cut Play Histories for Player’s & Dealer’s Strategies Player’s StrategiesDealer’s Strategies Strategies are returned grouped by outcomes: -$ 2, - $ 1, + $ 1, + $ 2. Select Dealer’s own Preferred mix of strategies to be bred Breed by using PCR to restore population size using a variable mutation rate. Crossover by pairwise recombining of “change your mind” regions. Learning

Ace2 Say Ace (adds $1) Say Ace (adds $1) Say 2 Player Dealer Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Call (adds $1) Fold Losses $ 1 Wins $ 2 Deal Player dealt an Ace Player dealt a 2 Loses $2 OBJECTIVE: To Obtain Probabilistic Strategies Each player wants to obtain a strategy for the game. A strategy prescribes an action in every possible situation. That is, at each node, raising as a function of hand dealt.

Complexity Our complexity is linear in the number of nodes in the tree # nodes in tree = 2 players + betting rounds At each node, we need a probability distribution giving “level of bet” as a function of “dealt hand”. For us, probability distribution is substituted by probabilistic hybridization of DNA encoded “dealt hand” to adapting “change you mind about folding” region of strategy. The output (if generated) is an adapting “level of bet” region of strategy. hand bet next next’ bet generator next Extend bet’ hand’ hand evaluator

Comparison Koller and Pfeffer derive equilibrium mixed strategies with complexity polynomial in # nodes * # possible deals * 2 betting levels “Representations and Solutions for Game-Theoretic Problems,” Artificial Intelligence (1997) Two-player games only Don’t exploit weakness of opponent No dynamics, only equilibrium

Player 1 Player 2 Player Player Poker: All Possible Deals Course of Play P1 P2 P3 P2 P1 PassBet $ a Pass Bet $ a FC FCFCFC FC FCFC FCFC C: Call (add $ b) F: Fold

Learning Poker Recover Dealer’s & Player’s Strategies Play New GameSeparate by Payoffs Programmable Selection of Recovered Dealer Strategies Programmable Selection of Recovered Player Strategies Dealer’s Adaptation Player’s Adaptation Amplify Crossover Mutate New Dealer Strategies Amplify Crossover Mutate Deals Assemble New Player Strategies

A A A A A A A A

A A A A A A A A A A