Sjónarhornin Perspectivism Nietzsche Sjónarhornin Perspectivism

Perspectivism The doctrine that there are no facts but only interpretations [is] termed Perspectivism. To be sure, we speak of seeing the same thing from different perspectives, and we might allow that there is no way to see the thing save through a perspective and, finally, that there is no one perspective privileged over any other. These would be logical features of the concept of perspective. The only difficulty here is in talking about the “same thing” on which these are distinct perspectives. Certainly we cannot say what it is except from one or another perspective, and we cannot speak about it as it is in itself.... We can meaningfully say nothing, then, about whatever it is on which these are perspectives. We cannot speak of a true perspective, but only of a perspective that prevails. Because we cannot appeal to any fact independently of its relation to the perspective it is meant to support, and we can do little more than insist on our perspective, and try, if we can, to impose it on others.(Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), bls. 77.) Tilvitnun fengin hjá James Conant. 1. Byrjað með mjög skýrt hugtak og síðan endað með teygt hugtak sem nær yfir allt og alla sem við getum hugsað um.

Philosophers ... always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; they always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. (Friedrich Nietzsche) Um sjónarhorn almennt. Líkíngarmál úr sjón, mynd og myndlist. Hér er vísað á sjónræn tengsl en ekki vitsmunaleg, eða hugræn.

Sjónarhorn (James Conant) eitthvað sem við getum breytt að vild veitir sýn til hlutarins hefur ákveðna staðsetningu í fylki (matrix) annarra mögulegra sjónarhorna hin ólíku sjónarhorn deila sameiginlegum hlut (eða fjölda hluta) saman mynda sjónarhornin þekkingu og gera okkur kleift að leiðrétta afbakanir og leggja rétt mat á hlutina 1. Verður ekki breytt að vild; 2. Einstaklingurinn sér ekki í gegnum eða yfir sjónarhornið, það sem einstaklingurinn sér er stýrt af sjónarhorninu; 3. Þekkingarfærðilegar einangrað, er ekki í neinum skýrum tengslum við önnur sjónarhorn; 4. Deilir ekki sameiginlegum hlut með öðrum sjónarhornum; 5. Nær yfir allt.

Útvíkkun líkingar frá sjón yfir á heyrn og tal og hugsun sumir hlutir eru einungis eiginleikar sjónarhornsins (hugmyndin um óbætanlega afbökun. Dæmi: Litur vs. lögun) öll sjónarhorn fela í sér óbætanlega afbökun (samanborðið við hlutinn í sjálfum sér). hluturinn í sjálfum sér er ímyndun, ekki til  við höfum bara sjónarhornin.

útvíkkun ekkert nema sjónarhornið ekkert eitt sjónarhorn er betra en annað sum sjónarhorn eru einungis meira aðlaðandi en önnur, eða rótgrónari; við höfum einfaldlega vanist þeim o.s.frv. innantóm hlutlægni vs óyfirstíganleg huglægni

Hversdagsleg merking To be sure, we speak of seeing the same thing from different perspectives ....

that there is no one perspective privileged over any other that there is no one perspective privileged over any other. These would be logical features of the concept of perspective.

Certainly we cannot say what it is except from one or another perspective

cannot speak about it as it is in itself

We cannot speak of a true perspective, but only of a perspective that prevails. Because we cannot appeal to any fact independently of its relation to the perspective it is meant to support, and we can do little more than insist on our perspective, and try, if we can, to impose it on others.

Nietzsche Basic question: whether the perspectival is of the essence of the matter? Rather than its merely being a form of viewing that which is essential, a mere relation between distinct entities? Might the various terms of this relation be related to one another in such a way that the relation itself is bound up in the optics of perception? (KGW, VIII, 1. 5. 12; þýðing James Conant)

Handan góðs og ills „Ég fæ hins vegar aldrei nógsamlega hamrað á því að „óvefengjanleg sannindi“ sem og „algild þekking“og „hluturinn í sjálfum sér“ fela í sér contradictio in adjecto. Það er mál til komið að menn hætti að láta orðin draga sig á tálar!“ (§16) 1. Hér er hlutnum í sjálfum sér ekki hafnað vegna þess að við getum ekki yfirstígið sjónarhornið heldur vegna þess að orðið er tælandi en hefur ekki verið gefin nein skýr merking.

Handan góðs og ills Sjá §15. We have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent world perhaps?... But no! With the real world we have also abolished the apparent world! (TI)

What is “appearance” for me now What is “appearance” for me now? Certainly not the opposite of some essence: what could I say about any essence except to name the attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a dead mask that one could place on an unknown X or remove from it. (GS, 54) The antithesis “thing-in-itself” and “appearance” is untenable; with that, however, the concept “appearance” also disappears. (WP, 552)

Það er ekkert sem við getum gert til að yfirstíga sjónarhornin Það er ekkert sem við getum gert til að yfirstíga sjónarhornin. Það er ekkert sem við getum gert til að yfirstíga huglægnina o.s.frv. Þetta „ekkert“ er innantómt. Ekkert nema sjónarhornið (þetta „ekkert“ er innantómt)

Nietzsche Hugum nú betur að myndun hugtakanna. [...] Öll hugtök verða til við samsömun þess sem er ekki eins. Líkt og engin tvö laufblöð eru nákvæmlega eins, þannig er hugtakið laufblað myndað með því að hafa að engu þennan einstaklingsmun og gleyma mismuninum. [...] Við myndum [...] hugtök með því að leiða hjá okkur einstaklingsbundinn veruleika. Náttúran þekkir hins vegar hvorki form né hugtök og því ekki heldur neinar tegundir. („Um sannleika og lygi“)

[P]recisely because we seek knowledge, let us not be ungrateful to such resolute reversals of accustomed perspective and valuations with which the spirit has, with apparent mischievousness and futility, raged against itself for so long: to see differently in this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity” – the latter understood not as “contemplation without interest” (which is nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. (GM, III, 12)

Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a “pure, willing, painless, timeless knowing subject”; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as “pure reason,” “absolute spirituality”, “knowledge in itself”: they always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity”, be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this – what would that mean but to castrate the intellect? (GM, III, 12)