1 SecSpider: Distributed DNSSEC Monitoring Eric Osterweil Michael Ryan Dan Massey Lixia Zhang.

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Presentation transcript:

1 SecSpider: Distributed DNSSEC Monitoring Eric Osterweil Michael Ryan Dan Massey Lixia Zhang

2 Why Monitoring is Important Distributed systems have different problems when viewed from different vantage points –It is important for zone admins to know their data is being served properly to resolvers in different places –It is important for resolvers to know if any availability problems they see are local or global Monitoring answers these immediate questions, and can generate aggregate and historical information In other words, monitoring can help the DNSSEC rollout

3 Outline How DNSSEC works What can go wrong What SecSpider can help with Summary

4 DNSSEC DNSSEC provides origin authenticity, data integrity, and secure denial of existence by using public-key cryptography Origin authenticity: –Resolvers can verify that data has originated from authoritative sources. Data integrity –Can also verify that responses are not modified in-flight Secure denial of existence –When there is no data for a query, authoritative servers can provide a response that proves no data exists

5 How DNSSEC Works Each DNSSEC zone creates one or more pairs of public/private key(s) –Public portion put in DNSSEC record type DNSKEY Zones sign all RRsets with private key(s) and resolvers use DNSKEY(s) to verify RRsets –Each RRset has a signature attached to it: RRSIG So, if a resolver has a zone’s DNSKEY(s) it can verify that RRsets are intact by verifying their RRSIGs

6 Signing Example Using a zone’s key on a standard RRset (the NS) Signature (RRSIG) will only verify with the DNSKEY if no data was modified

7 Getting the Keys Until a resolver gets the DNSKEY(s) for a zone, data can be spoofed How can a resolver know that the DNSKEY(s) themselves are not being spoofed? DNSSEC zones securely delegate from parents to children Zones that have no secure parents are called trust anchors When a zone is a trust anchor the zones that it delegates to form an island of security

8 What Can Go Wrong Getting the keys for a zone should be simple –Reality: cache problems, PMTU problems, etc Verifying data seems as simple as following the delegation hierarchy –Reality: the hierarchy is underdeveloped (for now) Getting valid data should be as easy as verifying RSA signatures –Reality: signatures on data do not prove that the data is valid

9 Specifically… In this talk we pick one of these: availability –We discus all 3 of these issues in our 2008 IMC paper “Quantifying the Operational Status of the DNSSEC Deployment” Availability is important because getting DNSSEC keys is not always as easy as one would hope –And clearly this is a precondition for verifying RRSIGs

10 SecSpider

11 What We Track We currently try to track as many DNSSEC zones as we can find –We take user submissions, crawl various sources, do NSEC walking, etc. –We have been monitoring since 2005 We track all zones in our corpus from a set of distributed pollers From these vantage points we can observe many facets of DNSSEC zones

12 Distributed Polling We use distributed pollers to measure consistency (or inconsistencies) For example: DNSKEY RRsets spoofing at one poller will not fool others, and discrepencies can be seen In addition, network issues can cause some vantage points to be unable (or less able) to access DNSSEC information –We call this availability dispersion

13 Availability Dispersion SecSpider does PMTU walking to each zone whenever there is trouble retrieving DNSKEYs Some polling locations have serious PMTU problems that disrupt availability

14 Whose Problem is it? Without a monitoring system, how can zone administrators know there is a problem? –With SecSpider, zone admins can see issues and correct them How can resolvers know why they are having a problem –With SecSpider, people can (sometimes) see if their problems are local or global

15 How to Use SecSpider From our front page, submit your zone After the next polling cycle, you will see your zone on our web site For DNSKEYs (for example) check their consistency

16 Zone Drilldown Page

17 Secure Delegation Hierarchy

18 Summary The DNSSEC rollout has gotten a shot in the arm, but open issues remain A distributed monitoring system can help and is here today We can track zones and highlight configuration and availability problems to aid early adopters But also, distributed monitoring is a general tool whose utility is not limited to the early stages of the rollout –As new problems arise, monitoring will allow us to see them and address them

19 Thank you