week 7 1 COS 444 Internet Auctions: Theory and Practice Spring 2008 Ken Steiglitz
week 72 Theory Conditional expectation Conditional expectation Interpretation of first-price equilibrium Interpretation of first-price equilibrium Stronger revenue equivalence Stronger revenue equivalence Graphical interpretation Graphical interpretation Check RE for all-pay auction Check RE for all-pay auction
week 73 Theory : Revenue equivalence III If P(v) = E[pay] as a function of v,
week 75 Theory: Preference revelation Theorem: A symmetric equilibrium bidding function in an IPV auction is monotonically nondecreasing. Proof: Follows directly from definition of equilibrium! (… if it exists)
week 76 Theory: Entry Value Define: Entry Value = v * = value at which it becomes advantageous to enter an auction. Example: FP, no reserve: v * = 0 Example: FP, reserve = 0.5: v * = 0.5
week 77 Field experiment “A Test of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem using Field Experiments on eBay” T. Hossain, J. Morgan, 2004 Theory predicts revenue equivalence for a wide class of auctions with the same entry value. This paper uses eBay to field-test this prediction.
week 78 Hypothesis testing We often need to test the statistical significance of observations (as in Hossein- Morgan 04) This is a huge subject Many common tests use normal distributions and their derivatives The one-tailed binomial test is the simplest Such tests can easily be abused