QinetiQ in confidence © Copyright QinetiQ CCRP: The Complex environment and C2 IOCS: 22/23 October 2007

QinetiQ in confidence © Copyright QinetiQ 2 01 Complex Endeavours: Environment (1) Cold War View –Strategic threats were: State Actors Rational (thought like us) Known doctrine Symmetric Observable (physically) Deterrence logic –Social Network Facilitation Geographic Proximity Person to person (Telephone)/One to many (Newspaper) –Large characteristic timescale for significant change Current Reality –Strategic threats are: Range of actors Multiple rationalities Emergent doctrine Asymmetric Less observable No clear deterrent –Social Networks facilitation Virtual Environment Many to many –Scale-free time distribution for changes in environment

QinetiQ in confidence © Copyright QinetiQ 3 Complex Endeavours: Environment (2) Cold War View –Information was; Homogeneous (state-controlled data sources or Oligarchy) No real-time global communications Accessibility to information often restricted (satellite imagery) –No cross-domain or scaling effects Primary concerned with kinetic effects Actions scale directly to effects scale (local actions stay local) –Local interdependencies Only formal structures could be global Current Reality –Information is: Heterogeneous information sources (reporters without borders) Real time global communications Accessibility on demand –Cross-domain and scaling effects Primarily concerned with non-kinetic effects No clear distinction between strategic, operational, tactical actions and effects –Globalisation (interdependencies) Informal structures empowered Tipping points more prevalent

QinetiQ in confidence © Copyright QinetiQ 4 Complex Endeavours: Assumptions (1) 1.Military C2 is only a subset of a larger whole (whole of government, comprehensive approach) 2.Multiple objectives exist and no single unifying command intent  collective intent? And perhaps informal/implicit and emergent 3.Multiple perspectives (perhaps contradictory) exist and should be recognized and conditions created so that his can be exploited 4.Roles and responsibilities less clearly defined and dynamic 5.Greater reliance on informal structures 6.Diverse set of competence skills needed and present

QinetiQ in confidence © Copyright QinetiQ 5 Complex Endeavours: Assumptions (1) 7.Traditional military leadership may be less relevant 8.Collaboration with wide range of actors with different cultures and goals 9.It may not be possible or desired to exercise C2 in a traditional manner (internal) 10.Sense making is much more difficult Much more difficult to correlate cause and effect Difficult to distinguish between red and blue and it is dynamic and influenced by events Harder to identify measures of success and to measure them 11.Need to be considered as a SoS with complex interdependencies

QinetiQ in confidence © Copyright QinetiQ 6 Complex Endeavours: Characteristics of effective C2 (1) When considering the C2 approach operational risk, uncertainty/unpredictability must be balanced The C2 Organisation: –Needs to be a learning organisation –Must have an understanding of the past, present and possible futures of: All actors – their roles, responsibilities, different perspectives on the situation, intents and motivations –Recognising that the allegiance of individual actors may be difficult to identify and may change over time The problem space –Through modelling the Casual and Influence Networks (although difficult to construct –Explicitly specify what we do and do not understand –Should explicitly be considered in terms of authority, power, ‘soft-mechanisms’, empowerment and task-oriented structures

QinetiQ in confidence © Copyright QinetiQ 7 Complex Endeavours: Characteristics of effective C2 (2) In a comprehensive approach all actors must understand each others’ cultures, structures, capabilities, goals, ways of working etc. The C2 organisations must be considered as a FoS with complex interdependencies with cross-level, cross-scale and cross-system effects The C2 organisation must be recognise the multiple objectives of its parts and have the ability to establish a ‘collective intent’ When leaders are selected/trained non-military leadership skills must be considered (e.g. negotiating, influencing, diplomacy). Note the overall leader may be a civilian