Pricing What Can Pricing Do In Wireless Networks? Jianning Mai and Lihua Yuan

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Outlines Introduction Pricing-based Approaches for: Spectrum Allocation Power Control Cooperation Incentives Conclusion

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Introduction Pricing for communication networks Applied to both wired and wireless networks: Congestion control Call Admission Control (CAC) Quality of Service (QoS) Wireless network specific issues?

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Issues Spectrum allocation for wireless communication Power control for mobile hosts in CDMA data networks Interference Battery life Incentives to collaborate in MANET

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Outlines Introduction Pricing-based Approaches for: Spectrum Allocation Power Control Cooperation Incentives Conclusion

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Spectrum Management Players – regulators, operators, manufacturers, and end users Cost – negotiations, administration of the frequency table, surveillance, compatibility, and so on regulators Generally the regulators set the rules and prices

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Methods Auction – operators bidding for a license Lottery – qualified operators with little technical differences Sharing – new technologies User fee – pay per use

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Outlines Introduction Pricing-based Approaches for: Spectrum Allocation Power Control Cooperation Incentives Conclusion

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Pricing-base Power Control Utility – QoS (Signal-to-Interference ratio)

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report NPG Non-cooperative Power Control Game Nash Equilibrium – a power vector p = (p1, p2, · · ·, pN) such that for every j in N, uj(p) >= uj(p ’ ) for all p ’ in P.

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report NPGP NPG with pricing – Pareto Improvement

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Extensions Multi-cell – interference from mobile hosts in adjacent cells taken into consideration as well Base Station – a normalization of the received power at base station to improve the system performance

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Outlines Introduction Pricing-based Approaches for: Spectrum Allocation Power Control Cooperation Incentives Conclusion

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Incentives or Disincentives Disincentive approach – to detect and isolate the selfish nodes to make the misbehavior unattractive Incentive approach – to promote or reward cooperations using pricing mechanism

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Bandwidth Sharing Problem definition : Unique solution – iterative algorithm to maximize the sum of users ’ utility

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Power Constraint To relay, or not to relay? Mobile hosts ’ battery life as a constraint Normalized Acceptance Rate (NAR) - the number of successful relay requests generated to the number of relay requests made by the node. Tradeoff between the NAR and lifetime Optimal NAR – a node cannot improve its NAR without decreasing some other node ’ s NAR

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report BW and Power Constrains Credit Scheme Relay fee is calculated from both BW and power consumption Users ’ prices and credit balances stabilize for a static ad hoc network Mobility through the center of the network can increase an individual user ’ s as well as increase the overall throughput

Winter '04ECS 289L Project Report Conclusion Spectrum allocation for wireless communication Power control in CDMA data networks Incentives to collaborate in MANET Relations between the various pricing- based approaches