Outline In-Class Experiment on a Coordination Game Test of Equilibrium Selection I :Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) Test of Equilibrium Selection II :Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1991) Test of Equilibrium Selection III : Copper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1990)
Example 1: Symmetric Game
Hypotheses The outcome will be a Nash equilibrium: 1 or 2 Payoff Dominance: 2 Irrelevance of dominated alternatives: Dominated strategies are irrelevant to equilibrium selection: 3 will not affect choice
Warm-up Task: Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (Game 1)
Asymmetric with Unique Nash Equilibrium (Game 2)
Coordination Games * Strategy 3 is always dominated by strategy 1
Coordination Games * Strategy 3 is always dominated by strategy 1
Games 7-8 Move the “cooperative outcome” from (3,3) to (2,2) If players place prior probability weight on strategy 3, this can influence their choice. We can use Games 7 (8) (Games 4 (3)) to separate whether players believe that the opponents are “cooperative” or “irrational”.
Experimental Design Section I: 11 Subjects, each played 10 rounds (Dominant Strategy Equilibrium) in 11 periods. Section II: Each subject played one of the games (Games 2-8) 20 rounds in 22 periods.
Results from Game 1
Results from Game 2
Coordination Games * Strategy 3 is always dominated by strategy 1
Games 3-6: Last 11 Periods
Games 3-6: Last 5 Periods
Games 7-8: Last 11 Periods
Games 7-8: Last 5 Periods
Transition Matrix
Summary Outcome will be from the set of Nash equilibria Payoff Dominance is not a good selection principle Irrelevance of dominated alternative is violated. Importance of “cooperative outcome”.