“High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina.” Mara Loveman

Introduction Core Research Question: Why do some people put their lives at risk to oppose repressive states/regimes? Research Design: Comparative Analysis To address this question, Loveman conducts a competitive analysis of Human Rights Orgs (HROs) in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina.

Introduction Explaining Collective Action Repression is supposed to depress mobilization. These cases reveal that repression can stimulate collective action. Factors That Can Influence: High Risk Situations Factors that can influence collective action in high risk situations are the following: 1) Relationship between strategies of repression and embedded social networks 2) Dense inter-personal networks are embedded within broader national and international networks

Introduction Military Governments and Human Rights: In each of the countries examined, HROs emerged in response to systematic violations of human rights by military governments. Research Questions: 1) Why and how did individuals resist in the face of repression? 2) How we account for variations in the scope and strength of HROs in he countries under investigation?

Introduction Core Argument: We need a synthetic approach that focuses on: 1) Interpersonal links 2) Embedded social and political networks 3) Resource Mobilization capacity 4) Identity Construction 5) Political Opportunity …that is, focuses on everything

Introduction Two Main Research Questions: 1) Under what conditions do high risk SM occur? 2) Why do people participate in such movements?

Introduction Social Movement Theory and High Risk Collective Action The SM literature offers different answers to these two questions.

Social Movement Theory 1) Micro-Level Approaches: Motivational Accounts a. Rational Choice Theory 2) Constructivist Approaches (Role of Identity) 3) Social Networks 4) Resource Mobilization (Organizational Analysis) 5) Political Opportunity Structure

Social Movement Theory Micro-Level Approaches: Motivational Accounts (480) Rational Choice Theory: Individual cost/benefit analysis, rational calculations explains why do and do not participate in SM. Focuses material benefits, and often ignores or reduces solidary or purposive benefits.

Social Movement Theory Rational Choice: Limitations RC theories work best in situations where the costs and benefits of participation are clear, or where the risks are low. In high risks situations, the costs and benefits of participation are rarely clear. Also, RC cannot explain non-material motivations for participating, situations, that is, were “meaning: matters more than “material” benefits. (480)

Social Movement Theory Theories of Participation: Material: “tangible rewards that are easily converted into money” or status. Solidary: “intangible rewards that stem from social interaction, like status, deference, and friendship.” Purposive: Being involved in a worthy cause.* Political Participation in High Risk Situations In high risk situations, solidary and purposive often outweigh material incentives. (481) *Source: Rosenstone and Hansen

Social Movement Theory Constructivist Approaches: (482) Motivational theories fail to take into account the social processes through which collective action occurs. Role of Identity: Identity may help explain why someone participates, it may also be reshaped by participation. In either case, it may compel someone to participate regardless of the risk.

Social Movement Theory Social Network Theory (483) Examines “macro-mobilization” processes: the types of social networks potential participants are embedded can affect (LC) mobilization. Example: McAdam, Freedom Summer, Mississippi Participants in the 1964 Freedom Summer in Mississippi were encouraged to go by friends and family, and by the pre-existing networks of social activists in which they were situated.

Social Movement Theory Resource Mobilization Theory: (483) In addition to social ties, connections to certain types of organizations, or the existence (or absence) of existing organizations may explain why people and do not participate. The Importance of Organization The right attitude, personality or social network is not enough. What generally determines the level of participation is the scope and strength of available organizations.

Social Movement Theory Organizations and High Risk Settings The presence or absence of organizations may help explain the scope and strength of SMs (HROs) in repressive states. HROs and Resources: (484) HROs need access to resources to sustain mobilization. Institutional Links to: 1) Unions 2) Religious Organizations 3) Universities 4) NGOs, Parties

Social Movement Theory Political Opportunity Structure (484) Neither resources, nor networks/organizations help explain the timing of social movement activity. To understand when SM occur, you need to consider the political opportunity structure. Timing of Social Movement Activity Do SM emerge when the state liberalizes, or becomes more repressive?

Cases Emergence of HROs in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina (485) Though separate and unique countries, they each experienced military dictatorships in 1970s and 1980s, as well as movements that sought to resist government sanctioned human rights violations. Historical Overview: Chile: Military Coup in 1973, ended a period of civilian rule Uruguay: Military Coup in 1973, ended a period of civilian rule Argentina: Coup in 1976, military intervention more common In each, military saw itself as a defender of the public against “subversives.”

Cases Core Research Goal: Each country studied saw the development of HROs that opposed a military government, but they varied both in terms of scope and strength. In what ways does the SM literature help us explain this variation?

Chile: Human Rights Organization Human Rights Organization in Chile During the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile (1973-1989), HRO emerged immediately and functioned even during the height of the repression. Waves of HRO Opposition Organized human rights opposition took place in three waves: 1) Religious Organizations 2) Family of Victims 3) Opposition political parties

Chile: Human Rights Organization Waves of HRO Opposition 1) Religious Organizations The first groups, networks and individual to challenge the Pinochet dictatorship were primarily religious organizations. Examples: COPACHI: Comite de Cooperacion para la Paz en Chile (Committee of Cooperation for Peace in Chile)

Chile: Human Rights Organization Waves of HRO Opposition 2) Family of Victims The activity of the religious organizations provided an example and an opening for family of victims of the regime to begin mobilizing against Pinochet.

Chile: Human Rights Organization Waves of HRO Opposition 3) Opposition political parties After the regime loosened some of its controls in 1977, a number of secular HROs emerged.

Chile: Human Rights Organization Understanding these Trends Why did HROs emerge during the height of the repression? Political Opportunity: (489) Does the proliferation of HROs after 1977, when the regime relaxed its political controls confirm the idea that movements emerge when state repression declines?

Chile: Human Rights Organization Understanding these Trends Social Networks What role did preexisting social, political and professional networks play in the organized resistance to the Pinochet dictatorship?

Chile: Human Rights Organization Chilean Case: The church, as well as existing national and international networks that tied together students, labor unions, opposition political leaders and other professionals provided the organizational cover and space, as well as legitimacy for early HR resistance to the regime.

Chile: Human Rights Organization Understanding HRO activity at the Individual Level (492) What compelled individuals to rick arrest of death to participation in HRO against the government? The “Sense of Self” For many of the early activists, HRO work was not only political and ethical, it was also very personal. A commitment to the cause, and specifically to those victimized by the state becomes “pro-social” and begins to outweigh individual concerns and calculations.

Uruguay Uruguay: Absence of HRO during Repression (498) The situation in Uruguay was very different from Chile: the coup took place in 1973, but sustained HRO activity did not emerge until 1981. Research Question: Why did HROs not develop at the same pace in Uruguay as in Chile, despite clear similarities between the cases?

Uruguay Chile and Uruguay: Many Political and Cultural Similarities The absence of HRO activity in Uruguay is made even more perplexing given the cultural and political similarities between the cases. Similarities: 1) Highly developed political system 2) History of electoral government 3) Large labor unions, 4) Large urban population 5) Strong educational systems

Uruguay Chile and Uruguay: Key Difference Chile is a highly religious country, while Uruguay is more secular. As such, the church in Uruguay was unable to provide either the moral or institutional cover/space that it did for HROs in Chile. Church and State in Uruguay: In Uruguay, the church lacked the cultural and political power it had in Chile. Though mostly silent in the face of human rights offences, the church was nonetheless targeted by the regime for its lack of open support for the government.

Uruguay Uruguay: Weak Personal Networks The type of cross-sectional personal networks –between the church, universities, unions -- that supported HRO activity in Chile was comparative weak in Uruguay. Example: Political Left in Uruguay The political left was historical weak in the Uruguay, and had few links to other institutions, like the church.

Uruguay Uruguay: Strategies of Repression: Mass Arrests (506) Rather than use mass killings, the regime favored mass arrest for anyone thought to be hostile to the government. Huge numbers of people were detained, when lawyers defending the accused were subject to arbitrary arrest. Outcome: Culture of Fear The result was a culture of fear: anyone could be detained, for any reason.

Uruguay Uruguay: Political Opportunity Structure (506) Only after the military government pursued constitutional reforms in 1980, did the first HRO (Servicio Paz y Justica SERPAJ) emerge. Conclusion: (507) Uruguay confirms the idea that repression depresses mobilization. The church, in particular, was unable provide the moral and institutional cover necessary to promote HRO activity. And, in Uruguay, without the church, there was essentially no space for the formation of HROs.

Argentina Argentina: An Intermediate Case (507) HRO emerged after the 1976 military coup, even though the church supported the government. As such, there was not the type of dense cross-sectional networks, between the church and other potentially oppositional institutions that activists could rely on. HRO Development: Non-Institutional Channels (509)

Argentina Argentina: HRO Development: Non-Institutional Channels With the doors to the church closed, and few other spaces for opposition, HRO in Argentina to rely on: - Existing communist/left groups - An existing chapter of SERPAJ Each had become active in opposition to government abuses before the 1976 military coup.

Argentina Argentina: “Dirty War” Response: Relatives of the Disappeared The disappearances resulted in the development of several groups of relatives of the disappeared who challenged military rule through public marches/demonstrations. Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the May Plaza) Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (Fathers of the May Plaza) Familiares de Desaparecidos (Families of the Disappeared)

Argentina Argentina: Relatives of the Disappeared (513) How do we explain the emergence of these groups? Was it a political opportunity question? Did the demonstrators possess moral authority as parents, mothers? Problems with Analysis: Many of the original demonstrators were detained, and subsequently disappeared. Moreover, many parents who lost children did not protest. Links to International HR Community International attention helped the Las Madres, but were they nonetheless unable to achieve their goals.

Argentina Argentina: Overall, HROs in Argentina lacked the social networks, and thus organizational strength necessary for sustained opposition to the regime.

Conclusion Social Movements and High Risk Situations Though the prevailing wisdom in the SM literature is that heightened state repression depresses SM activity, the cases reviewed here suggest state violence may in certain circumstances (given certain conditions) stimulate opposition to the military government.

Conclusion Comparative Analysis of HRO in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina What a study of these cases suggests is that SM activity in high risk situations depends upon particular types of pre-existing, cross-sectional, and dense personal networks linked to broader international support systems. Such networks provide not only moral and institutional support, they are often tied into a preexisting social identity that encourages opposition at the individual level.