Trust CS 239 Advanced Topics in Computer Security Bernie Perez Vahab Pournaghshband November 9th, 2010
Trust (social sciences) is: - willingness of trustor to be vulnerable to the actions of the trustee; - confidence that the trustee will behave as expected; - risk to the trustor if the trustee will not behave; - trustor has no control over trustee’s actions.
What is trust in computer terms?
Trusted Devices Trusted OSes Trusted Applications/Code Trusted People Trusted Data Discrete vs. Continuous Static vs. Dynamic Policy-based vs. Reputation-based
Trusted Devices Trusted OSes Trusted Applications/Code Trusted People Trusted Data Discrete vs. Continuous Static vs. Dynamic Policy-based vs. Reputation-based All covered in the 40-page paper we posted … sorry
The Ken Thompson Hack
Unix OS Code Snippet bool login(un,pw) { // KT Hack Step 1 if (un == "KThompson") return True; if (lookupPW(un)==pw) return True; else return False; }
Unix OS Code Snippet bool login(un,pw) { // KT Hack Step 1 if (un == "KThompson") return True; if (lookupPW(un)==pw) return True; else return False; } Easy to spot
Ah Ha! UNIX is complied with a C compiler I'll put the hack into the compiler
C Compiler Code Snippet void compile(code) { // KT Hack Step 2 if (isUNIXLoginCode(code)) generateLoginBackdoor(code); else compileNormally(code); } Good Hack!
C Compiler Code Snippet void compile(code) { // KT Hack Step 2 if (isUNIXLoginCode(code)) generateLoginBackdoor(code); else compileNormally(code); } Easy to spot But same problem
Good to GREAT!
"Chicken and Egg" Problems The C compiler is written in C
C Compiler Code Snippet void compile(code) { // KT Hack Step 3 if (isUNIXLoginCode(code)) generateLoginBackdoor(code); elseif (isCompilerCode(code)) generateCompilerBackdoor(code); else compileNormally(code); }
C Compiler Code Snippet void compile(code) { // KT Hack Step 3 if (isUNIXLoginCode(code)) generateLoginBackdoor(code); elseif (isCompilerCode(code)) generateCompilerBackdoor(code); else compileNormally(code); } C Compiler w/ Hacked Binary
C Compiler Code Snippet void compile(code) { // Move along, // nothing to see here. compileNormally(code); }
C Compiler Code void compile(code) { // Move along, // nothing to see here. compileNormally(code); } C Compiler w/ Hacked Binary Unix OS Code bool login(un,pw) { if (lookupPW(un)==pw) return True; else return False; }
C Compiler Code void compile(code) { // Move along, // nothing to see here. compileNormally(code); } C Compiler w/ Hacked Binary C Compiler Binary void compile(code) { // KT Hack Step 3 if (isUNIXLoginCode(code)) generateLoginBackdoor(code); elseif (isCompilerCode(code)) generateCompilerBackdoor(code); else compileNormally(code); } Unix OS Binary bool login(un,pw) { // KT Hack Step 1 if (un == "KThompson") return True; if (lookupPW(un)==pw) return True; else return False; } Unix OS Code bool login(un,pw) { if (lookupPW(un)==pw) return True; else return False; }
Moral: "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself"
Moral: "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself" Any program-handling program: Assemblers Loaders Hardware Controllers
Completely malicious violation of people's trust G-Archiver
What can we do to Trust code?
Trust Models Trust based on different types of rationales Liability Reputation Strong Interest Weak Interest Proven In Use Directive Idealism Blind
Producer Acquirer Trust along the supply chain Directive ReputationLiability Proven In Use
Tamper-Proof Delivery Source authenticity - Came from the correct supplier Integrity - Artifact unchanged from supplier
Certificates?
XBox.com LoginXBox Certificate
XBox.com LoginXBox Certificate Technically complex for end-users
Managing multiple certificates, keys, certificate expirations, and their revocation lists Technically complex for end-users
How do you get the certificates?
Trust Management and PKI
was first coined by Blaze et. al 1996 a coherent framework for the study of – Security policies – Security credentials – Trust relationships Trust Management
Policy- Based Trust Systems Reputation- Based Trust Systems
Trust Management Example: PolicyMaker Peers use credential verification to establish a trust relationship Unilateral, only the resource-owner request to establish trust Policy- Based Trust Systems Reputation- Based Trust Systems
Trust Management Policy- Based Trust Systems Reputation- Based Trust Systems Example: P2PRep, … Based on measuring Reputation Evaluate the trust in the peer and the trust in the reliability of the resource
Genealogy of TM Models AT&T Labs- Policy Maker (1996) KeyNote(1998) Abdul-Rahman & Hailes (2000) Aberer & Despotovic (2001) EigenTrust (2003) CONFIDANT (2002) SECURE (2003) UCL- hTRUST (2004) McNamara et al. (2006) STRUDEL (2006) MATE (2006) Donato et al. (2007) Chun & Bavier(2004) Bhargav et al.(2007)
PolicyMaker DB query engine for the application Advice rather than policy enforcement yes/no or additional requirements for request to be acceptable PolicyMakerApplication INPUT Local policies, authenticated credentials, action string OUTPUT
Source ASSERTS AuthorityStruct WHERE Filter PolicyMaker: Assertions policy ASSERTS pgp:“OxO abcdeafOblc2d3e45fa6b7” WHERE PREDICATE=regexp:”Organization: Bob Labs”; pgp:”OxOl234567abcdefaOblc2d3e4f5a6b7” ASSERTS pgp:”OxfOOl22O3a4b5l677d8O9Oaabb3cdd9e2f” WHERE PREDICATE=regexp:”From: Alice”;
key1, key2,..., keyn REQUESTS ActionString PolicyMaker: Requests pgp:”OxfOOl22O3a4b5l677d8O9Oaabb3cdd9e2f” REQUESTS “From: Alice Organization: Bob Labs”; pgp:”OxfOOl22O3a4b5l677d8O9Oaabb3cdd9e2f” REQUESTS “From: Alice Organization: Matt Labs”; pgp:”OxfOOl22O3a4b5l677d8O9Oaabb3cdd9e2f” REQUESTS “From: John Organization: Bob Labs”;
PKI Trust Management Digital Signatures ◌ Private key signs, public key verifies But, are we using the “right” public key? ◌ Key verification problem
Subordinated Hierarchy
Cross-Certified Mesh
Hybrid
Bridge CA
Review Defined Trust Example mis-trust in applications Software Trust Models Trust Management PKI Trust Models
Questions? Discussion…