The Chinese Room Argument Joe Lau. Readings n Searle and Churchland’s articles in Scientific American. n Ned Block’s “Computer Model of the Mind” n Online.

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Presentation transcript:

The Chinese Room Argument Joe Lau

Readings n Searle and Churchland’s articles in Scientific American. n Ned Block’s “Computer Model of the Mind” n Online notes from James Pryor

Issue n Can computations be sufficient for thinking or other mental states? n Not to be confused with : –Can machines think? –Can a computer simulate the mind? –Does the mind carry out computations? –Can computers think?

Against computational sufficiency n Bad argument –Current computers cannot do X. –So computations cannot be sufficient for X. n In-principle argument needed, e.g. –Mental state X requires Y. –No computational process can generate Y. –So computations are not sufficient for X.

The Chinese Room hmmm… what does that mean?

The argument (a reductio argument) n Suppose there is a program sufficient to produce understanding of Chinese. n A person in the Chinese room can in principle carry out this program. n But such a person would not understand Chinese. n So no program is by itself sufficient to produce understanding of Chinese.

Churchland’s reply n The program cannot be carried out in the Chinese room. n The Chinese room implements only serial processing. n The brain carries out parallel processing. n Searle : Change the Chinese room into the Chinese gym.

Another reply n The person does understand Chinese, but he is not conscious of his understanding. n Is this a good reply?

The system reply n The argument is not valid. (Conclusion does not follow from assumptions.) n The system as a whole understands Chinese even if the person does not. n The person is only the central processor of the whole system.

Searle’s Rejoinder n The person can internalize the whole system, by remembering all the rules, etc. –Now the person = the system. –The person still does not understand Chinese. –So the system does not understand Chinese.

Evaluation n Why accept the person = the system? –Searle : “There is nothing in the system that is not in the person” –But this shows at most that the system is within the person, not identical with it. n n Diagnosis – –It is possible that the person carries out computations that produce Chinese understanding, but the person cannot access the knowledge.

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