Antitrust Analysis Using Calibrated Economic Models Gregory J. Werden Senior Economic Counsel Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice The views expressed.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Pricing and Output Decisions: Imperfectly Competitive Markets
Advertisements

How, and Whether, to Define a Market (in Mergers) Joseph Farrell Based on work with Carl Shapiro.
Economic Analysis for Business Session XVIII: Public Goods and Common Resources Instructor Sandeep Basnyat
E FTC/DOJ Workshop on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Firms that Participate Through a Supply Response: Uncommitted Entry Mark Whitener Antitrust Counsel.
Oligopoly.
Lecture #11: Introduction to the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) - What is the old empirical IO? The old empirical IO refers to studies that.
Industrial Organization, Defined Industrial Organization: The study of the structure of firms and markets and of their interactions. Market Structure -
Part 8 Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education Canada 16/1 Chapter 16 Game Theory and Oligopoly.
0 MONOPOLY POWER, MARKET DEFINITION, AND THE CELLOPHANE FALLACY Washington DC Suite New Hampshire Avenue, NW Washington DC Tel (202)
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy
Monopolistic Competition. Market Structure Product Differentiation Product Differentiation Few Many Number of Firm Differentiation Product Differentiation.
1 Potential “Non-Unilateral” Effects From a Merger David Scheffman* and Owen Graduate School of Management Vanderbilt University February 2004 * This presentation.
Copyright © 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 9 Basic Oligopoly.
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc Chapter 16 Game Theory and Oligopoly.
Monopolistic Competition
Basic Oligopoly Models
Consumption, Production, Welfare B: Monopoly and Oligopoly (partial eq) Univ. Prof. dr. Maarten Janssen University of Vienna Winter semester 2013.
Monopolistic Competition. Characteristics: Relatively Large Numbers Firms have a small market share No collusion (concerted action by firms to restrict.
Chapter 7 In Between the Extremes: Imperfect Competition.
Regulation through Competition Policy Roger Ware Queen’s University January 2010.
1 Unilateral Effects Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department Merger Workshop February 18, 2004 Joseph Kattan Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Washington,
Price-Output Determination in Oligopolistic Market Structures We have good models of price- output determination for the structural cases of pure competition.
CHAPTER 9 Basic Oligopoly Models Copyright © 2014 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written.
The Use of Oligopoly Equilibrium for Economic and Policy Applications Jim Bushnell, UC Energy Institute and Haas School of Business.
Simulating Mergers MSc Regulation and Competition March 2005.
Oligopoly chapter 19 Copyright © 2014 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy
Chapter 8 Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets Copyright © 2014 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved.
1 Oligopoly. 2 By the end of this Section, you should be able to: Describe the characteristics of an oligopoly Describe the characteristics of an oligopoly.
Ch. 24: Monopolistic Competition, Oligopoly & Game Theory Del Mar College John Daly ©2003 South-Western Publishing, A Division of Thomson Learning.
Merger simulation models: useful or just plain dangerous Global Competition Law Centre Seminar 21 October 2005 Dr. Mike Walker Vice President, CRA International,
Market Definition and Effects Analysis European Commission, DG Competition, Chief Economist Disclaimer: the views expressed cannot be regarded as stating.
London 22 Nov 2005 Modernization of Article 82 Lars-Hendrik Röller * Chief Competition Economist European Commission CLA and BIICL Conference on Article.
Quantitative Analysis Of Competitive Effects For Antitrust Luke Froeb Owen Graduate School of Management Vanderbilt University April, 2003 Day 1.
David Bryce © Adapted from Baye © 2002 Power of Rivalry: Economics of Competition and Profits MANEC 387 Economics of Strategy MANEC 387 Economics.
SAYRE | MORRIS Seventh Edition Imperfect Competition CHAPTER © 2012 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited.
CHAPTER 8 Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2014 by The McGraw-Hill Companies,
MICROECONOMICS: Theory & Applications By Edgar K. Browning & Mark A. Zupan John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 10 th Edition, Copyright 2009 PowerPoint prepared by.
Perfect Competition Chapter 9 ECO 2023 Fall 2007.
Imperfect Competition Chapter 9
Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Chapter 11.
Lecture 12Slide 1 Topics to be Discussed Oligopoly Price Competition Competition Versus Collusion: The Prisoners’ Dilemma.
A monopolistically competitive market is characterized by three attributes: many firms, differentiated products, and free entry. The equilibrium in a monopolistically.
Vanderbilt University1 Quantitative Benefit-cost Analysis of Mergers Luke Froeb Oct. 26, 2001 Federal Trade Commission.
Today n Oligopoly Theory n Economic Experiment in Class.
Oligopoly: Interdependence and Collusion Industrial Economics.
CHAPTER 15 Oligopoly PowerPoint® Slides by Can Erbil © 2004 Worth Publishers, all rights reserved.
The Economic Framework For our purposes two basic sets of agents: –Consumers –Firms Interact through markets Faced with some economic environment or market.
Competitors and Competition
Principles of Merger Analysis The Antitrust Masters Course V September 30, 2010 Andrea Agathoklis, Department of Justice Norman A. Armstrong, Jr., Federal.
Supply and Demand How Markets Work?. MARKETS AND COMPETITION The terms supply and demand refer to the behavior of people......as they interact with one.
Merger Simulation with Homogeneous Goods Gregory J. Werden Senior Economic Counsel Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice The views expressed herein.
Monopolistic competition and Oligopoly
Chapters 13 & 14: Imperfect Competition & Game Theory
Pricing of Competing Products BI Solutions December
1 Part 5 ___________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________.
From Market Concentration to Market Outcome: The evolution of US antitrust agency horizontal merger guidelines Russell Pittman Antitrust Division, U.S.
MARKET STRUCTURE AND POWER Chapter Market Structure  Market structure: establishes the overall environment within which each firm operates.  Number.
Main Market Forms Foundation Economics BIMTECH June 2009.
Market Structure Characteristics of the Market Organizational Competitive Features that best describe goods or services market.
David Bryce © Adapted from Baye © 2002 Power of Rivalry: Economics of Competition and Profits MANEC 387 Economics of Strategy MANEC 387 Economics.
Imperfect Competition
Pure Competition Pure competition is a theoretical market structure that has a very large numbers of sellers, identical products, and freedom to enter.
Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly
ARE BUSINESSES EFFICIENT? 11a – Oligopoly
Monopolistic Competition
Today Oligopoly Theory Economic Experiment in Class.
BUS 525: Managerial Economics Basic Oligopoly Models
Perfect Competition A2 Economics.
Presentation transcript:

Antitrust Analysis Using Calibrated Economic Models Gregory J. Werden Senior Economic Counsel Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice The views expressed herein are not purported to reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice

Calibrated Economic Models Are:  Standard economic tools Monopoly and oligopoly models Consumer demand models  Applied in a straightforward way Using known facts (e.g., prices and shares) Making reasonable assumptions

Applications of Calibrated Economic Models In Merger Cases  Market delineation Modeling the hypothetical monopolist with the standard model of monopoly  Merger simulation Modeling oligopoly interaction with a standard model of oligopoly

Applications of Calibrated Economic Models In Non-Merger Cases  Market delineation Non-merger cases may present prospective market power issues just as mergers do  Analyzing competitive effects Modeling can shed light on the impact of many exclusionary practices

Selection and Calibration of Models  Select a model that generally describes the actual competitive interaction  Make necessary assumptions that are (1) supported by data, (2) unimportant, or (3) biased against the modeler  Calibrate the model by fitting it precisely to a “pre-merger equilibrium”

Calibrated Economic Models Sharpen Focus  Models are built on assumptions  Assumptions can and should be tested against the established facts  Modeling indicates: why price effects are large or small how experts reached different conclusions where resources should be concentrated

Calibrated Economic Models Increase Accuracy  Calculation replaces intuition Expert intuition on quantitative matters is a highly unreliable black box Modeling replaces the black box with transparent calculations  Measurement replaces assumption Real-world data is the basis for calculations

Calibrated Economic Models Enhance Persuasiveness  The analysis is firmly anchored in facts Model assumptions are tested against facts Model parameters are based on data  The analysis employs economic science The models are standard economic theory Econometrics may be used Economists do what they normally do

Artful Construction of Calibrated Economic Models  Highly realistic models are useless Calibration most likely is infeasible Predictions most likely are unclear  Useful models capture what matters most over the relatively short run The essence of the competitive process Critical firm and product attributes

Critical Elasticity of Demand and Critical Sales Loss  Indicate how much substitution is too much for the hypothetical monopolist  Qualitative application Providing a lens for viewing qualitative evidence of substitutability  Quantitative application Using demand elasticities estimated from transaction or survey data

Modeling a Hypothetical Monopolist  Demand models Multiple uses with significantly differing elasticities of demand  Cost models Marginal costs that vary with output Fixed costs for blocks of capacity  Multiple prices Disproportionate price increases

Modeling the Unilateral Competitive Effects of Mergers  Select a standard oligopoly model capturing important industry features  Calibrate the model so it perfectly predicts the pre-merger equilibrium  Compute the post-merger equilibrium, which internalizes the competition among merging products

Presumptions of Merger Simulation  Merger simulation presumes that the fundamental nature of the competitive interaction is not changed by a merger.  Merger simulation presumes that everything “outside the model” is unaffected by the merger.

Oligopoly Models Commonly Used in Merger Simulation  Dominant firm Monopoly with respect to residual demand  Cournot Quantity setting with a homogeneous product  Bertrand Price setting with differentiated products  Auctions Non-cooperative bidding

Bertrand Merger Simulation: Model Calibration  Calibrate prices and shares Normally use those prevailing pre merger May project changes “but for” the merger  Calibrate demand elasticities Commonly estimated from scanner data Can be inferred from price-cost margins

Bertrand Merger Simulation: Modeling Demand  Every demand model is restrictive Each has inherent “curvature” properties  Flexibility is a blessing and a curse Trading off bias and variance  The logit model Substitution proportionate to shares

Bertrand Merger Simulation: Checking the Bertrand Assumption  Compare Bertrand price-cost margins with “actual” price-cost margins  Examine substantial differences for the merging products and major rivals  Intensity of competition may not be as implied by the Bertrand assumption

Bertrand Merger Simulation: Continuing Controversies  Multifaceted marketing strategies  Product repositioning  The retail sector  Demand estimation problems

Merger Simulation in Perspective I  Merger simulation is simply a useful device for clarifying the implications of established facts and plausible market conditions.  Merger simulation combines what is known with reasonable assumptions about what is not known, and evaluates their significance in a precise, objective manner by substituting calculation for intuition.

Merger Simulation in Perspective II  Models simplify the world Models are tractable because they simplify Modeling is as much art as science  Calibration is inexact Assumptions fill gaps in measurement Measurement is inherently imperfect  Predictions are useful rough estimates