1 Civil Systems Planning Benefit/Cost Analysis Scott Matthews /

Announcements  HW 2 returned  Install Decision Tools Suite ASAP (in case there are problems)  Installation in CEE cluster done  (Group) Project 1 due Friday  Revision posted - Questions?  HW 3 Out and

3 Three Legs to Stand On  Pareto Efficiency  Make some better / make none worse  Kaldor-Hicks  Program adopted (NB > 0) if winners COULD compensate losers, still be better  Fundamental Principle of CBA  Amongst choices, select option with highest ‘net’ benefit

and Welfare Economics Concepts  Perfect Competition  Homogeneous goods.  No agent affects prices.  Perfect information.  No transaction costs /entry issues  No transportation costs.  No externalities:  Private benefits = social benefits.  Private costs = social costs.

Profit Maximization under Perfect Competition and Q P S D Q P S = MC p D p = MR q

and Benefits with WTP Price Quantity P* Q* A B  Total/Gross/User Benefits = area under curve or willingness to pay for all people = Social WTP = their benefit from consuming = sum of all WTP values  Receive benefits from consuming this much regardless of how much they pay to get it

and Net Benefits Price Quantity P* Q* A B A B  Amount ‘paid’ by society at Q* is P*, so total payment is B to receive (A+B) total benefit  Net benefits = (A+B) - B = A = consumer surplus (benefit received - price paid)

and Market Supply Curves Quantity Price Supply=MC P1 Q1 Q* Producer surplus is similar to CS -- the amount over and Above cost required to produce a given output level Changes in PS found the same way as before P* PS 1 PS* TVC 1 TVC* Producer Surplus = Economic Profit

and Social Surplus Social Surplus = consumer surplus + producer surplus Is difference between areas under D and S from 0 to Q* Losses in Social Surplus are Dead-Weight Losses! Q P Q* P* S D

and Allocative Efficiency Allocative efficiency occurs when MC = MB (or S = D) Equilibrium is max social surplus - prove by considering Q1,Q2 Q* P* S D = MB = MC Q1Q1 Q2Q2 a b Price Quantity Is the market equilibrium Pareto efficient? Yes - if increase CS, decrease PS and vice versa.

and Further Analysis  Assume price increase is because of tax  Tax is P2-P* per unit, tax revenue =(P2-P*)Q2  Tax revenue is transfer from consumers to gov’t  To society overall, no effect  Pay taxes to gov’t, get same amount back  But we only get yellow part.. Price Quantity P Q2 Q* A B P* CS1 C Old NB: CS2 New NB: CS1 Change:P2ABP*

and Deadweight Loss  Yellow paid to gov’t as tax  Green is pure cost (no offsetting benefit)  Called deadweight loss  Consumers buy less than they would w/o tax (exceeds some people’s WTP!) - loss of CS  There will always be DWL when tax imposed Price Quantity P Q* Q1 A B P* CS1

and Net Social Benefit Accounting  Change in CS: P 2 ABP* (loss)  Government Spending: P 2 ACP* (gain)  Gain because society gets it back  Net Benefit: Triangle ABC (loss)  Because we don’t get all of CS loss back  OR.. NSB= (-P 2 ABP*)+ P 2 ACP* = -ABC

and Types of Costs zPrivate - paid by consumers zSocial - paid by all of society zOpportunity - cost of foregone options zFixed - do not vary with usage zVariable - vary directly with usage zExternal - imposed by users on non-users ye.g. traffic, pollution, health risks yPrivate decisions usually ignore external

and Pollution (Air or Water) Q P Q# P# S*: marginal Private costs D S#:marginal Social costs P* Q* Typically supply (MC) only private, not social costs. Social costs higher for each quantity What do these curves, Equilibrium points tell us?

and What is WTP by society to avoid? Q P Q# P# S*: marginal Private costs D S#:marginal Social costs P* Q* Typically supply (MC) only private, not social costs. Social costs higher for each quantity

and What is WTP by society to avoid? Q P Q# P# S*: marginal Private costs D S#:marginal Social costs P* Q* Differences in cost functions represent the alternative ‘valuations’ of the product - Thus difference between them WTP to avoid costs

and Pollution (Air or Water) Q P Q# P# S*: marginal Private costs D S#:marginal Social costs P* Q* Relatively too much gets produced, At too low of a cost - how to Reduce externality effects? DWL

and Pollution (Air or Water) Q P Q# P# S*: marginal Private costs D S#:marginal Social costs P* Q* Government can charge a tax ‘t’ on Each unit, where t = distance between What are CS, PS, NSB? t

and Pollution (Air or Water) Q P Q# P# S*: marginal Private costs D S#:marginal Social costs P* Q* CS = (loss) A+B PS=(loss) E+F t P# - t AB E F

and Pollution (Air or Water) Q P Q# P# S*: marginal Private costs D S#:marginal Social costs P* Q* Third parties: (gain) B+C+F (avoided quantity between S curves) Govt revenue: A+E Total: gain of C t P# - t B F C A E C is reduced DWL of pollution eliminated by tax** **This cannot be a perfect reduction in practice - need to consider administrative costs of program

and Distorted Market - Vouchers  Example: rodent control vouchers  Give residents vouchers worth $v of cost  Producers subtract $v - and gov’t pays them  Likely have spillover effects  Neighbors receive benefits since less rodents nearby means less for them too  Thus ‘social demand’ for rodent control is higher than ‘market demand’

and Distortion : p0,q0 too low Q P Q0 P0 S-v DMDM S D S: represents higher WTP for rodent control P1 Q1 What is NSB? What are CS, PS? Social WTP

and Social Surplus - locals Q P Q0 P0 S-v DMDM S DSDS P1 Q1 B P E P1+v A C Make decisions based on S-v, Dm What about others in society, e.g. neighbors? Because of vouchers, Residents buy Q1

and Nearby Residents Q P Q0 P0 S-v DMDM S DSDS P1 Q1 B P E P1+v A C Added benefits are area between demand above consumption increase What is cost voucher program? F G

and Voucher Market Benefits  Program cost (vouchers):A+B+C+G+E ----  Gain (CS) from target pop: B+E  Gain (CS) in nearby: C+G+F  Producers (PS): A+C   Net: C+F

and Notes about Public Spending  Resource allocation to one project always comes at a ‘cost’ to other projects  E.g. Pittsburgh stadium projects  “Use it or Lose it”  There is never enough money to go around  Thus opportunity costs exist  Ideally represented by areas under supply curves  Do not consider ‘sunk costs’  Three cases (we will do 2, see book for all 3)

and Example: Change in Demand for Concrete Dam Project  If Q high enough, could effect market  Shifts demand -> price higher for all buyers  Moves from (P0,Q0) to (P1,Q1).. Then?? Q0 P0 D a Price Quantity D+q’ S P1 Q1

and Another Example: Change in Demand  Original buyers: look at D, buy Q2  Total purchases still increase by q’  What is net cost/benefit to society? Q0 P0 D a Price Quantity D+q’ S P1 Q1 Q2

and Another Example: Change in Demand  Project spends B+C+E+F+G on q’ units  Project causes change in social surplus!  Rule: consider expenditure and social surplus change Q0 P0 D Price Quantity D+q’ S P1 Q1 Q2 E B C FA G G G

and Dam Example: Change in Demand  Decrease in CS: A+B (negative)  Increase in PS: A+B+C (positive)  Net social benefit of project is B+G+E+F Q0 P0 D Price Quantity D+q’ S P1 Q1 Q2 E B C FA G G G

and Final Thoughts: Change in Demand  When prices change, budgetary outlay does not equal the total social cost  Unless rise in prices high, C negligible  So project outlays ~ social cost usually  Opp. Cost equals direct expenditures adjusted by social surplus changes Quantity

and Secondary Markets  When secondary markets affected  Can and should ignore impacts as long as primary effects measured and undistorted secondary market prices unchanged  Measuring both usually leads to double counting (since primary markets tend to show all effects)  Don’t forget that benefit changes are a function of price changes

and Monopoly - the real game  One producer of good w/o substitute  Not example of perfect comp!  Deviation that results in DWL  There tend to be barriers to entry  Monopolist is a price setter not taker  Monopolist is only firm in market  Thus it can set prices based on output

and Monopoly - the real game (2)  Could have shown that in perf. comp. Profit maximized where p=MR=MC (why?)  Same is true for a monopolist -> she can make the most money where additional revenue = added cost  But unlike perf comp, p not equal to MR

and Monopoly Analysis MR D MC Qc Pc In perfect competition, Equilibrium was at (Pc,Qc) - where S=D. But a monopolist has a Function of MR that Does not equal Demand So where does he supply?

and Monopoly Analysis (cont.) MR D MC Qc Pc Monopolist supplies where MR=MC for quantity to max. profits (at Qm) But at Qm, consumers are willing to pay Pm! What is social surplus, Is it maximized? Qm Pm

and Monopoly Analysis (cont.) MR D MC Qc Pc What is social surplus? Orange = CS Yellow = PS (bigger!) Grey = DWL (from not Producing at Pc,Qc) thus Soc. Surplus is not maximized Breaking monopoly Would transfer DWL to Social Surplus Qm Pm

and Natural Monopoly  Fixed costs very large relative to variable costs  Ex: public utilities (gas, power, water)  Average costs high at low output  AC usually higher than MC  One firm can provide good or service cheaper than 2+ firms  In this case, government allows monopoly but usually regulates it

and Natural Monopoly MR D Q* P* Faced with these curves Normal monop would Produce at Qm and Charge Pm. We would have same Social surplus. But natural monopolies Are regulated. What are options? Qm Pm MC AC a b c d e

and Natural Monopoly MR D Q* P* Forcing the price P* Means that the social surplus is increased. DWL decreases from abc to dec Society gains adeb Qm Pm MC AC a b c d e Q0

and Monopoly  Other options - set P = MC  But then the firm loses money  Subsidies needed to keep in business  Give away good for free (e.g. road)  Free rider problems  Also new deadweight loss from cost exceeding WTP