1 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e.

2 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e.

3 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation F ERNANDO Q UIJANO, Y VONN Q UIJANO, AND X IAO X UAN X U P R E P A R E D B Y In 1997, a U.S. court blocked the proposed merger of Staples and Office Depot, the nation’s two largest office- supply retailers. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e.

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 4 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. A P P L Y I N G T H E C O N C E P T S 1 2 How does a decrease in demand affect the price of a regulated monopoly? A Decrease in Demand Increases the Price of Cable TV What are the trade-offs with a merger? Satellite Radio Merger Does competition between the second- and third-largest firms matter? Heinz and Beech-Nut Battle for Second Place How does a merger affect prices? Xidex Recovers Its Acquisition Cost in Two Years 3 4

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 5 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. NATURAL MONOPOLY 13.1  FIGURE 13.1 A Natural Monopoly Uses the Marginal Principle to Pick Quantity and Price Because of the indivisible input of cable service (the cable system), the long-run average-cost curve is negatively sloped. The monopolist chooses point a, where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The firm serves 70,000 subscribers at a price of $27 each (point b) and an average cost of $21 (point c). The profit per subscriber is $6 ($27 – $21). Picking an Output Level

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 6 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. NATURAL MONOPOLY 13.1 Picking an Output Level

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 7 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. NATURAL MONOPOLY 13.1 Will a Second Firm Enter?  FIGURE 13.2 Will a Second Cable Firm Enter the Market? The entry of a second cable firm would shift the demand curve of the typical firm to the left. After entry, the firm’s demand curve lies entirely below the long-run average-cost curve. No matter what price the firm charges, it will lose money. Therefore, a second firm will not enter the market.

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 8 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. NATURAL MONOPOLY 13.1 Price Controls for a Natural Monopoly  FIGURE 13.3 Regulators Use Average-Cost Pricing to Pick a Monopoly’s Quantity and Price Under an average-cost pricing policy, the government chooses the price at which the demand curve intersects the long-run average-cost curve—$12 per subscriber. Regulation decreases the price and increases the quantity.

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 9 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. When the population of a city decreases, the demand for all sorts of goods decreases. The decrease in the demand for housing decreases the price of housing. In contrast, the price of cable TV service increases. A higher price for cable service seems to defy the laws of supply and demand. What explains the puzzling increase in price? The key to solving this puzzle is that cable TV is a regulated natural monopoly, with a price equal to the average cost of providing cable service. A decrease in the number of subscribers will cause the cable company to move upward along its negatively sloped average-cost curve to a higher average cost and a higher regulated price. In graphical terms, the demand curve for cable service shifts to the left, so it will intersect the negatively sloped average-cost curve at a higher average cost. There are fewer subscribers to share the large fixed cost of the cable system, so each subscriber must pay more. A DECREASE IN DEMAND INCREASES THE PRICE OF CABLE TV APPLYING THE CONCEPTS #1: How does a decrease in demand affect the price of a regulated monopoly? A P P L I C A T I O N 1

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 10 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. ANTITRUST POLICY 13.2 ● trust An arrangement under which the owners of several companies transfer their decision-making powers to a small group of trustees. Breaking Up Monopolies One form of antitrust policy is to break up a monopoly into several smaller firms. The label “antitrust” comes from the names of the early conglomerates that the government broke up.

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 11 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. ANTITRUST POLICY 13.2 Blocking Mergers ● merger A process in which two or more firms combine their operations. A horizontal merger involves two firms producing a similar product, for example, two producers of pet food. A vertical merger involves two firms at different stages of the production process, for example, a sugar refiner and a candy producer..

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 12 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. ANTITRUST POLICY 13.2 Blocking Mergers  FIGURE 13.4 Pricing by Staples in Cities with and without Competition Using the marginal principle, Staples picks the quantity at which its marginal revenue equals its marginal cost. In a city without a competing firm, Staples picks the monopoly price of $14. In a city where Staples competes with Office Depot, the demand facing Staples is lower, so the profit- maximizing price is only $12.

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 13 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. ANTITRUST POLICY 13.2 Merger Remedy for Wonder Bread In some cases, the government allows a merger to happen but imposes restrictions on the new company.

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 14 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. In 2007, the nation’s only two satellite radio providers, Sirius Satellite Radio and XM Satellite Radio, announced plans to merge into a single firm. Together the two firms had 14 million subscribers, each paying $13 per month for dozens of channels, most of which are free of advertisements. Both firms were losing money as they struggled to get enough subscribers to cover their substantial fixed costs. The proposed merger needed to be approved by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Communication Commission. The key question is whether the elimination of competition between the two firms would lead to higher prices, and how large any price hike would be. In evaluating the merits of the proposed merger, government regulators grappled with the trade-offs between saving costs by avoiding duplication and possible price hikes. Only the future can reveal what will happen to prices. SATELLITE RADIO MERGER APPLYING THE CONCEPTS #2: What are the trade-offs with a merger? A P P L I C A T I O N 2

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 15 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. ANTITRUST POLICY 13.2 Regulating Business Practices: Price-Fixing, Tying, and Cooperative Agreements ● tie-in sales A business practice under which a business requires a consumer of one product to purchase another product. ● predatory pricing A firm sells a product at a price below its production cost to drive a rival out of business and then increases the price.

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 16 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. ANTITRUST POLICY 13.2 The Microsoft Cases In recent years, the most widely reported antitrust actions have involved Microsoft Corporation, the software giant. In the case of United States v. Microsoft Corporation, the judge concluded that Microsoft stifled competition in the software industry.

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 17 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. ANTITRUST POLICY 13.2 A Brief History of U.S. Antitrust Policy

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 18 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. In 2001, H.J. Heinz Company announced plans to buy Milnot Holding Company’s Beech-Nut for $185 million. The merger would combine the nation’s second- and third-largest sellers of baby food, with a combined market share of 28 percent. The combined company would still be less than half the size of the market leader, Gerber, with its 70 percent market share. The FTC successfully blocked the merger, based on two observations: Most retailers stock only two brands of baby food, Gerber and either Heinz or Beech-Nut. After the merger, the Heinz brand would disappear, leaving Beech-Nut as a secure second brand on the shelves next to Gerber. The elimination of competition for second place would lead to higher prices. The smaller the number of firms in an oligopoly, the easier it is to coordinate pricing. In a market with two firms instead of three, it would be easier for the baby-food manufacturers to fix prices. HEINZ AND BEECH-NUT BATTLE FOR SECOND PLACE APPLYING THE CONCEPTS #3: Does competition between the second- and third-largest firms matter? A P P L I C A T I O N 3

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 19 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. The price of one type of microfilm (diazo) increased by 11 percent, and the price of a second type (vesicular) increased by 23 percent. These price hikes were large enough that Xidex recovered the cost of acquiring its two rivals ($4.2 million for Scott Graphics and $6 million for Kalvar) in less than two years. To settle the antitrust lawsuit, Xidex agreed to license its microfilm technology—at bargain prices—to other firms. In 1981, the FTC brought an antitrust suit against Xidex Corporation for its earlier acquisition of two rivals in the microfilm market. By acquiring Scott Graphics, Inc., in 1976 and Kalvar Corporation in 1979, Xidex increased its market share of the U.S. microfilm market from 46 to 71 percent. As a result, the price of microfilm increased: XIDEX RECOVERS ITS ACQUISITION COST IN TWO YEARS APPLYING THE CONCEPTS #4: How does a merger affect prices? A P P L I C A T I O N 4

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 20 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. DEREGULATION: AIRLINES, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND ELECTRICITY 13.3 Deregulation of Airlines Before 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated interstate air travel by limiting entry into the market and controlling prices. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 eliminated most of the entry restrictions and price controls, and the CAB eventually disappeared. Deregulation led to lower prices, which fell by about 28 percent, on average. By 1998, deregulation had generated $24 billion in savings for passengers. Here are the factors that contributed to the lower prices and the percentage of savings for each:

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 21 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. DEREGULATION: AIRLINES, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND ELECTRICITY 13.3 Deregulation of Telecommunication Services The Telecommunications Act of 1996 established new rules to promote competition among firms that transmit video, voice, and data. Several provisions of the act affect the Regional Bell Operating Companies (the Baby Bells) that were formed as a result of the breakup of AT&T in Here are the most important provisions of the act: Local telephone service. Cable TV service. Long-distance service.

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 22 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. DEREGULATION: AIRLINES, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND ELECTRICITY 13.3 Deregulation of Electricity The electricity industry has been regulated as a natural monopoly since its early days. In the 1990s, there was growing pressure to deregulate the electricity market for two reasons: First, technological innovations reduced the economies of scale in electricity generation, so generation was no longer a true natural monopoly. A second factor in the pressure to deregulate was the substantial variation in electricity prices across states.

C H A P T E R 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation 23 of 23 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. merger predatory pricing tie-in sales trust K E Y T E R M S