Week 15 Managerial Economics. Order of Business Homework Assigned Lectures Other Material Lectures for Next Week.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 10 Monopoly, Cartels, and Price Discrimination.
Advertisements

Final Exam 1) 7.5 points Suppose that your factory faces a total product curve that contains the following points: Q of Labor total product
I think the distance (as the crow flies) from Paris, France to Vienna, Austria is in the range of: miles miles miles.
Advanced Pricing Ideas 1. 2 We have looked at a single price monopoly. But perhaps other ways of pricing can lead to greater profits for the sports team.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 1 The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics.
Week 16 Managerial Economics. Bonus Set Pashigian, Chapter 12, Exercise 7.
Week 3 Managerial Economics. Order of Business Homework Assigned Lectures Other Material Lectures for Next Week.
Problem 1 A monopolist has a demand function and a cost function given by the following table. How many should he produce? And what price should he sell.
Week 13 Managerial Economics. Order of Business Homework Assigned Lectures Other Material Lectures for Next Week.
9 Import Tariffs and Quotas under Imperfect Competition 1
Lecture 2: Economics and Optimization AGEC 352 Spring 2011 – January 19 R. Keeney.
Asymmetric Information ECON 370: Microeconomic Theory Summer 2004 – Rice University Stanley Gilbert.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 9 Basic Oligopoly Models.
More Insurance How much insurance We started talking about insurance. Question now is “how much?” Recall that John’s expected utility involves his wealth.
Class Concepts – Advanced Pricing  Advanced Pricing -Use price customization to sell the same good at different prices per unit -Ideally, we would like.
Solution to Three Discrimination Problems. Three Discrimination Problems Joe’s Barber Shop Ethyl’s Bar and Grill Fred’s House of Pancakes.
Week 4 Managerial Economics. Order of Business Homework Assigned Lectures Other Material Lectures for Next Week.
15 Monopoly.
1 Price discrimination A form of Monopoly Power. 2 Our story of monopoly is incomplete. We have seen the case where the monopolist charges all customers.
Taxes, MC pricing, and a wrap-up of supply/demand Today: Finishing the basic ideas of supply and demand theory.
1 1 st degree price discrimination A form of Monopoly Power.
Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Three Discrimination Problems.
Week 8 Managerial Economics. Order of Business Homework Assigned Lectures Other Material Lectures for Next Week.
Week 11 Managerial Economics. Order of Business Homework Assigned Lectures Other Material Lectures for Next Week.
Managerial Economics-Charles W. Upton Competition and Monopoly II Second Part.
Session 4 Pricing Strategy Managerial Economics Professor Changqi Wu.
Three Discrimination Problems. Joe’s Barber Shop Ethyl’s Bar and Grill Fred’s House of Pancakes.
Sunk Costs and Opportunity Costs Break Theory of the Firm Break Team Exercise BA 215 Agenda for Lecture 3.
ECON 101 Tutorial: Week 7 Shane Murphy Office Hours: Monday 3:00-4:00 – LUMS C85.
BU-224 Micro Economics – Week 6 Seminar
Week 14 Managerial Economics. Order of Business Homework Assigned Lectures Other Material Lectures for Next Week.
Chapter 5 Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Linear Pricing.
Copyright © 2008 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Managerial Economics, 9e Managerial Economics Thomas Maurice.
Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Solution to Three Discrimination Problems.
1 1 st degree price discrimination A form of Monopoly Power.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy
Chapter 23 – Perfect Competition Homework – Day 1 Read pages 413 – 423. Stop at "Marginal Cost and Short-Run Supply.” On your own paper in your notebook,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure Jensen and Meckling, JFE, 1976 About 3400 citations.
Copyright © 2014 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Principles of Microeconomics
Explorations in Economics
CH5: SUPPLY Essential Question
Perfect Competition *MADE BY RACHEL STAND* :). I. Perfect Competition: A Model A. Basic Definitions 1. Perfect Competition: a model of the market based.
1 Microeconomics, 2 nd Edition David Besanko and Ronald Braeutigam Chapter 12: Pricing to Capture Surplus Value Prepared by Katharine Rockett © 2006 John.
1 Monopoly and Antitrust Policy Chapter IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND MARKET POWER imperfectly competitive industry An industry in which single firms.
Eco 6351 Economics for Managers Chapter 7. Monopoly Prof. Vera Adamchik.
Perfect Competition CHAPTER 10 © 2016 CENGAGE LEARNING. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. MAY NOT BE COPIED, SCANNED, OR DUPLICATED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, EXCEPT FOR.
1 LECTURE #14: MICROECONOMICS CHAPTER 16 (Chapter 17 in 4 th Edition) Monopolistic Competition.
LECTURE #13: MICROECONOMICS CHAPTER 15
Review Slide Selected Review of Exam 1 Questions.
PowerPoint Slides prepared by: Andreea CHIRITESCU Eastern Illinois University Monopoly 1 © 2012 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied,
Monopoly CHAPTER 12. After studying this chapter you will be able to Explain how monopoly arises and distinguish between single-price monopoly and price-discriminating.
Monopoly and Oligopoly Announcements See web page for all exam information. Please get to exam rooms on time and have your CU ID ready to show the proctor.
1 Chapter 7 Practice Quiz Tutorial Perfect Competition ©2004 South-Western.
Lecture 1 in Contracts Nonlinear Pricing This lecture studies how those who create and administer organizations design the incentives and institutional.
Chapter 10 – Perfect Competition Homework – Day 1 Read pages 220 – 230. Stop at "Marginal Cost and Short-Run Supply.” On your own paper in your notebook,
1 Chapters 12: Product Pricing with Monopoly Power.
 Many small firms  Standardized product  No need to advertise  “Price takers”  Free entry and exit  Perfectly elastic demand  Average revenue.
Chapter 11 Monopoly.
Economics 2010 Lecture 9 Markets and efficiency. Competition and Efficiency  The Key Question  Allocative Efficiency  The Invisible Hand  Obstacles.
Pashigian, Chapter 10, Exercise 3. Since marginal cost is zero, I assume each firm can produce the entire market demand. This sounds to me like a "winner.
Review Demand-oriented Pricing Strategies Consumer Surplus.
Chapter Monopoly 15. In economic terms, why are monopolies bad? Explain. 2.
Marketing I Curriculum Guide. Pricing Standard 4.
Adverse Selection. What Is Adverse Selection Adverse selection in health insurance exists when you know more about your likely use of health services.
Perfect Competition - Final. Objectives Investigate firms’ costs under perfect competition Explain the meaning and implication of shut down point Discuss.
Vertical Markets: Double Marginalization Todd Kaplan.
The analytics of constrained optimal decisions microeco nomics spring 2016 dynamic pricing (I) ………….1setup ………….2 uniform pricing assignment eight ………….4.
Maximizing Profit with Cost Curves
Presentation transcript:

Week 15 Managerial Economics

Order of Business Homework Assigned Lectures Other Material Lectures for Next Week

Homework-Last Week

Pashigian, Chapter 11, Exercise 3

I would expect expense preference to fall. Thus I would expect profits to rise

Pashigian, Chapter 11, Exercise 7

The statement means that the bonus or compensation of the CEO would be reduced to the extent of expense preference. Obviously this depends on the effectiveness of the board of directors as an internal monitor.

Pashigian, Chapter 12, Exercise 2

In both cases, the vendors want to set MR = MC. We know that the marginal cost of a hot dog is $0.15. Now let's look at marginal revenues.

For Yankee Fans, revenue is PQ = ( Q) Q = 4Q Q 2. Differentiating, marginal revenue is thus Q, and that is equal to 0.15 when Q = Rearranging terms, we get that Q = , so that Q = 385. Plugging that into the demand curve, we know that P = 4 - (0.005)(385) = = $2.075

In the case of Red Sox fans, the relevant revenue is ( Q)Q = 2.25Q Q 2, and, differentiating, we know that marginal revenue equals marginal cost when Q = Solving, we qet Q = 105, and, plugging into the inverse demand function, we get P = = $1.20.

Thus Yankees pay $2.075; Sox fans pay $1.20; Yankees consume 385 hot dogs, while the Sox consume 105. As to the profit of each vendor, he sells 490 hot dogs at a cost of $0.15 each or $ His revenues are $2.075 (385) + $1.20 (105) = $ , His profits are $ $73.50 = $

Your answer may be slightly different if you rounded the price the Yankee fans pay to $2.08.

Acme Widgets has conducted an exhaustive study of its 5,000 customers, and found that each one has a demand function Q = 15- 3p. Right now, it charges $2 a widget. The widgets cost essentially nothing to produce. How much profit is it making per customer? At what price would you sell widgets to maximize profits? Thomas Bednarz, a local inventor has come up with a device that would allow Acme to license widgets, so that they would not be transferable from one customer to another. Bednarz has offered to license the device to Acme for $110,000 per year. Explain why Acme should reject the offer, but should accept if Bednarz cuts his price to $80,000 per year. In addition, explain how they should change their selling policies if they accept his offer.

At $2 each, it is selling each customer 9 widgets for profits of $18 per customer or $45,000 total.

. The profit maximizing price would be where MR = 0. We know that total revenue equals Qp. From our demand function, we know that 3= 5 – (1/3)Q. Thus total revenue equals 5Q – 1/3Q 2. Marginal revenue is thus 5 – (2/3)Q, and equals zero when Q = 7.5,

That means a price of $2.50 as we can see by plugging into the demand function. Though you are not asked to compute this number, they are making (7.5)(2.5) = $18.75 per customer, for a total profit of $93,750.

If they buy the Bednarz device, they can exact all the consumer surplus from each customer. Each customer has surplus of (1/2)(15)(5) = $37.50 for total consumer surplus of $187,500. This profit would be $187,500 - $93,750 = $93, 750

Of course $93,750 is more than they are currently making. But if they have to pay Bednarz $110,000, they would lose money on the deal. At $80,000 they make $13,750 net.

You have all read about the recent spate of corporate scandals in which agents fundamentally failed their duties to principals. Propose a remedy. Be sure to show how your remedy is thoughtful and realistic and gives appropriate recognition to the necessity to provide agents incentives. … Illustrate your proposal by reference to one of the existing scandals (Enron, World Com, and Health South come to mind. You can use others but you must give me a reference to a web site summarizing the facts so I can familiarize myself with the case. …. Obviously there is no right or wrong answer to this question, so I will be looking for thoughtful reasoned responses. And, sorry no group answers.

No pat answer

Homework- Due this Week

Pashigian, Chapter 12, Exercise 7

Pashigian, Chapter 12, Exercise 8

Pashigian, Chapter 12, Exercise 10

The Damon’s restaurant in Kent offers 25% off any lunch tab Monday through Saturday to any Kent Faculty Staff or Student with an ID.. Damons explains that this offer is made to show appreciation to the university community for its support throughout the year. Explain what important economics lesson you think the Damon’s manager has learned.

Ethyl’s Bar and Grill has two types of customers. Their demand functions for drinks are Q = 12- 3p and Q = 24-8p. While Ethyl cannot tell the two types apart, she can prevent arbitrage. Devise a pricing system (You may assume the marginal cost of a drink is zero)

Fred has pancake houses in Seattle and Youngstown, Ohio. The demand functions for pancakes are Seattle Q = P Youngstown Q = 90 – 30 P You may assume that marginal cost is zero. What price should Fred charge if the Uniform Pancake Pricing Act (UPPA) becomes law (That is, Fred is constrained to charge the same price at both restaurants). What prices should Fred charge otherwise?.

Lectures for This Week The Free Rider Asymmetric Information Asymmetric Information 2 Moral Hazard Applying the Premium for Honesty

The Free Rider

Asymmetric Information Asymmetric Information 2

Moral Hazard

Applying the Premium for Honesty

Pashigian, Chapter 14, Exercises 2, 6, 7, 10

Lectures for Next Week