Conflict and Commitment

War from Commitment Problems 1.Bargaining over goods that effect future bargaining power (e.g., strategic territory, weapons programs, disarmament of rebel groups) 2.Bargaining in the shadow of large shifts in relative power (e.g., rapid economic growth, acquisition of new weapons) 3.Bargaining in the shadow of first-strike advantages

Bargaining over Objects of Power: The Example of Coercive Disarmament US ideal point: NK ends nuclear program and democratizes NK ideal point: US recognizes NK and its right to nuclear weapons Possible attack outcome: US eliminates some NK weapons w NK w US Possible deal: NK agrees to disarm in exchange for aid p

Bargaining over Objects of Power: The Example of Coercive Disarmament w NK w US p NK’s disarmament increases US relative power, shifting the expected war outcome: US can now force NK to accept an even worse deal, such as instituting political reforms. Anticipating this, NK could be better off fighting in the first place, rather than agreeing to disarm. w NK w US p

War from Commitment Problems 1.Bargaining over goods that effect future bargaining power (e.g., strategic territory, weapons programs) 2.Bargaining in the shadow of large shifts in relative power (e.g., rapid economic growth, acquisition of new weapons) 3.Bargaining in the shadow of first-strike advantages

Bargaining with Shifting Power wAwA wBwB p wAwA wBwB p Today: Tomorrow:

War from Commitment Problems 1.Bargaining over goods that effect future bargaining power (e.g., strategic territory, weapons programs) 2.Bargaining in the shadow of large shifts in relative power (e.g., rapid economic growth, acquisition of new weapons) 3.Bargaining in the shadow of first-strike advantages

Bargaining with First-Strike Advantages wAwA wBwB pwAwA wBwB p When there are first-strike advantages, the outcomes and values for war depend upon which side starts it: Bargaining space if A strikes first Bargaining space if B strikes first There is no deal that both sides prefer to striking first.

Empirical Implications Factors that make war more likely –Strategic vs. non-strategic goods –The disarmament problem in civil conflict –Rapid economic growth/temporary economic shocks Factors that might reduce the likelihood of war –Third-party guarantees, monitoring