Feedback Based Routing Offense by: Ted Merchant and Kevin Tan.

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Presentation transcript:

Feedback Based Routing Offense by: Ted Merchant and Kevin Tan

Paper is vauge - No mention of how this routing system will be implemented in the “wild” Internet. - How is the tree to be used by this routing system going to be built? - What will be the standard format used for the rule sets? No standard format mentioned at all in the paper. Rule sets are important to the routing system in the paper.

Paper is vauge (cont.)‏ - How often should routes get recomputed? The paper never mentions an appropriate time interval at all. (How long should the backup route have to be used before the best route can be used again?)‏

Lack of testing - The paper never mentions any testing on this routing system on... anything. - The paper makes lots of high-level assumptions without any testing results or measurements to back it up.

DoS defense - The end host can tell its access router to make a negative rule to accommodate the attack pattern of a malicious host. - Requires the access router to look at all of the packets and figure out if the packets match the attack pattern. This is not an easy thing to check, and the situation worsens when the access router has a lot of such situations to check.

DoS defense - Malicious or ignorant end hosts who make false reports of DoS attacks can make the situation even more problematic. - If malicious host gains control of the access router, he could tell the router to block access to a certain host, causing other routers to block access as well. Remedying this situation is difficult, and, even if the situation is eventually resolved, a significant amount of time (and money) has already been lost.

Other security risks - A malicious host who has gain controlled of the access router can instruct the access router to always use the longest route possible. This attack is also more difficult to detect than a DoS attack, which can be problematic.

Disjoint routes - This routing system always try to choose the most independent (disjoint) routes as the main route and the backup route. - Sometimes, the route chosen as the backup route is of poor quality. - In addition, if the recomputation interval is very long, users will be forced to use the poor quality backup route for a long time.

Questions? Comments? The usual.