Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton More on Compensation.

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Presentation transcript:

Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton More on Compensation

Compensation based on inputs or outputs –Pay by the hour or –Pay by the job

More on Compensation Inputs or Outputs Pay by Inputs –You get paid by the hour or month Pay by Outputs –You get paid by output.

More on Compensation Piecework Piecework seems the way to go where it is easy to measure productivity.

More on Compensation Piecework Piecework seems the way to go where it is easy to measure productivity. There are situations where monitoring is quite difficult.

More on Compensation Piecework Piecework seems the way to go where it is easy to measure productivity. There are situations where monitoring is quite difficult. –Suppose you pay a lettuce picker by the pounds of lettuce picked. –Workers will not look at the quality of heads and will overlook smaller heads.

More on Compensation Piecework Output is stochastic. –A salesman’s success depends in part on skills and motivation (which argues for piecework) and in part on factors beyond his control –A risk averse salesman will prefer not to be paid on output.

More on Compensation Piecework An aside Any waiter or waitress would prefer to work weekends: the tips are better. A sensible restaurant requires that all wait staff work weekdays as well

More on Compensation Piecework Work is often a team effort. –Workers paid strictly on piecework may not maximize total output. In sum, the choice of how to pay workers is not straightforward.

More on Compensation Piecework In sum, the choice of how to pay workers is not straightforward.

More on Compensation Using Wage Policy as an Incentive Mechanism Suppose I have employees whose performance is difficult to monitor.

More on Compensation Using Wage Policy as an Incentive Mechanism Suppose I have employees whose performance is difficult to monitor. Pay a premium, where they lose the premium if they are caught mis-performing.

More on Compensation Using Wage Policy as an Incentive Mechanism Suppose I have employees whose performance is difficult to monitor. Pay a premium, where they lose the premium if they are caught mis-performing. –Police officers –McDonald’s Franchises –Bank Tellers

More on Compensation An Example John Smith and Bill Wilson are both product managers for Baker Electronics.

More on Compensation An Example John Smith and Bill Wilson are both product managers for Baker Electronics. They know that when a senior product manager’s slot opens, it will be filled by “promotion from within”.

More on Compensation An Example That way they are best motivated to do their job. –Smith and Wilson can be paid the same salary, even though Smith is a better worker. –There will be a little griping about salary, but Smith will get his reward through a promotion.

More on Compensation An Example Now suppose that it appears that Smith is the better worker, but it may take a year or two before that is clear.

More on Compensation An Example Now suppose that it appears that Smith is the best worker, but it may take a year or two before that is clear. Smith has brought in all sorts of profitable clients for the firm. He deserves a reward of (say) $25,000 for that. It may turn out however that the clients will turn out to be unprofitable, perhaps because Smith made promises that can be kept only at high cost.

More on Compensation An Example Why not give Smith a promotion and a $5,000 a year increase in pay? If it turns out a year from now that Smith screwed up, he can be fired.

More on Compensation An Example There is a drawback. Smith and Wilson may need to work together, and the opportunities for “back- stabbing” seem to grow when they are competing for the same job.

More on Compensation Summary We have only scratched the surface. Compensation policy would be easy if we could monitor performance at no cost. We cannot, so it becomes more complicated.

More on Compensation End ©2003 Charles W. Upton