Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Ethics Material philosophy has to do with specific objects and the laws governing them –Physics is the science of the laws of nature –Ethics is the science of the laws of freedom Ethics has an empirical part, in that its laws concern a human will that is affected by nature The moral law concerns what ought to happen but may not in fact happen

The Moral Law The moral law is the a priori part of ethics –It contains nothing empirical It governs with absolute necessity It applies to all rational beings and does not depend on the nature of man or the circumstances in the world It must be sought in pure reason The moral law must guide our actions if they are to be good

Good Will Only a good will is good without qualification The virtues of the mind (e.g., intelligence) and of temperament (e.g., courage) can become bad if the will is bad The same holds for external goods that complete the ancient conception of happiness A good will is a necessary condition for being worthy of happiness It is good in itself, through its willing, not through any utility it might have

Reason and Happiness Reason is not well-suited by nature for the attainment of happiness Happiness would be better entrusted to instinct So if reason has a purpose, it must be something other than happiness Its true function is to produce a good will Good of the will is higher than happiness

Duty and Inclination We may act from duty, inclination, or selfish purpose Sometimes we do from selfish purpose what duty calls for, without inclination –A prudent merchant charges a fixed price Sometimes we do from inclination what duty calls for –Preserving one’s own life Sometimes we act purely from duty –Preserving one’s life when one does not wish to live

Moral Worth Only actions performed purely from duty have moral worth Acts that overcome inclinations and selfish purposes and arise from duty have the highest moral worth Even promotion of happiness has moral worth only insofar as it is done as duty

Maxims Moral worth is not found in the end of an action, but in the maxim that determines it The maxim is the principle that moves the will to action The rational maxim of duty is to follow the law even if it thwarts the inclinations The highest moral good is the representation of the moral law

Respect for Law The moral law motivates us without recourse to inclination or effects The only motivating principle remaining is to act out of respect for law One should act only on those maxims one can will to be a universal law

An Example I am in distress, and to alleviate my situation I might make a promise with the intention of breaking it I might act according to the maxim, “make dishonest promises when in trouble” Making this maxim universal might lead to bad consequences for me The moral, rather than practical, reason for rejecting it is that the maxim would destroy itself if it were made universal

Moral Philosophy The moral law is accessible to everyone We do not need science or philosophy to be able to tell right from wrong Still, we need to investigate the moral law philosophically due to the bad influence of inclinations and needs (desire for happiness) This can corrupt the purity of the moral law

The Dear Self It is difficult to find cases of acting purely from duty Philosophers have thus claimed that our motivation for acting is self-love We cannot even tell in ourselves whether this is a secret motivation We always seem to find the dear self at the basis of our actions Whether we have ever done it or not, we ought to do our duty

Pure Practical Reason The moral law commands all rational beings It could do so only if is valid with absolute necessity, subject to no contingencies Such a law can be found only in pure practical reason, not in knowledge of human nature It cannot be derived from examples Even the concept of God as the highest good is derived from the idea of moral perfection

Will and Reason Everything that happens in nature is the result of laws Human action is based on our rational conception of laws (principles) Human will may be determined by principles Or it may be determined by inclination If determined by principles, it follows the command of reason, which determines what one ought to do

Imperatives A divine will would always obey the moral law, so there is nothing it ought to do Humans do not always obey All imperatives command in one of two ways –Hypothetically: one should do this to accomplish that end –Categorically: one should do this as objectively necessary in itself Only a categorical imperative declares what is good in itself

Hypothetical Imperatives The end in a hypothetical imperative might be good or not Children are trained to achieve many varied ends, without regard to their good The natural end of human action is happiness Skill in choosing means to the end of happiness is prudence

Prudence Hypothetical imperatives are possible because willing the ends requires willing the means (that in one’s power) to the ends But how do we will the end of happiness? There is immense confusion over which means will promote it Wealth, knowledge, even health all can lead to unhappiness So there are only empirical counsels for happiness, never commands for happiness

Categorical Imperatives Categorical imperatives to not prescribe means to an end Apparent categorical imperatives may be disguised hypotheticals –One may adopt a maxim against telling false promises so as to remain credible So, we need to look to pure reason, not examples, to see how categorical imperatives are possible The categorical imperative is an a priori synthetic principle

The Categorical Imperative The only element of a categorical imperative that can be determined in advance is conformity to universal law This gives the content of a single imperative: act in such a way that the maxim of the action can serve as a universal law Or: act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature through your will

Perfect Duties to Ourselves A perfect duty admits of no exception in the interests of inclination We have a perfect duty to preserve our own life, even if self-love would dictate ending it I cannot universalize the maxim of suicide without destroying all of life So one must act on the maxim of preserving one’s own life, which can be universalized

Perfect Duties to Others We have a perfect duty to others to make honest promises, even when dishonesty would help us out of difficulty I cannot universalize the maxim of making false promises without destroying all trust If all trust is destroyed, my promise would not then serve my interests So one must act on the maxim that one must make honest promises

Imperfect Duties to Ourselves An imperfect duty is one which permits exceptions in the interests of inclination We have an imperfect duty to develop our talents I cannot universalize the maxim of indulging in pleasure Life would go on, but our rational abilities would go to waste So one must act on the maxim that one develop one’s talents to the greatest extent possible

Imperfect Duties to Others We have an imperfect duty to help others I cannot universalize a maxim of letting others get along on their own Life would go on, with less hypocrisy, but if everyone behaved this way, I might find myself without help when in need So one must act on the maxim of helping others

The Unity of the Duties All duties are derived from a single principle: that we be able to will the maxim of our action to be a universal law Acting against a perfect duty requires a maxim which cannot be thought of as a universal law of nature Acting against an imperfect duty requires a maxim which can be so thought, but which cannot be willed to be a universal law of nature

Transgression When we transgress our duties, we do not give up their claim to be universal law objectively Instead, we subjectively make an exception to the law to serve our own inclinations, in which case the law is only general There is no contradiction here, since it is reason that upholds objective universality and inclination that promotes only subjective generality So, even transgression of the categorical imperative acknowledges its validity

Justification Is there a categorical imperative that is binding on all rational beings? Justification cannot depend on an account of human nature, but must be a priori –A principle based on human nature could not be an objective law valid for all rational beings But it is tempting to appeal to empirical motives and laws, given the difficulty of justifying objective laws a priori

Ends Ends are what determine the will to action There are two kinds of ends –Objective ends, which are valid for every rational being, based on reason alone, and depending on motives –Subjective ends, which are arbitrarily proposed as the effect of one’s action, based on desire, and depending on incentives Subjective ends can be grounds for only hypothetical imperatives

An End in Itself An objective end could be a ground for a categorical imperative Rational beings (persons) are objective ends, ends in themselves It is a categorical imperative that they may not be arbitrarily used as means to some other ends Non-rational beings are not ends in themselves and may be used as means

The Examples Revisited Suicide is not permitted because it treats one’s self as a means to an end (relief) Making false promises requires using another person as a means to my ends Neglecting to develop one’s capacities is inconsistent with the advancement of the end of humanity Not furthering the ends of others is inconsistent with the fact that because they are ends in themselves, their ends are my ends

Legislation Insofar as everyone must be treated as an end in itself, we are not free to treat them as our subjective inclinations dictate The law constraining inclination is a universal law The universal law comes from the rational will So, a categorical imperative is to act only on a maxim that is consistent with a law which is legislated by the rational will When we act out of duty, we act in a way that is not based on any interest

Autonomy The will acts autonomously when it dictates a law for itself –If it acts for some interest, then it acts heteronomously Previous attempts to discover the moral law all presume a heteronomous will –For example, divine law is backed by a system of rewards and punishment As such, they were all doomed to failure

The Kingdom of Ends A kingdom is “a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws” The moral law requires that we treat other rational beings as ends in themselves So, it presupposes the possibility of a kingdom of ends –Each rational being is a legislator in the kingdom –Each rational being is subject to the laws of reason The laws of the kingdom of ends have in view the relation to one another as ends in themselves

Dignity Everything in the kingdom of ends has a price or a dignity –A price is worth based on inclination –A dignity is an intrinsic worth based on something’s being an end in itself, beyond all price Only morality and humanity have dignity, based on autonomy All the other virtues have a price of some sort (skill at work, wit, etc.) Keeping of promises, e.g., provides “immediate favor and delight,” as well as respect

Absolutely Good Will A will is absolutely good when it cannot be evil –Its maxim cannot be in conflict with itself it willed to be a universal law The categorical imperative is the supreme law of an absolutely good will –Obedience to the categorical imperative is the only way to avoid self-conflict The end of the actions of a good will must be an end in itself The good will legislates universal law

Happiness Moral principles based on the promotion of happiness are based on experience Happiness is construed as a physical or moral feeling The worst form of such a principle is that of one’s own happiness (egoism) There are three problems –Being well is not the same as doing well –Being prudent is not the same as being morally virtuous –Motives of virtue are on a par with motives of vice

Moral Feeling The principle that the good act is one that elicits happy moral feeling is superior to egoism It values morality for its own sake But appeal to it is superficial –Due to variation in people, are not a uniform standard of moral appraisal –No one person’s feelings can be the basis of the judgments of everyone’s actions

Rational Principles of Morality Philosophers have tried to base morality on a concept of perfection The ontological concept is empty and presupposes the morality it is supposed to explain The theological concept of perfection is that of a divine will –We have no understanding of divine properties except on the model of our own –If it is not derived from our concept of morality, it would be based on notions such as domination and vengeance, which are opposed to morality

Freedom The will is a causality that living beings have insofar as they are rational Freedom is a property of this causality, where the will acts independently of alien causes This conception of freedom is negative Positive freedom is autonomy: the will dictates a law to itself, the moral law So, a free will is one which is subject to moral law

Practical Reason Practical reason is the will of a rational being A will cannot be rational if it is directed by something other than itself, e.g., impulse So, a rational will can be directed only by itself So, a rational will must be considered to be free (in the positive sense) This is so even though we cannot demonstrate the metaphysical reality of freedom

Our Interest in Morality Why should I subject myself to the moral law? It is not that so doing will serve my interests The answer is that I would do so insofar as I am a rational being and am not hindered But I am also a sensible being and am subject to inclinations, so I only ought to obey the moral law

A Circle? We suppose that we are free of external causes so that we can understand how we are subject to moral laws But we think of ourselves as being subject to moral laws only because we suppose that we are free, autonomous, wills So it seems that freedom depends on morality and morality depends on freedom

Resolution When we think of ourselves as free from external causes, these causes are in the order of appearances When we think of the will as an autonomous cause, this cause is in the order of things in themselves There is a faculty in human beings which is distinct from all external causes: reason Rational causality can be thought only as freedom

Duality All my actions, viewed as appearances, can be explained in terms of desires and inclinations If I were a purely intelligible being, all my actions would be explained by freedom Since I am both sensible and intelligible, the laws of freedom express only what I ought to do Even the “meanest villain” recognizes that he would conform to the moral law if he were not such a slave to his impulses

Compatibilism There is no contradiction between freedom of the will and natural necessity –We think of the human being in different ways in each case So, natural necessity, which we know a priori holds, is no threat to freedom Inclinations and impulses are not all-controlling But on the other hand, we cannot explain anything in the natural world through freedom, which is a mere idea

The Limit of Moral Inquiry Moral feeling is not a criterion of morality Our pure interest in the moral law (membership in the kingdom of ends) is the basis of moral feeling Moral feeling, in turn, is what moves us to act in the world of appearances But we cannot understand how something intelligible explains something sensible We only have an idea of a reason that serves as a causality in and of itself This is the limit of all moral inquiry